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This thesis seeks to provide a deeper understanding of the Scots law of fraud. 
Adopting a method that is both historical and doctrinal, it provides a critical analysis 
of the current understanding of fraud and argues for an approach that is more 
consistent with Scotland’s legal history which, in turn, was profoundly influenced by 
a much older tradition of European legal thought.  
It begins by exploring the historical scope of fraud in both a criminal and civil 
context with specific focus on questions of definition and the extent to which “fraud” 
was used in the broader sense of activities not involving deceit. A detailed analysis is 
given of the widespread concept of presumptive fraud by means of which Scots law 
was able to provide a remedy for unfair or unwarrantable behaviour without any 
requirement for a deceitful intention and for misstatements made unintentionally. 
The argument is made that presumptive fraud was a mechanism for delivering 
substantive justice and that its conceptual roots lie in an Aristotelian understanding 
of justice as equality. A comparison is made between the scholastic doctrine of 
restitution, which was developed by Thomas Aquinas as the outworking of the 
Aristotelian virtue of justice, and the scheme of Scots law created in the Institutions 
of the Law of Scotland by Viscount Stair (1619-1695), who is said to be the founding 
father of Scots law. It is suggested that the religious and philosophical conditions 
which existed in seventeenth century Scotland were particularly fertile soil for 
scholastic legal ideas which conceptualised law within a moral and religious 
framework. 
The second half of the thesis undertakes a doctrinal analysis of fraud in three parts. 
First, the complex relationship between fraud, error and misrepresentation is 
examined and the case is made that misrepresentation, whether intentional or 
unintentional, sits more comfortably in the law of fraud than in the law of error. 
Secondly, modern legal literature is critically assessed and the dominant modern 
narrative – that error induced by misrepresentation is a native concept in Scots law – 
6 
 
is questioned. Thirdly, a new taxonomy of fraud is proposed which distinguishes 
between primary and secondary fraud. The operation of secondary fraud (which 
amounts to “participation” in the primary fraud of another and therefore involves 
three-party situations) is explored through the application of two familiar legal 
maxims: the “fraud” principle (that no one should be enriched through the fraud of 
another) and the good faith purchaser for value. In the context of secondary fraud, it 
is argued that the criteria for its operation - mala fides and a gratuitous transaction - 
are both core components of the older concept of presumptive fraud. The thesis 
comes full circle as it is suggested that while the broader equitable definition of 
fraud, rooted in equality, may have disappeared in the context of primary fraud, 
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Fraud is an amorphous and ill-defined concept and, to add to the difficulties of 
definition, it means different things in different contexts.  In its primary meaning it 
involves dishonesty and deception and can trigger both criminal and civil liability, 
for it is both a crime and a civil wrong.  In modern Scots law fraud is most 
commonly described, using Erskine’s formulation, as “a machination or contrivance 
to deceive”,
1
 itself a rendition of the classic or Labeonic definition of dolus malus in 
Justinian’s Digest: omnem calliditatem fallaciam machinationem ad 
circumveniendum fallendum decipiendum alterum adhibitam.
2
 In this guise fraud, as 
well as being a crime, has long been recognised as “the paradigm of an intentional 
delict”
3
 and as a factor vitiating consent in voluntary transactions, grounds for the 
annulment of a contract and for reduction of a property transaction.  
 
This thesis seeks to add to the current understanding of the Scots law of fraud. Its 
focus is a definitional one, charting the changing concept of fraud from a broad 
principle of substantive injustice, underpinned by the principle of inequality, to the 
narrow modern definition of fraud as intentional deceit.  The method used to 
examine the law of fraud is both doctrinal and historical. Doctrinal analysis is 
conducted in its historical context using primary source materials, the judgments of 
the Scottish courts and the Institutional texts, with reference to the extensive 
secondary literature in the field. A further historical dimension is provided by 
examining the influence of the Aristotelian concept of justice, mediated by Thomas 
Aquinas, which influenced Scots law in a significant way. 
 
                                                 
1




 Thomson (2009) para 2.10.  
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This study does not attempt to restate the modern law of fraud, much of which is 
settled, nor does it attempt to resolve all of the contested issues raised by academic 
commentators and by an extensive body of case law. However, it does address the 
definitional question of what constitutes fraud in both a criminal and a civil context. 
Its particular focus lies in the outer boundaries of fraud and the extent to which the 
label of fraud can be extended beyond intentional deceit. In both a criminal and a 
civil context, this is territory which borders on moral as much as legal standards and 
the perennial question of the boundary between law and morality. Is fraud in its older 
sense of unconscionable
4
 behaviour or bad faith relevant to Scots law in the twenty-
first century and, if so, can the concept be rationalised so that it is grounded in 
principles that can be articulated, that have boundaries and that can usefully be 
applied?   
 
It is suggested that existing academic treatments have been too quick to settle on the 
narrow definition of fraud derived from Derry v Peek,
5
 not because doing so 
represents a break with previous Scottish tradition (although that is undoubtedly 
true), but because adopting such a restrictive concept of fraud has disabled Scots law 
from developing a methodology and a taxonomy for dealing with substantive 
unfairness. The late nineteenth century in particular was a period when the House of 
Lords found it necessary to reverse a series of Scottish fraud cases in order to give 
redress for perceived injustice in the decisions of the Court of Session.
6
 Horns were 
locked in a familiar ideological battle between certainty and commercial interest on 
the one hand and substantive fairness on the other. And the judgments of the Inner 
House at times appear constrained by a narrow legal formalism which casts doubt on 
                                                 
4
 “Unwarrantable” is the term often used by the Scottish courts; for instance, in Trinch v Watson 
(1669) Mor 4958 a disposition granted by a vulnerable women was described as “very unwarrantable” 
and reduced “as being presumed fraudulent and unwarrantable”. See also Gordon v Crauford (1730) 1 
Paton 47; Erskine, Institute III.1.13, reparation must be made for “every fraudulent contrivance, or 
unwarrantable act”. 
5
 (1889) LR 14 App Cas 337. 
6
 Most of these cases concerned either fraud or error: McPherson’s Trs v Watt (1878) 5 R (HL) 9;  
Knox v Mackinnon (1888) 15 R (HL) 83; Raes v Meek (1889) 16 R (HL) 31; Stewart v Kennedy 
(1890) 17 R (HL) 25; Menzies v Menzies 1893 20 R (HL) 108; Carruthers v Carruthers (1896) 23 R 
(HL) 55; Mair v Rio Grande Rubber Est. Ltd 1913 SC (HL) 74. The late twentieth century saw a 
similar phenomenon, for instance Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC (HL) 111; Sharp v Thomson 
1997 SC (HL) 66. 
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the boast of legal nationalists
7 
such as TB Smith and Lord Cooper that Scots law 




All legal systems from the ancient Greeks and Romans to the modern European 
codifications contain mechanisms for addressing substantive injustice, often through 




[The principles of bona fides] thus contribute ... to the realisation of a social 
ideal. Without this constant regard for fairness and justice Roman law would 
not have survived throughout the ages; and the modern codifications, too, 
would soon have become useless and outdated, had they not provided space 
for the operation of bona fides. 
 
Historically, Scots law appears to have used bona fides in a “glass half empty” way 
and has used the concept of fraud,
10
 broadly defined, to address substantive 
unfairness or inequality. Since the nineteenth century there have been consistent 
attempts to limit its scope in the interests of commercial freedom. However, this 
approach contains a risk that the law is brought into disrepute, and it is arguably 
moving in a different direction from other European jurisdictions.
11
 It is perhaps 
going too far to say that the Scots law of fraud could become “useless and outdated”, 
but at a time of broader European legal development, it is certainly timely to examine 
where we are and how we got here. And, at a time when another sea-change may be 
in the air in the aftermath of an economic crisis that has travelled around the globe 
and created in western Europe the worst economic conditions since the second world 
war; when banks, corporations and the financial sector have been demonised in 
popular culture and in the media and may be subjected to government sanctions; 
                                                 
7
 On legal nationalism and the “Cooper–Smith ideology” see MacQueen (2005b) and references 
cited therein at n.1; Osler (2007). 
8
 A typical example can be found in Smith (1962b) p.89: “Contact with English law... has had the 
result in “mixed” systems of restricting interpretation of broader and more satisfactory principles 
which had been established before the infiltration of English influence”.  
9
 Schermaier (2000) p.92. 
10
 Sometimes mala fides is also used in this sense, but usually only in the context of secondary fraud, 
as outlined in ch.7 pp.249-255. 
11
 Sefton-Green (2005). 
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when the model of perpetual growth and unrestrained markets is beginning to be 
questioned as the sole economic paradigm;
12
 and when the balance between support 
for commercial risk-taking and protection of the public may have reached a tipping 
point it is apposite to re-evaluate the tangled history of fraud to see if it still 
embodies principles that help to translate law into justice.  
 
Stair’s Institutions of the Laws of Scotland provided the legal and philosophical 
foundations for modern Scots law, and his text will be the main historical point of 
reference in this study. That is not to deny the importance of later Institutional 
writers, but it is in Stair’s account that the fundamental principles are best articulated 
at a conceptual level. In addition, my overall argument rests on demonstrating the 
influence of Aquinas’ theory of liability on Stair specifically. A comparison is also 
made with the modern doctrinal analysis of fraud which demonstrates that, in relation 
to fraud, those foundational principles of justice did not withstand the onslaught of 
countervailing forces (both legal and philosophical) which were to affect Scotland so 
profoundly over the course of the two centuries after the publication of Stair’s 
Institutions. I will also suggest that Stair provided a model that was more internally 
coherent than the one we have in the twenty-first century. 
 
The principal aim of this thesis is to explore the definition of fraud in its historical 
context. From its early roots as a manifestation of inequality to its modern 
formulation as deception, a new narrative is offered which contends that it was not 
the influence of English law which narrowed the older concept of fraud, but rather 
that the Scottish courts were already working towards that position. The influential 
case of Derry v Peek merely provided authority for a phenomenon which was 
Scottish at root, and it is suggested that some of impetus for change can be attributed 





                                                 
12
 For harsh critique of the current economic model see Harvey (2010); Hutton (2011). 
13
 See further ch. 3 pp.126-131. 
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In the process of developing this narrative it has proved necessary to examine the law 
of error as well as the law of fraud, for as the definition of fraud narrowed many of 
the functions it fulfilled in the older law – functions which operated as a delivery 
mechanism for substantive justice in a very wide range of circumstances, but chiefly 
in relation to unintentional misstatements – were transferred to the law of error. In 
the process, this has created one of the least rational doctrines in modern Scots 
private law. It is suggested that the rules of fraud contain a more coherent structure 
for dealing with misrepresentation than the current law of error. 
 
Finally, a new taxonomy of fraud is developed which differentiates between primary 
fraud and secondary fraud. Primary fraud is the territory of wrongdoing which takes 
place between two parties, whether criminal or civil. Analysis becomes more 
difficult when three parties are involved and in three-party situations fraud appears to 
operate in a different way, as an exception to the usual rules. This is what I will refer 
to as secondary fraud, in modern terminology often referred to as bad faith.
14
 By 
exploring the parameters of both and the relationship between the two, it is hoped 
that a more solid foundation will be laid for the doctrine of fraud.  
 
Chapter 1 begins by examining the criminal law of fraud through the lens of the civil 
law. There is particular focus on the relationship between fraud, theft and breach of 
trust; the doctrine of vitium reale; and the divergent definitions of fraud which have 
emerged in criminal and civil law. 
 
Chapter 2 provides the first detailed analysis of the broad concept of fraud which 
operated prior to the nineteenth century. It examines three concepts which were often 
designated as fraudulent: mala fides; the principle that culpa lata aequiperatur dolo; 
and the wider doctrine of presumptive fraud. The purpose is to demonstrate the fact 
that fraud extended far beyond intentional deceit as a well-established historical 
pattern. 
                                                 
14
 In the context of property transfers, where formerly “fraud” was used to describe the behaviour of a 
second purchaser acting in knowledge of a first purchaser’s prior right, it has been suggested that 
“[m]odern statements of the principle ask whether a second purchaser was in good or bad faith”, 




Chapter 3 examines the historical roots of the principle of inequality inherent in 
presumptive fraud. The Aristotelian concept of justice as equality, which was 
developed by Thomas Aquinas and the scholastic moral theologians of the Counter-
Reformation, offers important structural insights into Stair’s Institutions. 
 
Chapter 4 provides an account of the transformation of fraud over the course of the 
nineteenth century. It includes detailed analysis of the fundamentally important case 
of Derry v Peek, and its effects on both the law of England and the law of Scotland.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the complex relationship between fraud, error and 
misrepresentation and argues that as the definition of fraud narrowed many of its 
functions were transferred to the law of error and that this development was 
misconceived. 
 
Chapter 6 critically reviews the modern law of fraud, as expressed by legal 
commentators, and the relationship between fraud and error.  
 
Chapter 7 explores the concept of secondary fraud, as expressed in two familiar legal 
maxims: the “fraud” principle (that no one should be enriched through the fraud of 
another) and the good faith purchaser for value.  It returns to Aquinas’ account of 
restitution as an important reference point for the conceptual underpinning of 
accessory liability and the doctrine of the particeps fraudis. 
 
Part of this thesis was published in 2008 in the Journal of Legal History and is 









Chapter 1: Lessons from the Criminal Law of Fraud 
 
Stair says that fraud is “of a criminal nature”
15
 and criminal fraud is a helpful starting 
point for this study, in the first place because this is where the definition of fraud 
ought to be clearest, considering the higher standard of proof and what one might 
expect to be more explicit criteria for liability where personal liberty may be at stake; 
secondly, because the elements required for fraudulent behaviour have been subject 
to extensive analysis in the criminal courts; and, thirdly, because in the aftermath of a 
criminal conviction we can begin to examine the civil consequences of secondary 
fraud.  This is not an exhaustive study of criminal fraud.
16
 Rather it views the 
criminal law through the eyes of the civil law in order to gain a better understanding 
of the latter, including definitional comparisons. It also includes an examination of a 
selection of cases familiar in the civil law of fraud, but which began life as crimes. 
 
In a criminal law context, the popular meaning of fraud conjures up images of white 
collar crime and financial scandal. The aftermath of the 2008 banking crisis provides 
classic examples, for instance the accusations of fraud levelled at Goldman Sachs for 
selling “Abacus” financial products with private knowledge, disclosed in email 
correspondence, that they were likely to fail.
17
 Criminal fraud, like its civil 




                                                 
15
 Stair, Institutions, IV.40.21 (hereafter “Stair”). 
16




 April, 2010 the Securities and Exchange Commission filed charges against Goldman Sachs 
for fraudulent misstatements and omissions 
(http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21489.htm). The bank settled the civil suit for $550 








1. Common Law Fraud 
Fraud was traditionally libelled as “falsehood, fraud and wilful imposition” and its 
essence was property-related i.e. depriving another person of his property by 
fraudulent means.
19
  The modern meaning is, however, broader than the protection of 
ownership. MacDonald defines it as “the bringing about of some practical result by 
means of false pretences”,
20
 the practical result usually, but not necessarily, causing 
economic loss to another.
21 
Classic examples of fraudulent dealings would be 
inducing someone to hand over property or money by making false claims as to 
personal identity, creditworthiness, or the value of an article being sold.  Criminal 
fraud can be committed expressly or impliedly, or even by omission where there is 




The mens rea of fraud, although it appears to be a relatively unexplored issue,
23
 
involves making a false representation “falsely and fraudulently”.
24
 This of course 
raises issues of motive and whether or not fraudulent criminal behaviour must be 
intentional, with knowledge that the representation is false, or if a standard of 
recklessness will suffice. In Gordon’s discussion of mens rea, which he also 
concedes is not settled in criminal law,
25
 he relies on the definition of fraud outlined 
in the English civil case of Derry v Peek.
26
 This case is discussed in more detail in 
                                                 
19
 The Scottish Institutional writers all consider the crime to consist of a misappropriation of property 
(see Gordon, GH (2001) para 18.14), and this appears to have been an essential element in 19
th
 
century case law, for instance HM Advocate v Livingstone (1888) 15 R (J) 48.  
20
 MacDonald (1948) p.52.  
21
 “It is, however, a mistake to suppose that to the commission of a fraud it is necessary to prove an 
actual gain by the accused, or an actual loss on the part of the person alleged to be defrauded. Any 
definite practical result achieved by the fraud is enough.” Adcock v Archibald 1925 JC 58 at 61 per 
Lord Justice-Clerk Clyde. For examples of other types of practical result see Gordon, GH (2001) paras 
18.21-18.25. 
22
 Gordon, GH (2001) paras 18.03-18.07. Many of the criteria (for instance, this rule) which apply to 
fraudulent criminal behaviour apply equally to the definition of a fraudulent misrepresentation in the 
civil law, for instance, rules relating to advertisements and “puffing” (para 18.09), distinctions 
between statements of fact, opinion and intention (paras 18.08, 18.10 and 18.11).  
23
 Gane et al. (2009) para 13-14. 
24
 Gordon (2001) para 18.30. 
25
 Ibid. para 18.31. 
26
 (1889) 14 App.Cas. 337. 
17 
 
relation to civil fraud in chapter 4, but Lord Herschell’s criteria for fraudulent 




(1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless 
whether it be true or false.  
 
Gordon concludes that while “[i]n principle Scots law might accept a false statement 
made recklessly as sufficient”,
28
 in practice people are usually prosecuted for fraud 
committed intentionally.
29
 While Scots criminal law in theory extends beyond 
intentional fraud, it appears that prosecution is unlikely unless there is intention to 
deceive, sometimes referred to as the sciens requirement. Furthermore, it appears not 
to be a crime for a representation to be made with an honest belief that it is true, 





2. Relationship between Fraud, Theft and Breach of Trust 
The Scottish criminal courts have had particular difficulties in their attempts to 
distinguish between the related crimes of theft, fraud and breach of trust or 
embezzlement. They have acknowledged “the thin and shadowy lines which 
distinguish theftuous possession from possession obtained by fraud”;
31
 and in 
relation to breach of trust it has been said that “the distinctions between theft and 
breach of trust are the most evanescent and slimmest known in our criminal law”.
32
 
These difficulties are not new. In Roman law and even for the writers of the 
mediaeval Ius Commune, theft (furtum) was conceptually part of the law of 
obligations, a private delict for the protection of property owners, rather than a public 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. at 374. 
28
 Gordon (2001) para 18.31. 
29
 Ibid. para 18.31. 
30
 Brander v Buttercup Dairy Co 1920 2 SLT 381; see also the more general comments about 
mistaken belief as a criminal defence in Jamieson v HM Advocate 1994 SLT 537 at 541 per Lord 
Justice-General Hope: “where a substantive defence is based on a belief which is mistaken, there need 
not be reasonable grounds for that belief”. 
31
 Brown v Marr, Barclay & others (1880) 7 R 427 at 446 per Lord Gifford. 
32





  Zimmermann demonstrates that in the Digest the concept of furtum was “so 
wide as to include almost any species of dishonesty”,
34
 including examples not only 
of what would now be considered fraud, but also unauthorised borrowing and 
embezzlement.  By the end of the Republic “[i]t had been made to cover almost any 
situation in which a person, through someone else’s deliberate act, suffered 
patrimonial loss other than by physical damage to property”.
35
 However, as the 
public law systems of Europe developed, the punitive sanctions of the criminal law 
demanded a more differentiated approach which resulted in a narrower and more 




It is clear that fraud, theft and breach of trust as “crimes of dishonesty” have from 
ancient times been close bedfellows and their historical roots in furtum as a means of 
redressing economic loss remain evident. The similarities between the three are 
greater than the differences in that all three require patrimonial loss or detriment,
37
 
all turn on the question of the owner’s consent and all, unsurprisingly, require 
dishonesty.
38
  The question of the owner’s consent is the key definitional criterion for 
“it is the absence of consent which distinguishes theft from fraud”.
39
 Moreover, this 
is a critical distinction for the civil law because of the consequences of the doctrine 
of vitium reale, examined below. The close relationship between fraud and breach of 
trust also provides important insights into the way in which the language of “fraud” 
is used pervasively in a criminal context, beyond the confines of the specific crime of 
fraud, to indicate a more general notion of dishonesty.  
                                                 
33
 Zimmermann (1990) pp. 922-923.  Zimmermann identifies the appearance of the Constitutio 
Criminalis Carolina in 1532 as the significant date when theft definitively became a public crime 
(Zimmermann (1990) p.944). 
34
 Ibid. p.925. 
35
 Ibid. p.928. 
36
 Ibid. p.947. 
37
 Historically all three were economic crimes, but subsequent to the decision in Adcock v Archibald 
1925 JC 58 the “practical result” no longer need involve any patrimonial loss. However, it has been 
pointed out that “the notion of prejudice is surely still important otherwise it would be a criminal 
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3. Fraud and Theft: Civil and Criminal Divergence 
Scotland’s Institutional writers, in particular Hume, considered theft to have a 
narrowly defined scope, an understandable requirement in light of the fact that until 
1887 it was a capital crime.
40
  Hume’s definition of theft is rooted in the civil law: 
contrectatio fraudulosa rei alienate, lucre faciendi gratia, which he translates as “the 
felonious taking away of the property of another, for lucre”.
41
 For Hume the 
distinction between theft and the “lower offences” of fraud, swindling and breach of 
trust turned on the issue of consent: when possession of property is obtained with the 
consent of the owner, and that possession includes a right to deal with the property 
(to dispose of or administer it in some way), even if possession has been obtained 
fraudulently it is nevertheless different from theft. In these lower offences there has 
been no “felonious taking”, according to Hume, for the owner has consented, 
however flawed that consent may turn out to have been retrospectively. Hume’s 
examples of lesser offences include dishonest appropriation by borrowers, hirers, 
those holding moveable property as security, trusted employees or sales involving a 
false identity or false representation as to credit-worthiness.
42
 However, over the 
course of the nineteenth century, the judiciary wrestled with and ultimately rejected 
Hume’s analysis, gradually extending the scope of theft.   
 
This process has continued to the present day and in modern criminal law the 
definition of theft is so wide that there is almost no need for any other crime of 
dishonesty. Indeed, it has been pointed out that almost all of what Hume considered 
to be “lower offences” would now constitute theft.
43
   The modern definition of theft 
still insists on the owner’s (or rightful possessor’s) lack of consent, but there is no 
longer any need for a “felonious taking”, the essential modern actus reus being 
“unauthorised appropriation”.
44
 Thus even a temporary interference with the rights of 
                                                 
40
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 Gane et al. (2009) para 11-03. 
44
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ownership or possession (wheel-clamping by a private contractor) is an act of theft.
45
 
Procedurally it is no longer necessary to make the fine distinctions required of the 
courts in an earlier era, for the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 provides that 
an accused charged with fraud or embezzlement can be convicted of theft and vice 
versa.
46
 Gordon confirms that “all deliberate and unauthorised borrowing of property 
belonging to another is theft, and the fact that some other offence may be charged in 
the same circumstances does not alter the position at all”.
47
 The expanded scope of 
theft may have brought a greater degree of simplicity to the criminal courts, but it has 
not helped create taxonomic clarity and has led to an unhelpful divergence between 
the criminal and civil definitions of theft (discussed below). This is particularly 
surprising in Scotland where the same judges staff the criminal and civil bench and 
so have been responsible for developing this definitional contradiction. As Gordon 
points out, although the three offences discussed have been conflated to a large 
extent in criminal law, the distinctions between them are much more important in 
civil law. Theftuous behaviour carries very different consequences from fraudulent 





(a) The Doctrine of Vitium Reale 
It is settled law that stolen property cannot pass because a vitium reale (or labes 
reales)
49
 attaches to it, thus tainting the property and preventing the transfer of 
ownership even to a good faith purchaser for value. Stair describes it as “inherent 
vitiosity”
50
 and even to the present day the law recognises “the pervasive quality of 
the vitium reale of theft”.
51
 However, for the most part the doctrine of vitium reale is 
asserted rather than discussed in case law and its origins are unexplored. The roots of 
the doctrine appear to derive from the Roman concept of vitium as a defect in 
property which was for sale. Roman owners of slaves had to declare any emotional, 
                                                 
45
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moral or physical defect in their property to the buyer, who had a remedy if that 
information proved to be false.
52
 The vitium was later extended to physical defects in 
sales of livestock and by the time of the Institutes it had extended into all sales.
53
 The 
Scottish courts regard stolen property as being “tainted with a labes realis, which 
will follow it into the hands of all parties, however innocently acquiring rights 
therein.”
54




Yet in moveables, purchasers are not quarrelable upon the fraud of their 
authors, if they did purchase for an onerous equivalent cause. The reason is, 
because moveables must have a current course of traffic, and the buyer is not 
to consider how the seller purchased, unless it were by theft or violence, 
which the law accounts as labes reales, following the subject to all 





Property acquired by theft or robbery is tainted by a vitium reale and cannot be 
voluntarily transferred no matter how innocent the transferee may be. However, apart 
from one apparently inconsistent passage,
56
 Stair holds that fraud is “no vitium reale 
affecting the subject, but only the committer of the fraud and these who are partakers 
of the fraud.”
57
 The property consequences arising from theft are therefore much 
more severe than those arising from fraud and it is of cardinal importance in civil law 
to distinguish between the two. Innocent third party purchasers can never acquire 
stolen property, but they can safely acquire property acquired by fraud because 
“positive law secures the buyer”.
58
 The apparent inconsistency in Stair, noted above, 
can be explained by looking at Stair’s overall scheme of justice (which will be 
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yet the parity of reason in fraud or force, should secure the innocent 
purchaser, who neither was accessory to the force, nor knew of it when he 
purchased, which requires a statute; for force, as well as fraud, are labes 
reales by common law. 
 
A possible explanation for this seeming lapse in Stair’s treatment of the effects of 
fraud on third parties lies in the fact that the natural law and the positive law 
consequences of fraud were different in his mind. This is clear from Institutions I.7.4 
where, in the context of restitution, he discusses circumstances in which a third party 
has in bona fide acquired things “belonging” to another. Stair’s view is that “[i]n 
such cases we are bound to restore them to the owner, though thereby we lose what 
we gave, except in some cases, wherein positive law secures the buyer, and leaves 
the owner to seek the seller.” The “natural obligation of restitution”
60
 demands that 
the property be restored regardless of the good or bad faith of the acquirer, but 
positive law, for policy reasons (“[t]he reason is, because moveables must have a 
current course of traffic”
 61
), protects the innocent third party. This commercial 
imperative is also consistent with Stair’s three principles of positive law which are 




Two further points should be noted in relation to the doctrine of vitium reale: first, it 
has created inconsistency between the criminal and the civil definitions of theft; and, 






(b) Strict Theft and Constructive Theft: Divergent Definitions 
One of the few Scottish cases to discuss the application of vitium reale is Brown v 
Marr, Barclay & Others
64
 in which a jeweller was running a fraudulent scheme 
acquiring gold watches from wholesalers on sale or return for the approval of non-








 The concept of secondary fraud is explored in ch.7 pp.232-238.  
64
 (1890) 7 R 427. 
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existent customers and subsequently pawning them. He was charged with both fraud 
and theft, but pleaded guilty to fraud and the theft charge was dropped. It was a 
classic case of two innocent parties litigating over the ownership of property in the 
aftermath of a criminal conviction: the original owners, who argued the watches had 
been theftuously obtained and therefore a vitium reale attached to them; and the 
pawnbrokers who had acquired them in good faith. The court held that the innocent 
third party acquirer was protected since this was a contract induced by fraud and not 
by theft. There would have been little difficulty in convicting the jeweller for theft in 
the criminal courts, but the Second Division was unwilling to accept such a broad 
definition of theft in the civil law. The existence of a contract was important (on the 
basis of which the property had been “voluntarily entrusted” to the jeweller), as was 
a line of English authority which held that between two innocent parties “he shall 
suffer who has enabled the wrongdoer to commit the fraud.”
65
 Lord Gifford 
explicitly stated that the result of the criminal trial “does not determine in the present 
question that Marr was not guilty of theft, and that question is entirely open”.
66
 It was 
for the civil law to determine the question of how far the doctrine of vitium reale 
applied, a category which was “not easily to be extended”.
67
 In this case the 
jeweller’s actions did not amount to “theft in the strict sense of that term – not theft 
in the sense that it attaches a vitium reale to the subject itself into whose hands 
soever it may come”.
68
 And in a valiant attempt to resolve criminal and civil 
definitions he suggested the jeweller’s actions could amount to “constructive theft”,
69
 
the consequences of which do not apparently involve vitium reale or stolen property.  
 
In an earlier criminal case with similar facts a retail jeweller fraudulently induced a 
wholesale jeweller to send him goods on approval and subsequently pawned the 
goods.
70
 Despite the fact that the court accepted that there was a contract between the 
parties, it concluded that fraudulently induced consent was invalid consent so there 
could be no transfer of property; hence Wilson was guilty of theft. Gordon considers 
                                                 
65
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this case to be wrongly decided
71
 for it would mean that “all goods fraudulently 
appropriated bear a vitium reale”
72
 and clearly in the civil law this is not the case.
73
  
Furthermore, Gordon warns that if “theft for the purposes of the law of vitium reale 
has a different meaning from theft in the criminal law, [this] would introduce a new 
and unnecessary confusion into the law”.
74
 It is submitted that such confusion 
already exists: the definition of theft in criminal law is now wide enough to include 
fraudulent and embezzled appropriations and the criminal courts do not generally 
concern themselves with the civil consequences of the crime (nor does criminal 
procedure require such a degree of precision).
75
 Gordon’s concerns about divergent 
definitions of fraud and theft do not appear to be shared by civil lawyers. 
 
Gordon looks to the law of contract for assistance, attempting to draw a parallel 
between void contracts, where there is deemed to be no consensus in idem, and theft. 
In particular, he considers the possibility that fraud leading to essential error could 
render a contract void and in those circumstances, he suggests, a subsequent 





Where the contract by which the owner consents to transfer ownership to the 
accused is void, and not merely voidable, the consent can be disregarded, and 
the accused is guilty of theft. 
 
Clearly the criminal courts are unlikely to plunge into the murky waters of the law of 
error. Moreover, while this would be a neat systematic approach and would provide a 
retrospective rationalisation of some of the case law, it has not found favour with the 
civil courts.  
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Gordon’s discussion of the question of consent is influenced by two controversial 
contract cases (Morrisson v Robertson
77
 and MacLeod v Kerr
78
) and the debate 
initiated by TB Smith about the correct legal analysis of Morrisson in which he 
argued that it should have been recognised as a case of theft.
79
 Both cases followed a 
criminal prosecution and both were civil actions to determine the ownership of 
property as between two innocent victims who had been duped into parting with their 
property or money by the respective rogues. In Morrisson cows were obtained from 
their owner on the false pretence that the fraudster was acting as agent for a 
creditworthy buyer known to the seller, and they were subsequently resold to an 
innocent third party. The action was for delivery of the cows from the third party on 
grounds of theft or alternatively essential error. The reasoning of the court is 
reminiscent of the arguments used in the criminal cases examined above to 
distinguish between theft, fraud and breach of trust, in particular discussion of 
whether the owner intended to transfer ownership or merely possession. The former 
requires the owner’s consent to part with ownership and therefore cannot be theft, 
but unauthorised appropriation by a possessor can be and in fact Telford, the 
fraudster, was convicted of theft.
80
 The court held there was no contract of sale 
because the owner’s intention was to transfer the property on credit to someone else 
entirely, and to transfer only possession or custody to Telford.  
 
There is extensive reference to the same English cases relied on in Brown above,
81
 a 
line of authority to the effect that in circumstances where the identity of the 
purchaser is falsely represented, so that the buyer does not know whom he is 
contracting with, there is no de facto contract in existence, no consensus in idem and 
no transfer of property. However, the English law of mistake is quite different from 
the Scots law of error (or at least, this has been true since the nineteenth century, 
when error in Scots law was put to a different purpose) and is much more 
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 The operative mistake (which is always shared) must destroy the very 
basis of the contract,
83
 and resembles the law of frustration more than the law of 
fraud (the distinction lies in the timing of the operative mistake).
84
 The principle that 
a mistake must be fundamental (in this instance, regarding the identity of the other 
contracting party), thereby rendering the contract void, was most recently asserted in 
Shogun Finance Ltd v Hudson.
85
 In Morrisson, perhaps influenced by English 
developments, the contract was held to be void on grounds of essential error induced 
by fraud. But was it theft? 
 
TB Smith argued that it was and that, while the correct result had been reached in 
Morrisson, the decision was based on a “false premise” relying on misleading 
English authority.
86
 He did, somewhat inconsistently, advocate that the narrow 
definition of vitium reale laid down in Brown should govern the civil law definition 
of theft, rather than the wide criminal definition.
87
 However, despite this, he 
nevertheless argued that Morrisson was a case of theft and the third party could not 
retain the property because of the operation of a vitium reale operating on the 
transfer of property. TB Smith’s purpose in this discussion was to question the 
influence on Scots law of the English void/voidable dichotomy in contract as well as 
the scheme of English property law.  
 
He was in effect arguing for a Scots property law analysis of Morrisson based on a 
civilian abstract theory of transfer whereby the agreement between buyer and seller 
(the underlying contract) is a separate question from the owner’s consent to transfer 
(the conveyance).
88
 On this analysis the question of consent in the underlying 
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contract is irrelevant and the issue ought to be whether or not a real vice (or vitium 




The test is whether, according to the doctrine of justa causa traditionis, the 
transferor intended to pass ownership to the person who took delivery; it is 
not whether the contract which may have underlain delivery was valid. 
Considerable confusion has resulted at times in Scotland from considering 
these problems in connection with English doctrines regarding “void” and 
“voidable” contracts. 
 
TB Smith demonstrated in a later article that the rogue in Morrisson had in fact been 
convicted of criminal theft,
90
 but in a sense this was an irrelevant fact given that the 
criminal definition of theft was not the definition used for the application of the 




TB Smith’s “theft theory” appears to have been accepted by modern academic 
commentators.
92
 This is a curious acquiescence in view of the fact that it was 
explicitly rejected by the First Division in MacLeod v Kerr and TB Smith himself 
later distanced himself from his earlier views.
93
 In MacLeod the fraudster paid for a 
car using a stolen cheque book and sold the car onto an innocent third party before 
the fraud was discovered. Once again there was a competition between the former 
owner of the car and the innocent third party purchaser. The sheriff accepted TB 
Smith’s theft argument on the basis that “there is no doubt that Galloway [the rogue] 
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 On appeal, the real argument was whether the crime which had been 
committed was fraud or theft, i.e. did the owner consent or not? The court held that 
the car was not stolen because the owner voluntarily agreed to transfer it to the 
person who came in response to the advertisement. Lord President Clyde is 
dismissive of Smith’s theft argument, relied on by the pursuer, and he clarifies 




The case truly was a case of error regarding the identity of the purchaser, and 
the learned author was quite wrong in suggesting that Telford was in the 
position of a thief for Morrisson voluntarily and intentionally delivered the 
cows to Telford.  
 
The Short Commentary was written prior to the decision in MacLeod, and TB Smith 
did modify his theft theory in a later article where he commented that “[t]heft has 
been construed in the criminal law and civil law to cover a wider scope of situations 
than forcible or clandestine dispossession, but it does not follow that because 
conviction for theft would be justified, the real vice attaches in the context of civil 
law”.
96
 However, it may be possible to understand Morrisson in the way that TB 
Smith argued it should be understood not by extending the civil definition of theft 
but by extending the scope of vitium reale beyond theft to denote all circumstances 
in which a transaction is void.  
 
 
(c) Real and Personal Vices 
It is certainly the case that in early case law the doctrine of vitium reale was not 
restricted to theft and robbery or violence. References to vitium reale in the brief 
reports contained in Morison’s Dictionary
97
 suggest that not only were the Scottish 
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courts at the end of the seventeenth century distinguishing between real and personal 
vices (or exceptions) as well as real and personal rights, but also that a vitium reale 
was a general term to designate a real vice which could be pleaded against innocent 
third parties. Undoubtedly it extended beyond theft. For instance, spuilzie,
98
 which 
Stair regarded as the civil law equivalent of theft and robbery, was included,
99
 as was 
force and fear or extortion.
100
 In an early domestic violence case the wife argued 
after her husband’s death that she had been compelled to consent to a disposition of 
property through fear of her husband who beat and threatened her.
101
 Despite the fact 
that the purchaser was in bona fide “and was neither partaker of the violence 
enforced, nor cause of fear, neither knew thereof”, the court reduced the disposition 
on grounds of metus. The law of deathbed was similarly classified as a labes realis 
and deeds granted in capito lecti could be reduced even against an innocent third 
party purchaser.
 102 
These are very brief reports, but indicative of a more general 
concept of a real vice.    
 
Modern commentators are more conservative as to what constitutes a real vice, but it 
is accepted that the doctrine extends beyond theft. In a 1976 Memorandum the 
Scottish Law Commission included theft, robbery and spuilzie.
103
 Reid, whose 
terminology distinguishes between a “real vice” or vitium reale and a “vice of 




 and error when it amounts to 
error in persona, relying on Morrisson albeit following TB Smith’s suggestion that 
the transferee’s dishonest conduct amounted to theft.
106
 However, Morrisson does 
not need to be classified as a case of theft, rather the “real effect” of a void contract 
or transfer has the equivalent effect. In Morrisson the court outlines the usual rules 
which would apply to a fraudulent sale, i.e. that property would pass under the 
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contract and the owner could either have an action for damages against the fraudster 
or could reduce the sale; but the right of an innocent third party acquirer would be 
indefeasible.
107
 However, this was not a fraudulent sale. Telford had not 
misrepresented his own “character and credit”, but claimed to be buying for another, 
hence there was no sale at all, no contract and no transfer. The whole transaction 
was, therefore, void and Telford had no better title than if he had stolen the cows,
108
 
the implication being that a void contract has the same effect as theft, i.e. a real vice 
operates on the putative contract. Lord Kinnear likens this to dealing with an agent 
when the person is not an agent at all, implying that a real vice will also operate on a 




Carey Miller contrasts property transfers which are subject to a “radical defect” with 
those which are “merely reducible”.
110
 The primary example of a radical defect is 
theft, but he also includes incapacity.
111
 The effect of force and fear is controversial 
and while historically it was a real vice, modern commentators tend not to include it 
in that category but to see it as leading to a voidable rather than a void contract or 
transfer.
112
 The most comprehensive modern treatment concludes that the issue has 
not been settled in modern Scots law mainly because of evidence in case law that 
third parties have been able to acquire rights where the transaction is defective on 
account of force and fear,
113
 but concedes that “[t]he balance of modern authority … 




The doctrine of vitium reale and indeed the categorisation of these “vices” is 
particularly important in property law because of the effect they have on third party 
transferees. However, they are most commonly analysed in a contractual context for 
their effect on the consent of the parties. And indeed property lawyers take the view 
that the categorisation of defects “must be determined by reference to rules of 
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 a surprising assertion given the lengths to which modern commentators 
go to emphasise the fact that contractual intention is separate from intention to 
transfer. It suggests, therefore, that there is a strong correlation between what will 
lead to a void or voidable contract and a void or voidable transfer. In relation to 
moveable property (which along with money will usually be the target of fraud), the 
causal/abstract discussion is somewhat meaningless because in most cases the owner 
will be able to recover the thing or its value and, in any event, in most cases the vice 
(real or consensual) will have the same effect on the conveyance as on the underlying 
contract.
116
 The question is only significant in relation to third parties or creditors. 
 
As for the consequences of fraud, it is settled that fraud is not a real vice, but merely 
a personal one or a “vice of consent”, leading to a voidable contract or a voidable 
transfer.
117
 Some commentators take the view that fraud leading to essential error 
would amount to a real vice
118
 (as was the case in Morrisson) but that will be a 
relatively rare occurrence and the courts have been reluctant to affirm that position. 
 
However, if, as I have suggested, the idea of a real vice or vitium reale is used to 
indicate voidness, i.e. circumstances whereby third parties cannot retain the property 
or money they have acquired, in certain circumstances secondary fraud operates in a 
similar way.  
                                                 
115
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(d) Fraud and Real Vices  
In older case law, as in modern Scots law, it is also clear that fraud is a “personal” 
rather than a “real” vice. However, when the courts are dealing with the situation 
where a third party has acquired property tainted by fraud there are two conditions 
which must be fulfilled for the third party to be protected: first, he must be innocent 
and must not have participated in the fraud; secondly, the transaction must not be 
gratuitous. This is the essence of secondary fraud, and if one or other of these 
requirements is not satisfied, the third party must restore the property. In other 
words, secondary fraud acts as the equivalent of a vitium reale and transforms a 
personal vice into a real vice which is effective against third parties. A detailed 
analysis of these rules will be given in chapter 7, but it is instructive that in an earlier 
period secondary fraud appears to have been related to the idea of vitium reale. 
 
When Stair deals with fraud in the context of reparation he is clear that it is no vitium 
reale. However, read carefully, we see that this position is qualified. Fraud is a 
personal vice and the fraudster is therefore liable, but so are “partakers” or 
accessories. Partaking is the essence of secondary fraud (although Stair does not use 
that terminology) and by implication it has “real” characteristics in relation to 
participating third parties, as a selection of passages from Stair illustrates: 
 
[fraud] was also personal, and reached no further than the person committing 
the fraud, and not in rem, reaching the thing, if lawfully it came to any other 




Fraud is no vitium reale affecting the subject, but only the committer of the 




Seventhly, any ground of fraud is a sufficient reason of reduction, or 
preference against the committer of the fraud, or these who are partakers of 
                                                 
119
 Stair I.9.10, emphasis added. He also alludes to the requirement of onerosity in his reference to the 
Digest (nisi in causa lucrativa, ref D.44.4.4.30). 
120
 Ibid. I.9.15, emphasis added. 
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and likewise fraud being of a criminal nature, it is not relevant against 
singular successors, not partakers of the fraud, but only against the 
committers of the fraud, and these representing them, especially as to feudal 
rights...; and therefore no action can be effectual against them, upon the fraud 
of their authors, unless they were accessory thereto, at least by knowing the 




In an interesting historical case dating from 1702,
123
 and therefore almost 
contemporaneous with Stair, property was disponed gratuitously in order for Sir John 
Dempster to qualify to become a Parliamentary candidate. When he subsequently 
sold the land an action was raised to reduce the transfer on grounds that to sell it was 
a breach of trust. The court held that the “trust” could not affect the third party’s right 
as it was not a vitium reale unless the third party was “conscius fraudis, or knew of 
the trust”. Knowledge, in this case of a breach of trust, would be enough to penalise 
the third party, with the implication that the same consequences would arise as if it 
had been a vitium reale. Again in Duff v Fowler
124
 it was argued that it was 
fraudulent for an assignee to take a tack that had already been given to a couple 
under a marriage contract. The court held that this would be a relevant defence if 
either “[D’s] right was without an onerous cause, or that when he took it he knew 
that it was contrary to the contract of marriage”.
125
 It had been argued that fraud was 
vitium reale to which the reply was that the assignee could not be prejudiced “unless 
it were proved that he were particeps fraudis”.
126
 The crucial word is “unless” 
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 Anderson v Dempster (1702) Mor 10213. 
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 Duff v Fowler (1672) Mor 10282. 
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 Ibid. at 10283. 
126
 Ibid.at 10283, Gosford’s Report. 
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 See also Andersons v Lows (1863) 2 M 100. 
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The concept of particeps fraudis, also expressed as conscius fraudis, implies that 
knowledge by the third party of a wrong amounts to participation in that wrong and 
therefore to shared liability. This will be discussed further in chapter 7, but it should 
be noted that Gosford reports, in the context of assignation, that “fraud and deceit 
being vitium reale doth affect singular successors”.
128
 Fraud appears to have real 




 another exception to the general 
protection given to onerous singular successors.
130
 In summary, in a variety of 
situations, either related to knowledge or participation in another’s wrongdoing or 
where the transaction is gratuitous, secondary fraud appears to have “real” effect. 
And the courts at this early period in Scots law freely use the terminology of vitium 
reale well beyond its traditional territory of theft to denote that real effect. 
 
4. Fraud and Breach of Trust 
Returning to questions of definition, the criminal offence which appears to have 
given the courts most difficulty is breach of trust, which was treated as a species of 
fraud by Scottish Institutional writers.
131
 In modern criminal law breach of trust and 
embezzlement constitute the single crime of embezzlement (although Gordon 
speculates that breach of trust may have wider, albeit undeveloped, limits)
132
 but 
attempts to define it and to distinguish it from fraud and from theft remain elusory.
133
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 Duff v Fowler (1672) Mor 10282 at 10283, Gosford’s Report. For extensive case reports on the 
position of assignees see the title “Personal and Real” in Morison’s Dictionary. 
129
 McBryde comments that Stair’s scheme of the consequences of fraud is over-complex ((2007) para 
14-75), but this remains the law. See also McDonnells v Carmichael (1772) Mor 4974 where the court 
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vitium reale which did affect a singular successor” (at 4869). 
131
 See Hume, Commentaries, 1.61; Burnett refers to “that species of trust, the breach of which is 
punishable only as fraud” ((1811) pp.111-113). 
132
 Gordon, GH (2001) para 17.01. 
133
 Gordon puts forward different possible definitions for breach of trust (see Gordon ch.17) but 




Many of the facts of breach of trust cases resemble cases classified as either theft or 




The essence of breach of trust appears to lie in the fact that a trusted person has been 
authorised to deal in some way with property or money (the usual case) and has 
appropriated it for his own use or failed to account to its rightful owner.
135
 Jones and 
Christie consider the trusted person to be in a position equivalent to an agent or 
someone in a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary position,
136
 but Gordon’s position is 
somewhat different. He concedes that trust is a key factor but argues against a 
narrower fiduciary criterion: “’trust’ is nowhere defined in this connection, and there 
is ample authority that a person entrusted with money can steal it”.
137
 In Gordon’s 
analysis anyone “who receives the property of another under some duty in respect of 
it ... can be said to receive it under trust”, thereby including the possibility that 
custodiers or any other temporary possessors may be potential embezzlers.
138
 The 
courts have defined embezzlement as “the criminal violation of a contract of 
trust”,
139












stockbrokers. It is essential to the crime of embezzlement that the accused has been 
authorised to deal with the property or money in question, i.e. the owner has given 
consent to the course of dealing. In Kent v HM Advocate
145
 the accused could not be 
convicted of embezzlement because there was insufficient evidence that he had been 
authorised to act on behalf of the firms in question. Consent, therefore, is a common 
element to both fraud and breach of trust. 
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 See Gordon, GH (2001) ch.17 and cases discussed there. 
135
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ownership ((2008) para 10-40). 
137




 Catherine Cosgrove or Bradley (1850) J Shaw 301 at 306 per Lord Justice-Clerk Hope. Gordon 
believes this case to be wrongly decided (Gordon, GH (2001) paras 17.08 and 14.30). 
140
 Allenby v HM Advocate 1938 JC 55. 
141
 Alex Mitchell (1874) 3 Couper 77. 
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 JB Walker Lee (1884) 5 Couper 492; Edgar v Mackay 1926 JC 94. 
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In many breach of trust cases there are explicit references to fraudulent behaviour,
146
 
and, as mentioned previously, the Institutional writers regarded breach of trust as a 
species of fraud.
147
 The owner’s authority (consent) is essential and the crime is 
committed when the embezzler acts outwith that authority. In John Lawrence
148
 the 
accused was an executor who appropriated some of the executry funds for his own 
purposes. He and his co-executor had found a cash sum belonging to the deceased 
which was to be deposited in the bank but instead Lawrence appropriated it. He 
argued that at most this amounted to a breach of promise to the co-executor but was 
not a crime. However, Lord Neaves held that if “he employs [the trust funds] in such 
a manner as to put them to any risk, he commits a wrong”,
149
 in this case 
embezzlement. On the evidence of the cases, it is arguable that embezzlement is a 
form of fraud with close affinities to the civil wrong of breach of fiduciary duty, 
which has an equally close relationship with civil fraud. 
 
Gordon, however, rejects the notion that breach of trust is a species of fraud arguing 
that “it has more affinities to theft than to fraud”.
150
 He suggests that there may be 
sociological stereotypes at work, positioning theft as a “lower-class” crime and 




Message-boys and railway porters steal, while the defalcations of solicitors, 
stockbrokers or company directors are usually dignified by the less crude 
term “embezzlement”. 
 
He considers breach of trust to be closer to theft than fraud for two reasons: first, the 
mens rea of embezzlement, like that of theft, consists in appropriation without the 
                                                 
146
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consent of the owner
152
 and, secondly, embezzlement does not require a false 




The question of consent is the key to distinguishing between these three offences of 
dishonesty. It is a strange claim to make for breach of trust that no consent is 
involved, for as we have seen the embezzler is necessarily entrusted with property or 
funds. And yet that was admittedly the effect of George Brown,
154
 where a bench of 
seven judges broadened the longstanding definition of theft and held by a majority 
that a watchmaker to whom watches had been entrusted for repair was guilty of theft 
when he appropriated them for his own gain. Despite the fact that the property had 
been given with the consent of the various owners, “the owner’s consent to the 
transference of possession is only a qualified and conditional consent, for a special 
and particular purpose”.
155
   
 
Lengthy and learned arguments were advanced on both sides, referring extensively to 
the civil law and to Regiam Majestatem. The prosecution successfully argued that it 
was time to abandon the notion that consent must be judged according to the initial 
act of transfer, according to the civil law principle initium unius cujusque actionis 
semper est attendendum.
156
 The distinction between theft and breach of trust “does in 
no way depend upon the fraud or the honesty of the first acquiring of the goods”,
157
 
which the court accepted and consequently drew a distinction between cases in 
which the property is given only in “custody” (whereby possession remains with the 
owner) and cases which involve the transfer of possession and a power of 
management. Dishonest appropriation in the former case can amount to theft, in the 
latter it is breach of trust.   
 
The reasoning in Brown is somewhat tortuous, even unconvincing, but the court did 
expand the definition of theft to include situations where “bare custody” was 
                                                 
152
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consented to and subsequently abused (Gordon refers to these cases as “theft-
embezzlement” cases).
158
 However, it remains the case that in true breach of trust 
cases (the usual case is the administration of money or incorporeal assets) possession 
is clearly consented to and there is a closer analogy with fraud. It could be argued 
that the owner consented to possession, but did not consent to the subsequent 
dishonest appropriation. But on this version of consent, the same could be argued for 
fraud: usually the fraudster has obtained possession with consent but that consent 
(retrospectively evaluated) has been obtained dishonestly and had the owner known 
the true position no consent would have been given. Consent is normally given to the 
embezzler just as much as to the fraudster. In true breach of trust cases, I would 
argue, with the support of the Institutional writers and considerable case law, that 
breach of trust and embezzlement is a species of fraud.  
 
On Gordon’s second point, namely that breach of trust does not require a false 
representation, there is certainly modern authority to that effect. For instance in 
Guild v Lees
159
 the Secretary of the World Curling Association, who was entitled to 
use the Association’s cheque book for travelling expenses on behalf of the 
Association, used it to pay his own domestic electricity bill. Lord Justice-General 
Hope affirmed that the correct charge was breach of trust and not fraud as he had 
made no false representation. Despite this, a convincing argument can be made that 
in most embezzlement cases fraud by concealment is involved even if there is no 
explicit false representation, for instance where a lawyer failed to inform his former 
clients that he had collected money belonging to them.
160
 There is ample authority to 
demonstrate that the criminal courts consider fraud to have a wider meaning than the 
making of a false representation, as do the civil courts. In HM Advocate v City of 
Glasgow Bank Directors
161
 the bank’s directors were charged with fraud, breach of 
trust and theft for, respectively, falsifying the balance sheets, taking unauthorised 
advances in abuse of their position as directors and stealing the proceeds of a bill of 
exchange. The fraud charge clearly related to making false representations, but in 
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39 
 
relation to breach of trust and embezzlement Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff discusses 





“before this can be raised into a criminal offence ..there must be superadded 
to the illegality of the act some element of bad faith, some corrupt motive, 
some guilty knowledge, some fraudulent intent, which shall raise that which, 
although illegal, was not a crime, into the category of a crime ... the corrupt 
motive, the bad faith, is essential to the crime itself, and without it there is no 
crime.” 
 
The synonyms used here – bad faith, corrupt motive, guilty knowledge, fraudulent 
intent – suggest that the court was familiar with a wider sense of fraud which was 
related to subjective motive and a broad conception of dishonesty and bad faith. On 
this definition breach of trust is a close relative of the older meaning of fraud in civil 
law. Breach of trust appears to involve questions of honesty and dishonesty:
163
 it is 
described as being “inconsistent with honesty”,
164
 a somewhat loosely defined moral 
standard, and as Gordon comments, “the cases lead to the rather vague conclusion 
that A is guilty of embezzlement only if he has acted ‘dishonestly’.”
165
 Certainly 
when the civil courts are describing actions which would amount to a criminal breach 
of trust they do not hesitate to describe it as fraud. In Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd 
v Millar
166
 the House of Lords referred to a trustee’s appropriation of trust property 
in breach of his fiduciary duty as amounting to both fraud and breach of trust and 
embezzlement.
167
 It seems a reasonable conclusion that in a criminal context the 
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courts have in the past used the terms “fraud” or “fraudulently” to characterise 
behaviour or intentions as dishonest even where a specific crime must be libelled.   
 
These subtleties shed light on some of the definitional issues concerning fraud, 
particularly the question of whether fraud requires actual deceit (a question hotly 
contested in the civil law in the nineteenth century and particularly after the decision 
in Derry v Peek), and demonstrate that at this period the criminal courts were using 
fraud in the broad general sense of acting dishonestly or in a way that is inconsistent 





 and embezzlement, a vague and necessarily subjective concept even in a 
criminal law context. Lord Young’s charge to the jury in the criminal trial of a 
solicitor who appropriated a client’s money for his own (temporary) use, could be 
summed up in one fundamental question: “do you think his conduct was that of a 
dishonest man?”
170
 It can be argued, then, that in a criminal context acting 
“fraudulently” can simply mean acting dishonestly or contrary to the standards of 
good faith. This is consistent with the use of similar language in the civil courts, and 
is indicative of a concept of fraud that goes beyond specific wrongs and which 
expresses a general sense of dishonesty, injustice or improbity. However, as will be 
demonstrated, criminal and civil definitions have moved in different directions: just 
as the criminal concept of fraud has broadened to be almost coterminous with theft, 
so the civil definition has narrowed from a broad overarching category of wrongful 
behaviour to the more restrictive standard of intentional deceit. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
not have applied the property to his own purpose “without committing a fraud for which he might 
have been made criminally responsible” (at 54). 
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Chapter 2: The Historical Scope of Fraud 
 
1. An Introduction to Civil Fraud 
One of the notable features of current literature on fraud is the diversity of opinion 
which it represents. This leads to the curious result that for some the civil law of 
fraud conveys a wider spectrum of behaviour than criminal fraud, while for others it 
is considerably narrower than the account given in chapter 1. The most widely 
accepted definition in modern Scots law is Erskine’s, namely that fraud is “a 
machination or contrivance to deceive”,
171
 hence deceit is an essential element. 
However, there is little doubt that historically fraud had a wider meaning and was 
often used as a means of describing substantive unfairness even where there was no 
deceit.  
 
The dominant narrative today accepts that in early Scots law fraud did have this 
wider meaning,
172
 but for historical reasons (the crucial period of transformation 
being the nineteenth century) its meaning was restricted to deliberate or reckless 
deceit, to which a plea of honest belief was a defence. This narrative will be explored 
in more detail than has previously been done to demonstrate that the Scots law of 
fraud is not so much a “mixture or muddle”
173
 but simply a muddle which continues 
to have significant impact on the law.
174
 The usual arguments about inauspicious 
borrowings from English law could be advanced, but it would be more accurate to 
say that the Scottish judiciary was responsible (whether innocently or deliberately) 
for misunderstanding the scope of English decisions and the relationship between 
common law and equity. This, together with a change in the zeitgeist, combined to 
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create a new understanding of fraud which was deemed to be more appropriate for 
Scotland’s growing economy. 
 
Beyond the truisms that civil fraud has long been recognised as a delict and as a 
factor vitiating consent in contracts and property transactions almost nothing about 
the law of fraud is uncontested. The fact that fraud straddles the law of obligations 
creates doubt as to where it fits in the general scheme of private law. At one end of 
the spectrum of liability Thomson classifies fraud as an intentional delict which 
requires mens rea
175
 (delict being the civil equivalent of crime); but in a contractual 
context he regards fraud as “a particular aspect of error”.
176
  Nor is the effect of fraud 
entirely without controversy. It usually renders a contract voidable, but it is at least 
arguable that fraud inducing essential error could bring about absolute nullity and, as 
argued in chapter 7, secondary fraud may have similar effect. When the Scottish Law 
Commission addressed the issue in 1978, on the one hand it recommended that fraud 
cease to exist as a separate ground of annulment from “caused error”.
177
 At the other 
extreme, it invited opinion on whether fraud could be strengthened as a concept to 
create a vitium reale.
178
 While it is unlikely that the latter was a serious suggestion 
for law reform, this disparity in the potential operation of fraud reflects uncertainty 
as to how best to integrate it into modern Scots law.  
 
Going back to the doctrinal roots of modern Scots law, certainly it is true that in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Scottish courts used the word fraud to apply 
to a wide range of situations. Its primary meaning involves intentional deceit causing 
harm or loss and to that extent Erskine’s definition is accurate. However, it is, and 
always was, incomplete in that it does not take account of other situations where one 
party gained an advantage through loss to another in a variety of circumstances not 
necessarily involving deceit.  
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In this chapter the historical scope of what was deemed to be fraudulent behaviour is 
examined in relation to three legal concepts: mala fides, the principle culpa lata dolo 
aequiparatur and the wider doctrine of presumptive fraud. All three were at times 
labelled fraud but encompassed behaviour which was not intentionally deceitful. 
Much has been written about the first of these categories, but the latter two are 
almost entirely ignored in modern literature. It is acknowledged that this analysis is, 
therefore, a preliminary attempt to create a taxonomy of the older definition of fraud 
and that more research into the historical sources is needed.   
 
2. Fraud and Mala Fides 
It is a common assumption that in older Scots law fraud could denote mala fides. 
While there is some evidence for this,
179
 a distinction must be made between two 
party transactions (the territory of primary fraud) and those involving three parties 
(secondary fraud).
180
 In the former there is a reasonably clear distinction between 
fraud and mala fides; but in the latter bad faith is often referred to as fraud. 
Historically there are three contexts in which bona fides or mala fides are relevant in 
two party situations: bona fide possession, bona fide consumption (of fruits) and 
bona fide payment.  
 
The first two contexts relate to property law. Bad faith is constituted by actual 
knowledge of someone else’s right, or ignorance and uncertainty about one’s own 
right.
181
 A good faith possessor is “one who, though he be not truly proprietor of the 
subject which he possesses, yet has reasonably ground to believe himself to be so”.
182
 
If it is established that a person possesses in bad faith, by determining whether or not 
possession is held on a justifiable or “colourable” title, he is liable for the “fruits” of 
the property, even those already consumed, and any profits derived from it.
183
 If bad 
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faith is not established, there is no liability for fruits already consumed, only to the 
extent that the possessor is in quantum lucrati. The liability of the bad faith possessor 
is one of the outworkings of the scholastic theory of liability outlined in chapter 7, in 
that bad faith increases the severity of the consequences. 
 
The third context, bona fide payment,
184
 usually consists of payment made in error, 
often involving the condictio indebiti in what could be considered early examples of 
unjustified enrichment.
185
 Findlay v Monro
186
 is a typical example. An ox was 
delivered in error, which the family salted and consumed. The defender subsequently 
argued it had been bona fide consumption, and in any event he had received little 
benefit as “a little Highland cow would have served his small family”.
187
 It was 
replied that “[i]t is a law of nature, jus suum cuique tribuere .... and whether you was 
in dolo or culpa, yea or no, I may vindicate my property wherever I find it; and there 
was not so much a title of donation, or any other to sustain his bona fides; et nemo 
debet locupletari cum alterius jactura”.
188
 Bad faith amounts to knowledge of 
another’s right, in this case manifested in an error which the defender either knew 
about or ought to have known about. Such examples are rarely referred to as fraud. 
 
Stair is clear that fraud and mala fides are distinct, albeit related, legal concepts. In 
the Institutions fraud is primarily a “delinquence” or delict
189
 involving deceit: 
“Circumvention signifieth the act of fraud, whereby a person is induced to a deed or 
obligation by deceit, and is called dolus malus, in opposition to dolus bonus or 
solertia”.
190
 There is little doubt that the primary meaning of fraud involves deceitful 
intent; mala fides, on the other hand, indicates, at most, private knowledge.  
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 Stair I.9.4. 
190
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Stair’s most extensive discussion of mala fides is in relation to possession,
191
 for 
different consequences apply to good faith and bad faith possessors and his 
distinction provides some insight into the meaning of bad faith.
192
 There is, in fact, a 
relatively rare instance in Stair’s discussion where he appears to use bad faith and 
fraud interchangeably but this is an unusual occurrence, perhaps influenced by the 




“[u]nder which distinction are comprehended possessio bonae fidei, which 
may be called innocent possession, and malae fidei or fraudulent”. 
 
Innocent possessors are those “who do truly think that which they possess to be their 
own, and know not the right of any other” or, where a third party is concerned, if he 
is “not accessory to, or conscious of” the fact that his predecessor acquired the 
property wrongfully.
194
 On the other hand, if the words above are read dispositively, 
Stair may simply be outlining three states of mind, moving from innocent to 
fraudulent, which would suggest he envisaged mala fides to be somewhere in the no 
man’s land between innocence and fraud. 
 
Bad faith almost always consists of private knowledge which, in a property context, 
means knowledge of someone else’s property right. Stair appears to suggest there 




“But private knowledge upon information, without legal diligence, or other 
solemnity allowed in law, at least unless the private knowledge be certain, it 
is not regarded, nor doth constitute the knower in mala fide”. 
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However, he goes on to qualify that position by citing cases, for instance Children of 
Wolmet v Lady Wolmet, in which there were “several presumptions of her knowledge 
of their right”.
196
  The presumption of knowledge is what today would be referred to 
as constructive knowledge or a “due diligence” approach,
197
 which can be inferred 
from certain fact situations or from the presence of facts which ought to put the 
possessor on enquiry. Stair recognises that since matters of good or bad faith are 
“hidden acts of the mind, it is very difficult to know who is in bona fide or mala 
fide”.
198
 Good faith is presumed, but he nevertheless allows for circumstances in 




Scots law historically had a tendency, one which persists to the present day, to 
discuss questions of bad faith rather than good faith. This is unsurprising because 
good faith was not used as a stand-alone legal concept; rather it operated as a 
defence.
200
 In his opening discussion of the principles of law, Stair defines the limits 
of the law’s intervention in human life and enters into a philosophical (and 
theological) exposition of the distinction between “duty which is necessary, and 
wherein we are obliged” and “matters of expediency [which] are but bona utilia, and 
                                                 
196
 Children of Wolmet v Douglas and Cuningham (1662) Mor 1730. In Stair’s report of this case 
(Stair’s Decisions Book 1, 20 November 1662) there was argument about whether actual knowledge 
was required to put a person in mala fide. Stair reports that the very fact of the child in her womb 
inferred knowledge prior to its birth.  
197
 Carey Miller (2005a) para 8.30. Carey Miller and others do not accept a “due diligence” approach 
(para 8.31 and references at n.81) but insist that actual knowledge of another’s right is required; 
Wortley argues that the leading modern authority, Rodger (Builders) Ltd v Fawdry 1950 SC 483, 
extended the rule from actual knowledge to constructive knowledge (Wortley (2002) pp.292-300). 
198
 Stair II.12.7 
199
 Ibid. The presumption arises in a variety of circumstances: where there is possession without title; 
common knowledge that the property belongs to someone else; if the possessor was informed before 
acquiring the property that it belonged to someone else; admission of the possessor that it belonged to 
someone else; if “solemnities” have not been observed in the acquisition; if acquired from a 
procurator without warrant; if acquired from “a prodigal person”; if unusual security measures are 
taken; finally that ignorance of the law is no excuse (scire et scire debere aequiparantur in jure, trans. 
to know a thing, and to be bound to know it, are regarded in law as equivalent). 
200
 See Taylor (1927) para 672. This is also consistent with Lord Hope’s modern description of good 
faith as being “generally an underlying principle of an explanatory and legitimating rather than an 
active or creative nature” (R v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport [2005] 2 AC 1 at para 60, with 
reference to MacQueen, HL “Delict, Contract, and the Bill of Rights: a Perspective from the United 
Kingdom” (2004) 121 South African LJ 359 at 382; and MacQueen, HL “Good Faith in the Scots 
Law of Contract: An Undisclosed Principle?” in Good Faith in Contract and Property Law (1999) ed. 





 In matters of “expediency” or individual conscience even if 




it were a sad rack to the consciences of men, if their errors and mistakes in 
the matters of expediency were to lie as a guilt upon their consciences: but 
that bona fides or conscientia illaesa, so much spoken of in the law, is that 
which cleareth and acquitteth men in such mistakes. 
 
Stair discusses good faith almost in religious terms and equates it with a clean 
conscience so that even when people get things wrong, good faith will absolve them. 




Clearly there is some overlap between fraud and bad faith. The predominant meaning 
of the latter is private knowledge and a large number of early cases of fraud involved 
fraudulent concealment.
204
 The distinction may lie in the fact that fraudulent 
concealment often involves intention to deceive, and in modern law it is usually 
treated as a sub-category of misrepresentation; bad faith, on the other hand, is doing 
nothing despite having private knowledge that would be to another person’s 
advantage. It is an internal state of mind. The comparison is between action and 
omission, although in the case of fraudulent concealment (sometimes referred to by 
commentators as active concealment for this reason) it is obviously a very fine line, 
and hence understandably the language of fraud overlaps with bad faith in case law. 
For Stair mala fides does have legal consequences. He devotes no title to it, no 
systematic treatment, and yet it is woven throughout the text of the Institutions, most 
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often in relation to three party situations or secondary fraud.
205
 There appears to be a 
presumption of fraud where a person is designated particeps fraudis i.e. has 




Bad faith is, therefore, treated in early Scots law as a separate concept from fraud 
except in the context of secondary fraud, where bad faith is said to amount to 
fraud.
207
 However, two other features which form part of Stair’s discussion of fraud 
significantly extended its meaning: the use of the maxim culpa lata dolo 
aequiparatur and the wider concept of presumptive fraud. 
 
 
3. Presumptive Fraud in Delict: culpa lata dolo aequiparatur  
The effect of the maxim culpa lata dolo aequiparatur was to deem as fraud (dolus) 
conduct which did not meet the delictual standard of intentional deceit and it was 
used in a variety of contexts. It most commonly occurred in relation to agency and 
the behaviour of fiduciaries, where it still has some currency in modern law.
208
 But it 
also had a wider significance in that it was a means of attributing liability for fraud 
where behaviour was considered “unwarrantable”,
209
 or where there was a lack of 
due care, thus resembling what we would now consider negligence.. The doctrine of 
culpa lata, therefore, considerably expanded the scope of fraud. 
 
 
(a) A historical note on presumptive fraud 
Attempts to broaden the scope of fraud are neither new, nor are they unique to Scots 
law. All legal systems, ancient and modern, have to grapple with the problem of 
behaviour which is considered morally unacceptable but does not quite come up to 
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the standard of intentional deceit.  In Roman law there was a gradual extension of the 
definition of dolus malus from initially requiring simulation or pretence
210
 to the 
classic Labeonic definition which shifted the focus onto deceit practised by any 
means.
211
 However, Zimmermann demonstrates
212
 that dolus developed beyond 
Labeo’s classic definition (which “is hardly ever even referred to”
213
) to comprise a 
variety of cases which fell short of intentional deceit, and that both the actio de dolo 
and the exceptio doli came to be used in any situation which a party turned to his 
advantage against the precepts of natural equity.
214
   
 
From here it is only a small step to the recognition of the fact that dolus was a 
kind of opposite number to bona fides. 
 
Dolus was also an important principle in canonist legal thinking because it was “si 
proche de la morale”.
215
 This resulted in the Roman concept of dolus being modified 
by the canonist doctrine of restitution
216
 in light of “des exigencies de la morale et 
des enseignements des théologiens”.
217
 The connection between fraud and the 
doctrine of restitution is explored in greater detail in chapter 3, but from a 
definitional perspective this led to some very fine distinctions. The canonists adopted 
a purposive approach, judging behaviour by its goal according to the standards of 
Christian morality, which meant that non-fraudulent behaviour could be equally 
reprehensible if its outcome was causing harm to another. Dolus and fraud thus 
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 “the demands of morality and the teaching of theologians”, ibid. 
218
 Ibid. p.1361. 
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The canonists were concerned with the question of intention, which was not of great 
interest to Roman law.
219
 By contrast, the Labeonic definition of dolus
220
 focused on 
conduct – calliditas, fallacia, machinatio – whereas the canonists required the sin of 
a guilty intention. The influence of Aquinas was also considerable. His exposition of 
an Aristotelian scheme of justice with its fundamental dividing line between 
voluntary and involuntary acts meant that there was no liability where there was no 
knowledge.
221
 Another principle was developed by the canonists to modify that 
doctrine: dolus praesumptus, which Lemosse defines as culpa latior, unintentional 
fault which is equivalent of dolus.
222
 In situations where there was no knowledge or 
intention, dolus could be presumed. Even in ancient legal history, presumptive fraud 
was not without its difficulties, particularly in relation to the requirement for proof of 
fraud.
223
 The canonists resolved this by imbuing certain fact situations with an 
inherent guilty intention, thus bringing into play a presumption of fraud and 
bypassing the need for proof.
224
 There was further development of presumptive fraud 
in the fifteenth century beyond culpa lata to apply to any inequitable conduct which 
was contra naturam,
225
 thus bringing it back into line with the Roman development 
of dolus via a very different route.  
 
The roots of the doctrine of culpa lata in Scots law, part of an overarching doctrine 
of presumptive fraud, are consistent with this more general historical development.  
 
(b) Stair and presumptive fraud in delict 
Stair begins his account of fraud as a delict with the oft-repeated mantra that “[f]raud 
is not to be presumed, but must be proven”.
226
 This was a commonplace assertion in 
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 Omnia quae fiunt contra naturam praesumuntur dolose fieri, ibid. p.1368. 
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 but a presumption of fraud was nevertheless raised in certain 
situations. Stair does the same, for he then goes on to qualify his statement in that 
proof can consist of showing either that a person “designed to deceive or that he did 
such acts from whence fraud is presumed,”
228
 thus admitting the possibility that 
proof may take the form of a presumption of fraud in certain circumstances.   
 
In his discussion of presumptive fraud, at times Stair appears to be conflicted. On the 
one hand, equity and morality demand that the law take account of harm caused by 
less than deceit; on the other hand there are the requirements of commerce, a tension 




For nothing is more prejudicial to trade, than to be easily involved in pleas; 
which diverts merchants from their trade, and frequently mars their gain, and 
sometimes their credit. Therefore we allow not the quarrelling of bargains 
upon presumed fraud ex re ipsa ... if there be not sophistication, or latent 
insufficiency, which we exactly consider, because it is destructive to trade. 
 
Stair says that Scots law, unlike Roman law, only allows presumptive fraud for 
“sophistication” (in old Scots this meant “sophistication of ware”, i.e. “adulteration” 
of goods)
 230
 or latent insufficiency.
231
 The implied warranty that goods should be of 
marketable quality is the first, and most obvious, type of presumed fraud and 
historically Scots law, unlike English law, presumed it to be fraudulent if a seller 
sold goods below that standard. According to Lord Kilbrandon, by providing that any 
warranty as to quality must be express rather than implied and, in effect, embedding 
the principle of caveat emptor in Scots law, “[t]he Mercantile Law Amendment 
(Scotland) Act 1856 saw the end of the old-fashioned commercial morality”.
232
 In 
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1967 he wondered whether Scots law had been “off the rails for the last 100 years or 
so”.
233
 Stein provides a detailed history of the disappearance of latent insufficiency 





A second type of presumptive fraud for Stair is “where the deeds alleged can have no 
fair construction, but do infer fraud”, for instance deeds which cause “great lesion to 
the subscriber”; or wills which are not read before signing; or collusion between 
family members to prevent a creditor doing diligence.
235 
He then embarks on a 
lengthy exposition of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1621, mostly in relation 
to what we would now classify as gratuitous alienations or fraudulent preferences to 
defeat creditors.
236
 It has sometimes been suggested that this is a type of presumptive 
fraud but the legislation considered such actions to be fraud proper, rather than 
inferred.
237
 There was, however, a presumption in relation to the “three-day rule”, 
namely that a bankrupt person could not enter into transactions within three days of 
bankruptcy. This rule is consistent with the other categories of presumptive fraud 
mentioned above in that its rationale was concealment, in this case of impending 
insolvency.
238
 The presumption did not survive. Classifying the attempts to trade in a 
state of debt as presumptive fraud was rejected by Bell as being “inconsistent with an 
advanced state of commerce”
239
 and for the same reasons by Hume, who attributed 




In his discussion of cases where the deeds themselves infer fraud, Stair includes 
Wardlaw v Dalziel,
241
 an early case in which a “comprising [was] impugned by way 
of exception quod dolo”.
242
  He goes on to say that the wrongdoing in Wardlaw, 
which amounted to a failure to disclose information, “and that of latent insufficiency, 
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be rather lata culpa quae dolo aequiparatur”, in contrast to dolus, and he explains 




For the difference betwixt dolus and lata culpa is, that dolus est magis animi, 
and oftentimes by positive acts, and lata culpa is rather facti, and by omission 
of that which the party is obliged to show. 
 
This is a fascinating philosophical observation by Stair, namely that the kind of 
wrongdoing inherent in dolus is principally about intention, it is about motive, the 
territory of the mind. By contrast, culpa lata is about facti, about deeds or things 
done, i.e. it is presumed from fact scenarios or circumstances. The second distinction 
is that dolus is about positive actions, whereas culpa lata is the territory of 
omissions.
244
   
 
Recent scholarship on the history of Scots law has demonstrated that Stair’s 
influential scheme of obediential obligations in private law still dominates the way 
the law of delict is structured.
245
 It has been said that Stair’s account of reparation 
(which he considers to be the civil equivalent of crime)
246
 deals only with intentional 
delicts, including fraud, and that negligence was a later development. However, in 
his juxtaposition of dolus and culpa lata Stair foreshadows the modern law in which 
the whole of the law of negligence, formulated as breach of a duty of care, amounts 
to liability for omissions. In the culpa lata principle we find the historical roots of the 
way in which Scots law dealt with situations amounting to negligence. As MacQueen 
and Sellar point out, by using the relatively undeveloped law of culpa “the law might 
well have taken another path, pursuing notions of wrongfulness or unlawfulness such 
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In summary, the maxim culpa lata dolo aequiperatur is part of Stair’s account of the 
law of delict. It would perhaps be fair to call it the delictual version of presumptive 
fraud as opposed to the contractual version which was even wider in scope.
248
 It was 
principally about omissions, often situations amounting to a lack of due care. This in 
turn made it a suitable tool to deal with breaches of a fiduciary duty by trustees, 
executors and partners, as well as with unintentional misrepresentations. It seems 
clear, therefore, that Stair’s treatment of delict was not limited to “intentional injuries 
amounting to crime”
249
 in that culpa lata goes beyond the territory of intentional 
wrongdoing. This account may also cast doubt on the assertion that as a general 
principle of Scots law culpa did not emerge until the late nineteenth century.
250
 In the 
guise of culpa lata dolo aequiperatur it was alive and well long before then. 
 
It is perhaps worth noting that Stair’s reference to Wardlaw v Dalziel may suggest 
that there is a link between the culpa lata principle and the exceptio doli. In Wardlaw 
(which Stair relates explicitly to behaviour involving culpa lata) a “comprising [was] 
impugned by way of exception quod dolo”.
251
 In South African law there has been 
discussion of the exceptio doli as a broad equitable principle and one potential route 
towards a general principle of good faith,
252
 although this theory has been rejected by 
the courts.
253
 While there are occasional references in older Scottish cases,
254
 it does 
not appear that the exceptio doli was used with any regularity. The culpa lata 
principle is much more familiar. It is also interesting to note that the same principle 
has played a role in English equity, particularly in the eventual recognition of 
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Although the Roman sources putting culpa lata on an equal footing with 
dolus are not quoted in the relevant cases, the shift in Equity towards the 
recognition of liability for honest but negligent misrepresentation seems to 
have come about as a result of an equation of gross negligence with fraud. 
Similar tendencies are evident with regard to that part of equitable fraud that 




One influential English textbook
256
 specifically discusses “the broad principle that, 
so far as civil liability is concerned, gross negligence is to be treated as equivalent to 
fraud,”
257
 citing the Digest, several English cases
258
 and one Scottish appeal case.
259
 
It was obviously a principle that had some currency up until the end of the nineteenth 
century north and south of the border and the similarities with developments in Scots 
law would merit further study. Broadly speaking, culpa lata involved lack of 
reasonable care: in modern terminology negligence.  
 
(c) Culpa lata and negligence 
The cases discussed below rely on the concept of culpa lata to express a broad notion 
of fault by omission. This weaker sense of culpa lata as fault appears to have been 
the meaning ascribed to it, rather than the later tendency to translate it as “gross 
recklessness”. Liability is often assessed on policy grounds in terms of whether or 
not the defender acted with reasonable care and caution particularly where property 
was acquired in circumstances which ought to have put the acquirer on guard. In 
these cases culpa lata comes close to denoting bad faith.  
 
For instance in Brown v Marr, Barclay & Others
260
 the court had concerns about the 
behaviour of a third party recipient who was a pawnbroker because a substantial 
quantity of jewellery had been pawned in a short period of time. According to Lord 
                                                 
256
 Moyle (1892), cited in Lubbe (1996) p.296. 
257
 Moyle (1892) pp.59ff. 
258
 Evans v Edmonds (1853) 13 CB 786; Reese River Silver Mining Co v Smith (1869) LR 64 HL 4; 
Weir v Bell (1898) 3 Ex D 238 CA. 
259
 Western Bank v Addie (1867) LR 1 Sc App 145. 
260
 Brown v Marr, Barclay & Others (1890) 7 R 427. 
56 
 
Moncreiff “[the] question arises whether the defenders exercised such reasonable 
care and caution as to give them a right to be considered as bona fide or innocent 
parties in this question,”
261
 or “whether they acted so rashly in making the advances 
and in taking the watches in security thereof as to deprive them on the benefit of 
being held bona fide and onerous holders”.
262
 In this context bad faith is not limited 
to questions about the third party’s private state of knowledge. It also involves 
scrutiny of behaviour according to a more objective standard of “reasonable care and 
caution”. In Brown the pawnbrokers were not entirely free of blame because of the 
lack of enquiry into Marr’s title to the goods, but the court was not prepared to go so 




The clearest explanation of the culpa lata principle is found in Faulds v Townsend,
264
 
a case normally considered to illustrate principles of unjustified enrichment. The 
defender was a manufacturing chemist whose business involved the slaughter of 
animals which were no longer fit for butchering. In order to avoid nuisance to the 
neighbourhood, the purchase and processing of the animals usually took place during 
the night. The pursuer’s horse was stolen, hastily sold to Townsend for less than its 
market value, and the same night was boiled up for manure. It was not until 
afterwards that it came to light the animal had been stolen, and the owner brought an 
action for the value of the horse. Lord Ardmillan set out the various possible 
responses of the law where stolen property has been acquired by a third party: 
 
a)  stolen property can always be recovered by an owner because of the 




b) if the third party recipient parted with possession honestly and in good 
faith, he would only be liable in quantum lucratus and “the owner would be 
left to seek restitution from the possessor”;
266
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c) if the third party acquired the property “not merely in good faith, and 
without knowledge that it was stolen, but with due care and caution under the 
circumstances” and subsequently disposed of it also with “due care and 
caution”, again he would only be liable in quantum lucratus; 
 
d) however, if the third party put an end to possession “in mala fide or by 
dole, or by such fault as is equivalent to dole … he would be liable in the 
proved value of the animal”.
267
   
 
Because of the unusual nature of the business, and the fact that it afforded 
“temptation to theft”, as a matter of public policy a high degree of care and caution 
was required and, in this case, was not exercised in the purchase and disposal of the 
horse. The defender was, therefore, guilty of culpa lata quae equiparatur dolo and 




Besides providing some insight into third party liability, Lord Ardmillan also appears 




Want of care and caution is fault – not always culpa lata; but it may be culpa 
lata in circumstances where great care and caution are required, and are not 
given. The peculiar circumstances which demand great care and caution raise 
the character of the culpa which consists in the want of that care and caution. 
When, on grounds of public policy, an unusual degree of care and caution is 
required from a person who carries on a business which must afford 
temptation to theft, then the want of that care and caution in the purchase and 




 Ibid. See also McKay v Forsyth (1758) Mor 4944 where a purchase of salmon was found not to 
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value. 
269
 (1861) 23 D 437 at 439-440 per Lord Ardmillan. This explanation is reminiscent of Bell’s 
discussion of culpa lata ((1839) Principles §233-4) which comes under the heading “Responsibility 
for Neglect, Actual or Presumed”, and is immediately followed by a similarly policy-based liability 
applying to common carriers, innkeepers and stablers. The roots of this liability arise from the 
Praetorian Edict, which is “enlarged” because they are “cases supposed to be peculiarly exposed to the 
dangers of collusion and carelessness” (§ 235). 
58 
 
disposal of a stolen article is not only a fault, and a fault through which the 
purchaser has acquired the property, or has ceased to possess it, and 
prevented the possibility of vindication, but it is a fault in regard to which 
public policy, and consequent personal responsibility in the matter, have 
raised and aggravated the quality. 
 
On this analysis there are two possible faults in the behaviour of a third party 
recipient: the first is the question of how the property was acquired; the second is the 
question if and how it was disposed of. In Faulds the third party was liable on both 
counts, but Lord Ardmillan appears to suggest that either would have created 
liability. Bad faith is a familiar criterion for liability in the acquisition of the property 
by a third party. The second type of fault, applicable to both acquisition and disposal, 
is a more objective standard of due care and caution, which derives in Faulds from 
public policy. It comes closer to the idea of constructive knowledge where the 
acquirer ought to have been put on enquiry. To modern eyes it appears closely 
related to negligence, failure to meet a reasonable standard of care and caution, and it 
is at least arguable that this amounts to a delictual claim, based on culpa as Stair 
would have had it, and treated as an aspect of fraud. It was a familiar characterisation 
of behaviour which could not be classified as either a crime or an intentional delict, 





(d) Breach of fiduciary duty, negligence and culpa lata  
The culpa lata principle was also used in relation to trustees and breaches of 
fiduciary duty in the late nineteenth century, at a time when the courts were 
grappling with liability for negligent misstatements. It is a notable feature of the 
authorities on fraud in its wider meaning that many of the cases involve agents, 
trustees or other fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary relationships. But in the cases discussed 
below it appears that the Scottish courts had a restrictive view of what constituted a 
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breach of a fiduciary duty, and the House of Lords used the culpa lata principle to 
expand liability. The language of fraud is sometimes used in the judgments, which 
cast light on the relationship between fraud and breach of fiduciary duty as well as on 
the scope of culpa lata. 
 
In McPherson’s Trs v Watt
271
 a solicitor, who had acted for family members in 
various transactions, purchased trust property for himself but concealed from the 
family his identity as purchaser. It was argued that he had been acting as agent for 
the family, that there had been concealment and, in addition, that he had not bought 
at a fair price. Lord President Inglis denied liability on grounds that there was no 
agency relationship;
272
 Lord Deas agreed and, in addition, held that although the 
solicitor concealed he was the buyer, there was no deceit so fraud was not proved.
273
 
Lord Shand dissented on both counts (and his judgment was affirmed on appeal): the 
solicitor’s liability arose from a combination of concealment and the relationship 
between the parties, which was fiduciary in character; there was evidence that he had 
obtained the property for less than the market price; and he should not be allowed to 
retain a benefit obtained in these circumstances. He affirmed the decision of the Lord 
Ordinary that a purchase by an agent is a transaction which “the law regards, and 
rightly regards, with jealousy” and any such agent “must come into Court with clean 
hands, and must show that his client was acting with full information upon every 
material matter, and that the price was adequate”.
274
 A relationship of confidence, 
disclosure, good faith and equality in the transaction are identified as relevant factors 
for inferring culpa. 
 
The House of Lords agreed with Lord Shand that there was a “relation of 
confidence” between the solicitor and the family,
275
 which, although not strictly 
fiduciary in that he was not acting for them in this particular transaction (although he 
had done previously), implies that any relation of confidence would import the same 
duty. And even if there was no intentional deceit in the concealment, the combination 
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He may not have had any fraudulent design; he may have conceived himself 
warranted in acting as he did; he may not have apprehended the duties 
imposed by fiduciary relations; but it is not the less clear that the law must be 
enforced and the purchase nullified. 
 
Regardless of his intention, this combination of factors inferred culpa or fraud. It is 
also worth remaking that in the late nineteenth century the Scottish courts appear 
somewhat reluctant to penalise fiduciaries, many of whom were lawyers like 
themselves. McPherson was followed a decade later, almost contemporaneously with 
the decision in Derry v Peek, by a trilogy of cases all of which involved the liability 
of trustees who had acted negligently with trust assets and had incurred losses 
(usually following a bankruptcy). The actions were brought by the beneficiaries 
arguing that the trustees should be personally liable for the losses incurred. 
 
In Knox v Mackinnon
277
 some of the trustees had made an imprudent loan to a family 
member who subsequently became insolvent. Lord Watson held (affirming the 
decision of the Inner House
278
) that an indemnity clause in the trust deed was 
“ineffectual to protect a trustee against the consequences of culpa lata, or of gross 
negligence on his part, or of any conduct which is inconsistent with bona fides”.
279
 
Even though they had acted from honest motives in making the loan they had 
nevertheless committed a breach of trust.  
 
In the following year in Raes v Meek
280
 trust funds were lent for property 
development and the borrower again became insolvent. The case was clearly 
controversial in Scotland where a bench of seven judges held by a narrow margin 
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(four to three) that the trustees were not personally liable. This was reversed on 
appeal and Lord Herschell’s speech, with which the rest of the court concurred, 
relied on the decision in Knox and on Lord Watson’s reference to the culpa lata 
principle. According to Lord Herschell, culpa lata is indistinguishable from “the 
want of that care which a man of ordinary prudence would display in the 
management of his own affairs”.
281
 In Raes it is used as an early formulation of 
liability for negligence in the context of a breach of trust. 
 
Lord Shand was one of the three dissenting voices in the Inner House in Raes, where 
there was clearly controversy about extending liability for misrepresentations made 
without deceitful intent. By the time of Carruthers v Carruthers
282
 Lord Shand was 
no longer on the Scottish bench but he had handed on the dissenting mantle to Lord 
Rutherfurd Clark. Once again trustees were in the frame for not having conducted 
any regular examination of accounts, subsequent to which one of their number 
absconded with part of the trust fund and became insolvent. And yet again the House 
of Lords affirmed the dissenting judgment, holding that the trustees’ breach of duty 
amounted to culpa lata, now equated to gross negligence. Just as the meaning of 
fraud became more restrictive in the second half of the nineteenth century, so we see 
a similar narrowing of the culpa lata principle. Where previously it had been used to 
denote a broad sense of fault, now the standard was one of gross negligence, 
equivalent to both a delict and (probably) a crime. 
 
Several points are worth noting in relation to these cases. The Scottish courts 
attributed no liability to the trustees either because they did not consider the 
relationship to be fiduciary in character; or because they had a lower standard for 
what constituted a fiduciary duty; or because they considered the trustees to be 
protected by a variety of immunity or indemnity clauses in the trust deeds. The 
House of Lords consistently overruled and attempted to articulate the fine line 
between fraud and breach of trust which was imperceptible in the Scottish decisions. 
In some of these cases fraud was argued, but the ground of liability settled on to 
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create liability for the trustees was the culpa lata principle. A variety of explanations 
for the principle were put forward in a fiduciary context. It was sometimes referred to 
as negligence or gross negligence; sometimes merely as an omission or failure to 
take the care expected of a fiduciary; sometimes equivalent to a breach of trust; and 
sometimes it was related to misrepresentation and misstatements made without 
intention to deceive. Just as for a criminal breach of trust there was no need to show 
intention, so in a civil context the language of fraud was used, but the test for 
whether the duty had been breached was judged objectively. Another point of interest 
is that the Scottish courts appeared to apply a lower standard in relation to when a 
relationship was fiduciary in character and what constituted breach of a fiduciary 
duty. The nature and extent of the fiduciary obligation and the relationship between 
fraud and a breach of that obligation would be fruitful territory for further research.  
 
(e) Unintentional misrepresentation and culpa lata 
Courts north and south of the border were exercised in the mid-nineteenth century 
about how to deal with misrepresentations which were unintentional. In an era of 
commercial expansion and, towards the end of the nineteenth century, a financial 
crisis in which many banks and other financial institutions failed, contractors, 
builders, shareholders and other members of the public were trying to find a way 
either to get their money back or to be compensated for the higher than anticipated 
costs of performing contracts. 
 
Peter Stein has argued that in older Scots law unintentional misrepresentation was 
dealt with in two different ways: by an implied warranty against latent defects and 
“by applying the principle that culpa lata is the equivalent of dolus.”
283
 It is easy to 
find evidence of the former in older case law, as Stein demonstrates.  However, the 
culpa lata principle appears to have been used in this way only occasionally in early 
case law, and only becomes associated with misrepresentation in the second half of 
the nineteenth century.
284
 The culpa lata principle is certainly part of the complex 
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story of how the Scottish courts treated unintentional misrepresentations, and this is 
considered is some detail in chapter 5.  
 
(f) The fate of culpa lata 
As has been demonstrated, the culpa lata principle was used in a variety of contexts 
which can be considered examples of presumptive fraud in a delictual context. It was 
applied to the behaviour of third party recipients of property who were in mala fides 
or failed to make enquiry, sometimes explained on grounds of public policy.
285
 It was 
also relevant in a fiduciary context to attribute liability for a failure to adhere to the 
standards of behaviour expected of a prudent trustee. Its meaning has been little 
explored
286
 but it covers a broad range of behaviour ranging from gross negligence 
(the modern understanding of the phrase), to a lack of the care expected of a prudent 
fiduciary or employee,
287
 to a broader range of unconscionable behaviour which has 
been characterised as “conduct which is inconsistent with bona fides”.
288
 It also 
brought within the scope of fraud behavior which did not involve intentional deceit 
by deeming it to be “equivalent” to dole. The tendency was to apply the principle in 
cases which today we would consider the territory of negligence, and in all cases the 
defender’s honesty or lack of it was not relevant and did not amount to a defence. 
 
The culpa lata principle has survived almost exclusively in the context of breach of 
trust where it is now understood to mean gross negligence,
289
 rather than its weaker 
sense of unwarrantable behaviour.
290
 After the decision in Carruthers v Carruthers
291
 
there was some debate about whether the prohibition on excluding liability for fraud 
would also apply to cases of culpa lata, a principle which was accepted in Scotland 
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but not in England.
292
 Since then there have been a number of judicial 
pronouncements about culpa lata alleging that as a doctrine it is not useful
293
 or even 
that it is simply no longer in fashion.
294
 Lord Justice-Clerk Alness’ comments in 




There has been much refinement in the older cases regarding culpa levissima, 
culpa levis, and culpa lata. I venture respectfully to doubt whether these 
somewhat fine distinctions assist in the solution of the problem today. I 
incline to the view expressed by an eminent English judge, who said that 
gross negligence is just negligence, with a vituperative adjective attached to 
it. 
 
This view was questioned by Lord President Cooper in Hunter v Hanley
296
 who 
noted that the terms “gross negligence”, “culpa lata” and “crassa negligentia” had 
often been used in connection with the liability of trustees. Although it was not 
relevant to the question before the court (professional negligence) he nevertheless 
affirmed: “I am not therefore prepared to say that the concept of gross negligence 
forms no part of the law of Scotland today”.
297
 In England, it has been regarded as 
the Scottish equivalent of equitable fraud,
298
 which is perhaps uncomfortable but, in 
substance, may be more consistent with history.  
 
Culpa lata appears to have all but vanished in modern law as a general concept 
outwith the context of the law of trusts.
299
 This is regrettable in that it could have laid 
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the foundations for the Scottish law of negligence to develop independently based on 
the broad principle of culpa,
300
 developing a line of case law that had been 
established over a long period.  
 
 
4. Presumptive Fraud in Contract 
There are suggestions in case law that bad faith or knowledge is a species of 
presumptive fraud
301
 and, as discussed above, Stein also includes culpa lata and 
latent insufficiency within its scope.
302
 For the purpose of this analysis I have treated 
bad faith as a separate concept from fraud, other than in the context of secondary 
fraud;
303
 and the culpa lata principle as an aspect of Stair’s discussion of 
presumptive fraud in a delictual context. Bad faith amounts to private knowledge and 
lack of disclosure; culpa lata is, arguably, an attempt to create a more objective 
standard of behaviour, with reference to limiting devices such as public policy, 
reasonableness or prudence, and it has some affinity with the modern concept of 
negligence. Both of these categories essentially cover omissions. However, there is 
another version of presumptive fraud in a contractual context which has a different 
rationale and is almost entirely subjective. Broadly defined, one party has acted in an 
underhand way so as to cause disadvantage or lesion to another and this is deemed to 
be fraudulent behaviour. It may be helpful to think of bad faith and culpa lata as the 
passive voice of presumptive fraud; contractual presumptive fraud, on the other hand, 
is a more active concept – a sword rather than a shield. 
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(a) Stair and presumptive fraud in contract 
Stair returns to the question of when fraud is presumed in his treatment of 
“conventional obligations”.  Presumptive fraud in the context of delict is principally 
about concealment, whether of defects, of the import of deeds, or of a state of 
insolvency. However, in title I.10, his discussion of presumptive fraud is part of a 
philosophical exploration of the basis of a contract, in which Aristotelian influence is 




It is the property of permutative contracts, that the purpose of the contractors 
is to keep an equality in the worth and value of the things, fruit, or worth 
interchanged, the value whereof is regulated according to the common esteem 
and custom of men in every place. 
 




Whether in these contracts there be a moral necessity to keep an exact 
equality, that whosoever ex post facto, shall be found to have made an 
unequal bargain, the gainer ought to repair the loser.   
 
His answer is that in Scots law it is the will of the parties that will prevail:
306 
 
the equality required in these contracts, cannot be in any other rate than the 
parties agree on. 
 
There is a pattern in Stair’s writing that could be described as scholastic in character, 
a method which would have been familiar from his time as regent at Glasgow 
University.
307
 It is particularly obvious in this discussion. He makes a general 
statement of a legal principle, then puts forward arguments for and against, in the 
manner of disputations. Just as he had qualified his requirement for proof of fraud in 
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his discussion of fraud as a delict,
308
 now he does the same with his assertion of the 
high principle of freedom of contract. This is perhaps explicable on grounds of style 
and method, but some insight into his unease can also be found by placing Stair in 
his religious context. While freedom was a cardinal principle of the Presbyterian 
Church, it was always bound by the greater importance of duty;
309
 likewise for Stair 
the conventional obligations are always qualified by the obediential. Immediately 





but in [permutative contracts], as in all others, if any party hath disadvantage 
by fraud or guile, it ought to be repaired; but not by virtue of the contract, but 
from the obligation arising from delinquence.  
 
There appears to be a certain amount of vacillation in this passage, as though Stair is 
torn between the requirements of commerce and the moral character of the law: 
Roman law punishes enorm lesion, Grotius demands equality, but Scots law does 
not; on the other hand, the Scriptures tell us that “unjust balances are an abomination 
to the Lord”, and so there is redress for certain kinds of inequality. This is a closely 
argued passage and the detail is important.  The obvious cases of inequality are false 





obvious and easily perceivable by the acquirer, in which case there can be no 
presumption of fraud, “his eye is his merchant”. But in others, according to 
the sentence of Ambrose; “In contracts,” saith he, “even the defects of the 
things which are sold ought to be laid open, and unless the seller intimate the 
same, there is competent to the buyer an action of fraud.” So also ... 
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It is not insignificant that Stair openly refers to Ambrose for authority, an influential 
fourth century ecclesiast and one of the four Doctors of the Church, thus making 
clear that his source lies not in the civil law, but in theology and morality. In the 
previous title on delinquence he had already discussed the fact that latent 
insufficiency was a case of presumptive fraud, and the crucial words “so also” 
indicate that there are other cases too. Thus not only are latent defects an example of 
inequality (protecting buyers); so are situations where “the buyer take[s] advantage 
of the ignorance and simplicity of the seller” (protecting sellers); holding onto goods 
“till pinching necessity, which raiseth extreme dearth” is another; or inflating the 
price where the buyer has some special need that puts him at the mercy of the seller, 
which would violate “the natural obligation of charity”.
312
 These exceptions to the 
freedom of contracting are part of a discussion of inequality, but they are also 
inextricably linked to fraud. They considerably extend the range of situations in 
which fraud is presumed, this time in a contractual context.
313
 They also demonstrate 
that inequality (which must derive from Stair’s understanding of Aristotelian and 
Thomist philosophy) is the root of the presumption.
314
 This is borne out in the case 
law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
 
(b) Presumptive fraud as inequality 
There is abundant evidence that presumptive fraud was an active concept in the 
Scottish courts well into the nineteenth century. Cases of presumptive fraud were 
most frequently based on “fraud and circumvention”.
315
 For Stair, circumvention was 
synonymous with fraud. However, over the course of the nineteenth century the 
meaning of circumvention came to denote the various species of fraud which did not 
involve intentional deceit.
316
 In Clunie v Stirling
317
 Lord Cockburn explained that, 




 For discussion of the treatment of presumptive fraud in Bankton and Erskine see Stein (1958) 
pp.177-179, and discussion below, pp.75-76.  Bell is different in that his treatment fraud is eclipsed by 
error (Stein (1958) pp.184ff.) and there is little trace of presumptive fraud. 
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“[t]he inference of fraud may be drawn from the whole case, although no one act can 
be pointed out as in itself a direct instance of the practice of deceit”.
318
 He 




Circumvention sometimes amounts to fraud, and some cases of fraud are 
cases of simple circumvention; and the two pass into each other by such 
shadowy gradations, that they are often difficult to be distinguished.  
 
Under the influence of English Chancery cases, a similar distinction evolved using 
the unfortunate categories of moral fraud and legal fraud.
320
 Whatever the 
terminology that was used, most of these cases did not amount to fraud proper in the 
sense of intentional deceit. It was imposition or taking advantage that created 
inequality and brought legal sanctions down upon the defender.  
 
The basis of contractual presumptive fraud is inequality, often referred to explicitly 
in the cases.
321
 However, not every case of inequality in a bargain was actionable, 
bearing in mind the demands of commerce and the caveat emptor principle.
322
 In 
Gillespie v Russel a landlord claimed to have been manipulated into granting a lease 
for far below its value but there was not enough in the facts to substantiate a case of 
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inferred fraud principally because it was a straightforward commercial transaction, 
the pursuers could not argue that they were vulnerable, and they did not lack 
opportunity to attend to their own interests as normal landlords would have done.
323
 
For inequality to raise a presumption of fraud, there generally had to be a further 
aggravating factor. It is, therefore, inequality plus the aggravating factor which 
creates a presumption of fraud and not simply a disadvantageous bargain. In cases 
where the presumption was established the courts appear to weigh up a number of 
factors which may indicate what is sometimes called gross inequality: the 
presumption may arise from the nature of the deed itself or the circumstances in 
which it was signed; it may turn on the weakness or vulnerability of the person 
imposed upon;
324
 it may relate to the nature of the behaviour which caused the 
inequality;
325
or it may arise from exploitation of a relationship of trust and 
confidence. And in that mix of factors, there is often discussion of whether or not the 
transaction is gratuitous and whether the vulnerable party had independent legal 
advice. It is difficult to categorise these cases with any precision, and often several 
factors work in combination. Detail is given below of the principal categories where 
presumptive fraud is found. 
 
(c) Inequality arising from the deed 
Some of the presumptive fraud cases involve deeds, particularly wills, which were 
not read aloud to ill or dying people before they were signed. Unsurprisingly, it was 
held that “fraud is easily inferred by such an act.”
326
 In others, the transactions in 
question were so disadvantageous to one of the parties that the very nature of the 
deed raised a presumption of fraud,
327
 or at least ought to have put the other party on 
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enquiry as to the probity of the transaction, even for an arms’-length transaction.
328
 It 
was argued in McDiarmid v McDiarmid,
329
 where a frail elderly man had signed over 
property with no independent legal advice, that fraud was “manifest ex facie of the 
deed”. Despite argument that no specific acts of fraud could be proved, Lord 
Hermand held that “the deed itself proves the fraud”
330
 on account of the inequality 
of the bargain he had entered into. Lord President Hope went further and equated 




(d) Inequality plus vulnerability 
A particularly common combination of circumstances giving rise to a presumption of 
fraud was an unequal bargain with a vulnerable person.
332
 The rationale for 




It is nothing but a notification to the lieges of the weakness of the person 
interdicted, and to caution them against dealing with that person, unless on an 
equal footing.  It was therefore wrong in the defenders to take advantage of 
the known facility of Jean Mackie, and to elicit from her dispositions for a 
song, at least far under their true value. 
 
There was no need to prove deception in these cases, merely that there was 
vulnerability which had been taken advantage of causing the vulnerable party to 
suffer lesion or disadvantage. In Love v Marshall
334
 the relationship between 
intentional deceit and taking advantage was discussed. It was said that it was not 
fraud “in the ordinary sense of the term, - that is to say, it is not a case of a deed 
                                                 
328
 Nisbet v Kinnaird (1698) Mor 4872; Nisbet v Cairns and Howden (1864) 2 M 863. 
329
 (1826) 4 S 583. 
330
 Ibid. at 585. 
331
 Ibid. at 586. 
332
 In Maitland v Fergusson (1729) Mor 4956 (aff Fergusson v Maitland (1729) 1 Pat 73) a discharge 
was reduced “upon fraud and circumvention, which was principally presumed from the facility and 
weakness of the granter, joined with the very great inequality of the bargain”. 
333
 Mackie v Maxwell (1752) Mor 4963 at 4964. 
334
 (1870) 9 M 291. 
72 
 
procured by a specific act of deception”.
335





on whom a general influence has been used of an undue and improper 
character.  This influence implies a course of deception, rightly characterised 
by the word circumvention, which is fraud in grain, but not fraud perpetrated 
by a single specific act.  
 
The term “circumvention” gradually replaced fraud in circumstances where 
advantage was taken of weakness, laying the foundations for a discrete doctrine of 
facility and circumvention, the roots of which clearly lie in presumptive fraud.
337
 
However, unless those roots are properly understood, the doctrine of facility and 
circumvention may lack a doctrinal basis and risks being misapplied. An example 
from the early twentieth century can be found in McDougal v McDougal’s Trs
338
 at a 
period when presumptive fraud was no longer a familiar legal doctrine. A will was 
challenged on grounds of facility and circumvention but the claim was rejected by 
the Lord Ordinary on grounds that there were no express averments of fraud. On 
appeal it was argued that the pursuers had shown enough for the court to infer fraud. 
However, the Second Division affirmed the earlier judgment. Lord Justice-Clerk 
Alness considered a charge of circumvention to be “almost criminal in its 
character”
339
 and that proof of fraud, deceit and “moral obliquity” had to be shown. 
In an astonishing statement he claims to be unable to recall any case of the kind 
where deceit was not present.
340
 This is surely wrong but it amply demonstrates that 
when modern legal doctrines are detached from their history, courts have a tendency 
to lapse into a narrow formalism because they do not have sufficient understanding 
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 For a detailed account of the history of facility and circumvention see McBryde (1976) pp.92-101. 
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 1931 SC 102. 
339
 Ibid. at 111. 
340
 Ibid. at 112. His colleagues on the bench did acknowledge that in some circumstances fraud could 
be inferred, but required a much higher degree of dishonesty than in most of the older authorities. A 
more recent expression of the same sentiment can be found in Hartdegen v Fanner 1980 SLT (Notes) 




to develop the law in a way that is historically consistent without fear of “opening the 
floodgates” and creating uncertainty.  
 
The conceptual basis of presumptive fraud as inequality is stated most clearly in 
McNeill v Moir
341
 where an 80 year old man had granted a gratuitous deed of 
discharge “to the granter’s great hurt and prejudice, and enormous lesion”.
342
 He was 
found not to have fully understood the deed, nor had he received independent legal 
advice, and the Lord Ordinary held that it was “a most unequal and unfair 
transaction”.
343
 On appeal, it was argued before the First Division inter alia that it 
was not relevant to state that there had been inequality,
344
 to which the court’s 
response was that “the transaction upon the face of it appeared so grossly unequal 
and irrational, that it was plain that it could only have been brought about by a 
fraudulent advantage having been taken of the facility”.
345
 McNeill contains a 
number of aggravating factors which, in combination, amounted to presumptive 
fraud although the separate doctrine of facility and circumvention was beginning to 




Facility and lesion by themselves have not been held as sufficient grounds of 
reduction by the law of Scotland; fraud has been reckoned a necessary 
ingredient; at the same time, where the other two are great, a lesser degree of 
fraud will be sufficient, and will, in certain cases, be presumed: great facility 
and great lesion will presume fraud.  The Lords, however, in some late cases, 
seem to hold that facility and lesion, even without fraud, are sufficient. 
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(e) Inequality plus a relationship of trust and confidence 
Fraud could also be presumed in cases where a relationship of trust or confidence 
was taken advantage of either between family members,
347
 or in relationships which 
were fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary in character such as those involving curators and 
tutors.
348
 There is clearly overlap with the way in which the culpa lata principle was 
used in relationships of trust.
349
 The important point is that both doctrines assumed 
that exploitation of such relationships was part of the law of fraud. In some of these 
cases, particularly those involving wills, there is both a family relationship and 
vulnerability in that the person imposed upon may be a family member who is also 
old or frail. There is a tendency to focus more on the person’s weakness than on the 
nature of the relationship, facility being a more familiar ground of challenge.
350
 The 
cases discussed below represent, in my view, a historical basis in Scots law for what 
would now be understood as the territory of undue influence. This is perhaps 
controversial as it has been authoritatively asserted
351
 (an assertion first made in 
1940 by an English barrister and which has subsequently remained unchallenged
352
) 
that undue influence was imported into Scots in the late nineteenth century through 
Gray v Binny
353
 and that the native ground of challenge in Scots law was facility and 
circumvention.
354
 While Gray v Binny may represent a turning point in terms of 
formal affirmation that the English equitable doctrine of undue influence was 
compatible with Scots law (with the important caveat that it was neither imported in 
                                                 
347
 Wright v Ritchie (1746) Mor 4952 (an unsuccessful challenge between a husband and wife); Mann 
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“that secondary or lower species of fraud which is our law is known as circumvention” (Gray v Binny 
(1879) 7 R 332 at 351). 
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its entirety nor could it be considered a faithful reproduction),
355
 it is inaccurate to 
say that Scots law did not recognise situations involving abuse of a relationship. 
Such situations may not be (and are not usually) called “undue influence”, which was 
not a term of art in Scots law,
356
 but that is not to say that exploitation of a 
relationship of trust and confidence was not sanctionable as part of the scope of 
presumptive fraud.  
 
There are many early cases involving “status” relationships which have a fiduciary or 
quasi-fiduciary character. In the Institutions Stair begins his treatment of the 
substantive law with status relationships.
357
 The duties arising from these 
relationships are “obediential” and although Stair does not specifically refer to them 
in his treatment of fraud, there are strong parallels with other examples of 
presumptive fraud. Where in the previous category facility and lesion amounted to 
presumptive fraud, in some of the relationship cases it is minority and lesion which is 
the actionable combination.
358
 It could rightly be argued that minority and lesion has 
its modern equivalent in the law of incapacity, but it also appears to be regarded as a 
type of presumptive fraud.  
 
Other Institutional sources are more explicit in making the link with fraud, as are the 
courts. Bankton’s list of circumstances in which fraud can be inferred (“without any 
proof of actual circumvention”) supports this typology: as well as transactions 
involving people who transact in the knowledge of impending insolvency, fraud can 
be presumed from the deed itself if it causes “great lesion”, for instance where the 
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granter is a “weak person”; and, in addition, “all latent rights, among very conjunct 








All bargains which, from their very appearance discover oppression, or an 
intention in any of the contractors to catch some undue advantage from his 
neighbour’s necessities, lie open to reduction on the head of dole or extortion, 
without the necessity of proving any special circumstance of fraud or 
circumvention on the part of that contractor.  
 
And while presumptive fraud is not so clearly articulated in the relationship cases as 
in those where facility is present,
361
 there is nevertheless sufficient authority to 
indicate that Scots law was always concerned about abuse of relationships of trust 
and considered it to be a close bedfellow of fraud.  
 
Where lesion was caused to a minor or pupil the courts were quick to reverse the 
transaction. Sometimes this was done to remove the disadvantage caused, sometimes 
to restore equality, sometimes to punish unwarrantable behaviour.
362
 A disposition 
was reduced on grounds of minority and lesion where the young woman did not 
receive a “competent price”, on grounds that “the minor was found thereby 
circumvented”.
363
 In a very early case it was seen as fraudulent (described as 
“summa fraude et dolo se gessit”) for a tutor’s son to purchase property belonging to 
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 Not only were curators or tutors barred from gaining any 
personal benefit, but this extended to their close relatives and to contravene that 
principle was described in the language of fraud.
365
 It is the principle of equality 
which is emphasised in Carmichael v Castlehill, an action to reduce an assignation 
granted by a minor which was argued on grounds of inequality and lesion. The court 
found lesion and wanted to adjust the transaction “to bring up the terms to an 
equality and equilibrium”.
366
 In Bower, Complainer,
367
 a sectarian-flavoured 
competition for control of the estate of a 10 year old boy, it was alleged that his 
Catholic relatives had him sign a document naming them as his curators and 
subsequently carted him off to the Scots College at Paris “to be educated in the 
Popish religion”.
368
 The court reduced the deed and appointed a closer (Protestant) 
relative curator, explaining that “wherever there is suspicion of undue management, 
or of imposition on the minor, it is competent to the Court ex oficio, in order to 




Perhaps of greater interest are cases where the young person has reached majority but 
a transaction involving a former curator or tutor is nevertheless reduced, with more 
explicit references to the fraudulent nature of the transaction. The relationship 
between minority and lesion and presumptive fraud can be seen in argument in 
Cockburn v Oxenfoord
370
 where a young man who had recently attained majority 
attempted to reduce a bond granted to his former governor. The counter-argument, 
that “neither will all the grounds adduced infer circumvention of a person that was 
major”, implies that fraud would readily have been inferred had he been a minor. 
And in Trinch v Watson
371
 a contract entered into between a young woman and her 
former curator was reduced despite the fact she had reached majority. There was 
some evidence of facility, but fraud was presumed from the fact that she had recently 
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been his minor, that the contract was “upon such unequal terms” and was “very 
unwarrantable on the curator’s part”.
372
 However, inequality on its own was not a 
sufficient ground of reduction unless the presumption of fraud was raised by another 




There are other cases in which family members were able to reduce a deed without 
evidence either of facility or of circumvention. In Fraser v Fraser’s Trs,
374
 which 
concerned a discharge of rights obtained by a father from his own child, Lord 





I need not tell you, for I am sure your own good sense will point out to you, 
that both in law and reason, where bargains and contracts are entered into 
between persons standing in the relationship to each other, such as that of 
husband and wife, parent and child, every thing ought to be done as fairly, 
equally, openly and candidly as possible. 
 
Again the root of injustice is inequality which arises because of the imbalance of 
power and influence in the relationship, thus creating a higher duty of honesty. As 




on one side you have marital authority, parental authority and influence; 
while, on the other side, you have conjugal love and regard, filial duty and 
affection 
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And, therefore,  
 
they do not treat each other upon fair and equal terms, unless every thing be 
laid by the father fairly and openly before the child.  
 
The children in this particular case had no independent advice nor did their father 
present them with accounts or any other evidence before asking for their signature. 





The impact of the relationship is obvious where husbands and wives are 
concerned,
378
 or parents and children,
379
 but abuse of a position of trust and 
confidence is not limited to immediate family. In Murray v Murray’s Trs
380
 a young 
man (who was not a minor) had been persuaded by his uncle to sign a discharge of 
his inheritance rights. In addition to his youth, he had led a sheltered life, had never 
travelled beyond the Isle of Skye and was uneducated. An action to reduce the 
discharge was successful, not on grounds of facility, but of inequality and taking 
advantage of a trusted position. The Lord Ordinary notes that “without being obliged 
to establish facility, a very unequal transaction entered into, by which a great 
advantage has been obtained by one of the parties from the ignorance or want of 
experience of the other, who ought to have been invited to seek the aid of a friend or 
man of business to advise with, may be set aside”.
381
 The First Division considered it 
an “ugly” case
382
 which was “tainted with fraud”,
383
 for gross advantage had been 
taken of the pursuer. In Ballantyne v Neilson
384
 despite the fact that the pursuer was 
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“major, sciens et prudens”, a contract was reduced on grounds of fraud and 
circumvention because he had been “grossly imposed upon under pretence of 
friendship ... to go into so disadvantageous a contract”. Once again abuse of a 
relationship of trust was a route to inferring fraud. It is, therefore, suggested that a 
relationship of confidence acts as an aggravating factor – just as frailty or 
vulnerability does in the previous category of cases – in raising a presumption of 
fraud. In one judicial explanation it was regarded as fortifying the presumption: “I 
think the presumption, or more than presumption of mala fides, is strengthened by 




The idea of aggravation is discussed in the important case of Tennent v Tennent’s 
Trs
386
 which concerned the family partnership of Tennent Breweries. The father had 
entered into an agreement with one of his sons (Gilbert) that he would advance 
money to meet his extensive debts on condition that Gilbert renounced his rights 
under the partnership. After the father’s death Gilbert raised an action to have the 
agreement annulled on various grounds including the allegation that it had been 
signed for a grossly inadequate consideration and that his consent had been 
“fraudulently impetrated” on account of the relationship of trust and confidence.
387
 
The action was unsuccessful, but largely because there was no evidence for his 
allegations. The court considered that there was adequate consideration in that he had 
received a substantial amount of money to pay off his debts, even if it was much less 
than the potential value of his partnership rights. Nor was there any evidence that 
pressure had been brought to bear on him: indeed he had initiated the transaction 
because he was in desperate financial straits. Moreover, he had been a practising 
lawyer and could hardly argue that he did not understand the nature of what he had 
signed. There are many references in the judgments to the fact that he went into the 
transaction with his eyes open, which largely accounts for his lack of success.
388
 
However, there is extensive obiter discussion of the combination of factors that 
might have led to a successful reduction – the lack of adequate consideration, 
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parental influence, the lack of independent legal advice, all of which had been 
successful in some of the cases explored above. An argument was made about the 
inequality of the bargain, and while it was recognised to be unequal, this alone was 
not enough without the presence of an aggravating factor, and there were none. 
However, the majority of the court accepted that the relationship could have been a 




I can perfectly understand the application of the legal principle against 
influence of a father over a son, or even of one brother over another, in a case 
where the party is got to sign a deed giving up valuable rights, the extent and 
nature of which are not fully revealed or known to him. If there had been 
anything of that kind here, - any withholding of information which could 
have been given, even upon matters as to which, in dealing with third parties, 
there might have been no duty of disclosure, or any deception as to the nature 
of the transaction, I think the relationship would have been most important, 
probably having led to the signing of the deed, in reliance, on the pursuer’s 
part, that those who were so related to him would conceal from him nothing 
they themselves knew. 
 
Lord Ardmillan, in a dissenting judgment, considered that the circumstances inferred 
fraud (although by now the concept of presumptive fraud is so far removed from 




It is an element of importance to be weighed with all the other circumstances, 
and if, in the relations or the conduct of the parties, there are any suspicious 
circumstances, then gross inadequacy of consideration may reasonably 
furnish what the English lawyers call “a vehement presumption of fraud”. 
                                                 
389
 Ibid. at 861 per Lord Deas. 
390
 Ibid. at 865, relying on the authority of Story on Equity and Erskine, Institute, IV.1.27. It is not 
clear why Lord Ardmillan should refer to this as an “English” presumption unless he is referring to the 
“vehement” adjective. There was clearly ample Scottish authority for such a presumption. It may also 
illustrate that even judges who were sympathetic to, even searching for, such a principle were 
unfamiliar with it by the second half of the nineteenth century. 
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The fact that a transaction is unequal, extortionate, and unfair, cannot be left 
out of consideration in conducting the inquiry whether it was fraudulent.  
 
Lord Ardmillan’s decision supports the suggestion that aggravating factors operate to 
raise a presumption of fraud. In Tennent he, unlike his colleagues, accepted that the 
combination of a number of factors was sufficient to infer fraud and to reduce the 
agreement: great inequality in the transaction, taking advantage of a relationship of 
confidence and of the son’s financial difficulties; and lack of legal advice.
391
 For 




The gates of justice are open wide in the tracing of fraud …. The violation of 
confidence, the breach of faith, is an incident and an element in the fraud, and 
an aggravation of it.  
 
By this period in the nineteenth century, it is only the dissenting judgment which 
supports an analysis of presumptive fraud. Lord President Inglis appeared to disagree 
fundamentally, or is usually taken to do so,
393
 for he did not include abuse of a 




Incapacity is one well known ground of reduction; force and fear is another 
category; facility and circumvention is a third; fraud is a fourth, - and fraud 
may consist either in fraudulent misrepresentation or in fraudulent 
concealment, or in both together; and, lastly, there is essential error.  But 
really, beyond these categories, I am not myself, as a lawyer, – as a Scottish 
lawyer, –  acquainted with any other ground of reduction applicable to deeds.  
 
He examined each of the arguments in turn, but concluded that although there was no 
doubt that fraud “comprehends within it an infinite variety of cases”, there was no 
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evidence here of “fraud, in the proper sense of the term”.
395
 Lord President Inglis 
specifically refused to make a general pronouncement about whether the alleged 
factors combined (gross inadequacy of consideration, undue influence arising from a 
confidential relationship, plus lesion on the one hand and great advantage on the 
other) would be a sufficient ground of reduction in other cases without proof of 
deceit, regarding it as “dangerous” to do so.
396
 Undoubtedly the Lord President 
considered that abuse of a relationship could, in principle, infer fraud, but there was 
simply no evidence of abuse in this case.
397
 It failed on the facts rather than the law. 
Given his judgment less than ten years later in Gray v Binny it would have been 
surprising had he rejected relationship as a relevant aggravating factor. For in that 
case he founded on the trust and confidence between the parties, particularly in 




If [the contracting parties] are strangers to each other, and dealing at arm’s-
length, each is not only entitled to make the best bargain he can, but to 
assume that the other fully understands and is the best judge of his own 
interests.  If, on the other hand, the relation of the parties is such as to beget 
mutual trust and confidence, each owes the other a duty which has no place as 
between strangers. But if the trust and confidence, instead of being mutual, 
are all given on one side and not reciprocated, the party trusted and confided 
in is bound, by the most obvious principles of fair dealing and honesty, not to 
abuse the power thus put in his hands.  
 
It has been said that Scots law makes a clear distinction between fraud and breach of 
a fiduciary duty
399
 but in an earlier period the two are much more closely related.  
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 Ibid. at 877. 
398
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399
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Many cases involving fiduciaries use the language of fraud (both via the culpa lata 
principle and presumptive fraud) and it is also to the law of agency that Lord Shand 
turned to illustrate that Scots law had its own remedy where relationships were 
abused. In Gray v Binny he made a clear analogy with agent/client cases which 
represented “only one of the various known relations of life in which influence arises 
from confidence given”.
400
 There is little evidence that the courts regarded fraud, 
including presumptive fraud, as an entirely different species of wrong from a breach 
of a fiduciary duty, and the case law is at times used interchangeably.
401
 The 
principles which operated in fiduciary relationships, particularly the relationship 
between agent and principal where there was a growing body of case law, were 
extended to include anyone in a position in trust, regardless of whether or not there 
was strictly a fiduciary duty. Although the Scottish courts had a restrictive approach 
to the standard of behaviour expected of a fiduciary (i.e. breach of fiduciary duty), 
they did not regard the fiduciary relationship as being different in character from 
other relationships of trust and confidence, and interpreted it generously in that 
respect. 
 
In Munro v Strain,
402
 where a will which had been altered in favour of a clergyman 
who was also the testator’s confessor, Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff explained the 




unquestionably if persons in those relations use the influence so acquired in 
order to accomplish purposes of their own, and overcome the will of the 
client, or parishioner, or patient, such acts will be viewed with great jealousy. 
                                                 
400
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A jury found that there was fraud and circumvention, but the case came before the 
Second Division a second time because of the absence of a finding of facility in the 
jury’s verdict.
404
 The court affirmed the verdict and facility was said to be inferred 




facility may be inferred from, or may consist in, circumstances giving to one 
man an unusual power or influence over another, not necessarily mental 
weakness. 
 
It would have been more usual at the time to infer fraud from the nature of the 
relationship, but instead it is facility which is inferred, albeit leading to the same end 
result. What is clear is that a number of factors may raise the same inference, 
particularly where they are found in combination. Lord Ormidale took the view that 
both facility and fraud could be inferred from a variety of causes or a combination of 




Nor was it disputed in the argument in this case that the weakness and facility 
necessary to be established may be of a varied character, and may arise from 
a variety of different causes; that it may arise from the natural disposition of 
the individual, or from the decay and prostration of his mental and bodily 
powers consequent upon advanced age or severe affliction, or many other 
agencies. 
In like manner, the fraud or circumvention which ought to be established in 
conjunction with weakness or facility may differ in degree according to 
circumstances. Nor is it necessary that there should be direct and positive 
proof of the fraud or circumvention. It is enough that there are facts and 
circumstances sufficient to entitle a jury to infer in a reasonable sense that 
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there has been fraud or circumvention. And in considering this matter, as well 
as the matter of facility and weakness, it is competent and proper for the jury 
to look at them not separately merely, but also in combination, and in the 
light of all the surrounding circumstances. I need scarcely add that among 
these circumstances there can be none more important than the nature and 
effect of the challenged deed itself, the way in which it was obtained from the 
granter, and the relative position of the granted and the party by whom it was 
obtained or procured from him.  
 
In a historical analysis of undue influence McBryde describes the second half of the 
nineteenth century as a period in which “the doctrine of undue influence had been 
slowly fermenting”
407
 with reference to many of the cases discussed here. This 
fermentation may have been prompted by familiarity with English law, but in my 
view it can also be viewed as a continuation of a line of legal doctrine which had 
been present in Scots law for many hundreds of years. The scrutiny of close 
relationships was not an unfamiliar aspect of presumptive fraud for the Scottish 
courts.
408
 However, it is true that the language of presumptive fraud became more 
infrequent and unfamiliar and the courts began to look to other doctrines (such as 
undue influence and, particularly, the law of error) to fulfil the same function.   
 
Gray v Binny represents a turning point of terminology and language. The action was 
based on fraud and circumvention or facility and circumvention, but the court 
(particularly Lord Shand) was uncomfortable about naming abuse of a relationship 
“fraud” and regarded it as shoe-horning undue influence into the law of fraud. 
However, the fact that fraud or circumvention did not require proof of intentional 
deceit was not in question and the court rejected the argument that the pursuer must 
show fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment or facility and 
circumvention as the only grounds for which Scots law provides a remedy,
409
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drawing a parallel with other cases of circumvention in its broad sense.
410





would lead, on the one hand, to transactions obviously unjust, entered into by 
one of the parties in the position of not being truly an entirely free agent, 
being nevertheless held valid, because it could not be shewn that the deed 
was procured by deceit; or, on the other hand, to the particular facts and circs 
of cases in which gratuitous benefits have been gained through such influence 
as I have referred to being held as amounting to fraud or deceit, only by 
taking a strained and exaggerated view of them.  
 
It was now considered inappropriate to use the language of fraud in this category of 
cases. 
 
Before leaving the topic of presumptive fraud, there are two other factors which are 
often considered in combination with the categories outlined above, and indeed are 
often present either singly or in combination: whether or not the exploited party 
received independent legal advice and whether or not the transaction was 
gratuitous.
412
  Both are part of the mix of aggravating factors precisely because they 
indicate inequality. If one party has no independent advisor there is a question of 
equality of arms and so the presumption is raised. Likewise, if only one party gains a 
benefit from a transaction, the law is suspicious and asks if the un-benefitted party 
has truly consented. 
 
(f) Inequality plus lack of independent legal advice 
Where there is an imbalance of power, caused either by weakness or a dominant 
relationship, a further aggravating factor which often arises is whether the person 
                                                 
410
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imposed on has been independently advised.
413
 This continues to be of significance 
in modern Scots law, particularly in the context of spousal cautionary obligations and 
in relation to wills. However, it appears to be the case that it does not raise a 
sufficiently strong presumption of fraud on its own; rather it is significant in 
combination with the other factors enumerated above. In a case where a father had 
his daughter sign a discharge of her rights to her disadvantage, the Scottish courts did 
not consider the fact that she was young and lacked an independent advisor to 
amount to inferred fraud.
414
 The House of Lords reversed the decision on grounds 




(g) Inequality plus a gratuitous transaction 
Of much greater significance is the special treatment of gratuitous transactions or 
those which are granted for inadequate consideration as an aspect of presumptive 
fraud.
416
 This is particularly important in relation to secondary fraud, and is 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 7, but it is also relevant to ordinary contractual 
relations.
417
 In a sense, a gratuitous transaction is the ultimate embodiment of 
inequality for there is no reciprocity at all. Historically Scots law has been suspicious 
of gratuitous or “lucrative” transactions,
418
 and there are close links with presumptive 
fraud as well as the more general presumption against donation.
419
 There are obvious 
historical comparisons with concepts such as just price and enorm lesion. In 
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 it was argued that for reduction of a lease to take place there 
must be enorm lesion and not simply inequality combined with facility. The 
circumstances could have amounted to presumptive fraud. However, the Lord 
Chancellor (Loughborough) held that such a disadvantageous transaction was 
acquired in effect “without consideration” by inducing fear in the elderly landlord.
421
  
It is a feature of these cases that the Scottish courts frequently refer to 
“consideration”, perhaps surprisingly as Scots law proudly disclaims any such 
doctrine in the law of contract. However, although the language appears to glance at 
English law, the division between gifts and bilateral contracts and the underlying 
suspicion of gratuitous or inadequately valued transactions has a different root. It is 
possible to trace the distinction between gratuitous and onerous transactions back to 
the Aristotelian (and Thomist) virtues of liberality (which involved right giving or 
donation) and justice.
422
 The English doctrine of consideration fulfils a quite 
different function and historically the common law was not concerned with 
“distinguishing gift transactions from other transactions, or gratuitous transactions 
from non-gratuitous transactions, and no doctrine about derisory considerations ever 
developed.”
423
 An inadequate transaction or one which has no consideration is 
sometimes latinised and becomes sine causa,
424
 and it was said that “it is a principle 




In relationships of trust there is particular scrutiny of gifts (“the law looks with great 
jealousy on all gratuitous benefits obtained by the exercise of influence arising from 
these relations [of trust]”),
426
 and although Scots law did not place an absolute bar on 
gifts to an agent, a solicitor’s taking advantage of a financially embarrassed client by 
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insisting on a “gift” was “inconsistent with the confidence and trust which the 
relation of agent implies”
427
 and could be considered “inherently faulty, and open to 




A transaction which lacks consideration or adequate consideration is clearly part of 
the matrix of factors which creates inequality between the parties. Lord President 





Is it not because it goes far to shew that the party who executed the deed, to 
his own loss and injury, did not very well understand what he was about? 
That is the reason why inadequacy of consideration affords a presumption of 
fraud: but if it is obvious otherwise – from evidence – that the party who 
signed the deed knew perfectly well what he was about, the importance of 
this element very nearly disappears altogether. 
 
The requirement for onerosity continues to be an important factor in the law of fraud, 
particularly in three-party situations. 
 
5. Conclusion 
By the end of the nineteenth century, presumptive fraud had had its day (albeit there 
were still occasional references to it), particularly after the decision in Derry v Peek.  
In its place discrete doctrines such as facility and circumvention and undue influence 
began to take hold, although the courts well into the twentieth century recognised 
that the roots of both lay in the broad doctrine of fraud. In Ross v Gosselin’s Exrs 




                                                 
427
 Anstruther v Wilkie (1856) 18 D 405 at 416 per Lord Justice-Clerk Hope. 
428
 Ibid. at 419 per Lord Cowan. 
429
 Tennent v Tennent’s Trs (1868) 6 M 840 at 877 per Lord President Inglis. 
430
 Ross v Gosselin's Executors 1926 SC 325 at 334 per Lord President Clyde. 
91 
 
I think it would be extravagant and fallacious to refuse to recognise the 
distinction between these two different kinds of questions, merely because 
they are both ultimately referable to the same broad category of fraud. 
 
Other categories of presumptive fraud are now embodied in legislation, for instance 
the modern rules relating to unfair preferences or gratuitous alienations.
431
 Perhaps 
the most controversial manifestation of presumptive fraud in this overview are cases 
where the courts appear to penalise a bad bargain, although it is evident that 
inequality in itself was only in rare cases – when it amounted to gross inequality – 
sufficient to annul a transaction, but rather had to be accompanied by an aggravating 
factor. Modern commentators rely on the growing dominance of the caveat emptor 
principle to explain the disappearance of considerations of inequality or injustice in 
setting aside a bargain.
432
 And yet it could be argued that the purpose of legislation 
such as the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 or the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations
433
 is to reassert the same underlying principle of protecting the 
weaker party, even those trading in a commercial context, from abuse of the power 
of the more dominant one, a manifestation of inequality. 
 
However, it is important to recognise that, historically, any of the aggravating factors 
which created inequality could be penalised under the head of presumptive fraud. If 
this is not appreciated then the conceptual basis of the wider concept of fraud 
becomes an anomaly. Arguably, that is what we are now experiencing. Fraud in its 
wider sense is little understood by the current generation of lawyers, nor is it taught 
to new generations of law students. Consequently, when new situations arise which 
raise questions of injustice and inequality, there is little sense that historical 
precedents can be appealed to or worked with to deliver a coherent response. 
Exploitation of a weaker person’s vulnerability, or an unequal relationship, or a 
gratuitous transaction that brings great disadvantage to its granter, or obtaining 
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consent to a deed in an improper way – all of these are aspects of presumptive fraud 
and are as likely to recur in 2012 as in earlier centuries.  
 
This exploration of the ways in which Scots law dealt with situations which were 
considered fraudulent without involving intentional deceit demonstrates that an 
enormously wide range of behaviour was included in the scope of fraud. Omissions 
and concealment were dealt with as bad faith or by using the culpa lata principle 
without the need to show any pre-existing duty of disclosure but simply on the basis 
that equality between the parties demanded it. And behaviour which amounted to 
imposition or bad faith, whether because of the disadvantageous terms of the bargain 
itself, or because of the vulnerability of one of the parties, or because of a 
relationship which could be exploited, raised a presumption of fraud, fortified often 
by a lack of independent legal advice or the fact that the transaction was gratuitous or 
lacked adequate consideration. Furthermore, instead of regarding references to fraud 
in this context as anomalous, it may be helpful to recognise that fraud was a unified 
and coherent doctrine in the early law, whether proven or inferred. It may also prove 
helpful at a deeper level to recognise a unifying principle based on the underlying 
principle of justice as inequality. This was a philosophical concept, rooted in an 
Aristotelian account of justice, and it is argued in the next chapter that it was a 
foundational concept for university-educated men in Scotland in the seventeenth 
century, hence for Stair, whose influence on the subsequent development of the law 










Chapter 3: The influence of Philosophy and Religion on Scots Law - 
Justice as Inequality 
 
It could be argued that equality is inherent in all concepts of justice, and certainly 
countries which have adopted formal Constitutions include equality as a foundational 
principle.
434
 However, the principle of equality examined in this chapter does not 
concern the rights of citizens, rather it is a term of art which derives from 
Aristotelian philosophy as the primary characteristic of justice. It will be argued that 
history and geography combined in late seventeenth century Scotland to create an 
environment in which Stair was profoundly influenced by these philosophical ideas 




The importance of Stair’s Institutions of the Law of Scotland for modern Scots law 
can hardly be overstated. Its publication in 1681 has been described as “[t]he most 
significant event in Scottish legal development”
436
 in that it provided, for the first 
time, a systematic and rational exposition of Scots private law. To the present day it 
is regarded as foundational and authoritative by courts and commentators alike, even 
when Stair’s account of the law proves troublesome for the development of a modern 
taxonomy. For instance, in the recent trilogy of cases which have reshaped the law of 
unjustified enrichment the leading judgments all relied on Stair’s authority despite 
the difficulties inherent in doing so.
437
 Indeed in 1998 in Shilliday v Smith
438
 an 
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argument of counsel is specifically rejected as being “inconsistent with Stair's 
statement of the law”.
439
   
 
Stair was remarkable not only for his formidable intellect, but also the extent of his 
involvement in the civic life of Scotland in the seventeenth century. He devoted his 
life to religion, law and politics, probably in that order, and was deeply immersed in 
the struggles between Kirk and state which dominated that period.
440
 He was a 
committed Presbyterian, an allegiance which affected both his personal life and his 
formulation of the law. For Stair was intent not only on creating a rational system of 
law, but one which was godly in character and would, in turn, yield godly Scottish 
citizens.  
 
The Institutions have been scrutinised by many eminent jurists with the result that we 
have considerable understanding of the context within which Stair wrote,
441
 the 
sources he relied on and, in particular, the (not unqualified) civilian pedigree of his 
work.
442
 It is also recognised that his initial training in philosophy brought a 
conceptual depth to his writing that was not matched by the Scottish jurists who 
followed in his footsteps and the Institutions have provided fertile ground for 
jurisprudential analysis.
443
 But there remain puzzling aspects of his thought. In 1954 
Professor Campbell’s analytical study of the Institutions identified the fact that 
Stair’s treatment of obligations was unusual in that it did not “fit harmoniously” 
either with his own stated aim of enumerating rights
444
 or with the scheme of Roman 
law.
445
 He concluded that Stair’s structure did not derive either from the civilian 
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 or from the natural law thinking of the “mighty Grotius”
447
 and suggested 




I suspect that one might need not only to explore the Protestant theologians 
but also to trace the relationship, whether by derivation or by repulsion, 
between their doctrines and those of their Catholic predecessors and 
contemporaries. 
 
This chapter contributes to the debate by focusing on Stair’s encounter with the 
scholasticism of Thomas Aquinas which was later developed by the Spanish moral 
theologians of the Counter-Reformation.
449
 The territory is complex and in many 
ways counter-intuitive, for who would expect the legal system of fiercely Protestant 
Scotland to have been profoundly influenced by Roman Catholic theologians? And 
yet Stair’s formulation of natural law and, consequently, his treatment of what he 
called “obediential” obligations
450
 may derive from this source. This chapter traces 
the direct influence of Aquinas on Stair’s overall conception of justice. It focuses 
particularly on the Aristotelian definition of justice as inequality, a concept which 
was juridified by Aquinas and his scholastic followers. And it argues that herein lie 
the roots of the unifying concept of inequality evident in the earlier account of the 
law of presumptive fraud. 
 
1. The Canonist Doctrine of Restitution 
The story begins with canon law. The church had enormous influence on European 
legal development because of the intellectual and literary resources of its clerics, the 
efficiency of its legal system and, not least, its ubiquitous presence. Wieacker 
describes the “intimate interplay” of canon and civil law in northern Europe, 
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mediated by clerics trained in both, from the thirteenth century on.
451
 The 
intermingling of juristic traditions inevitably meant that concepts from the one 
infiltrated the other. In the century following the compilation of Gratian’s Decretum 
(1140) canonist jurists were prepared to borrow Roman terminology and concepts 
where there were gaps to fill or details to be elaborated.
452
 However, the borrowing 
was not always faithful in that civilian rules were modified if they were deemed 
inadequate to provide ethical solutions to ethical problems.    
 
We have here a “reception” which is not so much a wholesale acceptance of Roman 
law qua valid norms of law, as an interpretation of norms contained in the older 
canonical sources in the light of principles of civil jurisprudence, when such 
interpretation was feasible and possible.  In other words, we have assimilation, not 




The breadth of ecclesiastical jurisdiction represented a potential threat to the civil 
law since most human disputes could be interpreted as having a moral or spiritual 
dimension.
454
 But this jurisdictional “pull” arose also from the fact that the law of the 
church was perceived to be “the true source of Christian equity”,
455
 superior both 
morally and legally to the pagan and secular civil law. Its enduring legacy lies in the 
dissemination of broad equitable and moral principles such as “aequitas (canonica), 
bona fides, conscientia, honestas and misericordia”,
456
 norms which became part of 
the fabric of the ius commune and infiltrated the substantive doctrines of the civil 
law.
457
 Dolezalek suggests that the conventional characterisation of the ius commune 
as predominantly civil law is misconceived, for history shows “canon law travelling 
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throughout Europe in a state-coach; and on the footboard of that state-coach, there 
travelled Roman law”.
458




 on this complex process of cross-fertilisation between the 
canonists and civilians suggests broadly that in order to preserve the pre-eminent 
position of Roman law during a period of wider political struggle between Pope and 
Emperor, canonist doctrines were appropriated and “Romanised” by the civilians, 
thus removing the need to have recourse to canon law as an independent legal 
system. This is illustrated in the development of the canonist doctrine of restitution. 
 
Restitution has an ancient pedigree stretching at least as far back as the Old 
Testament Decalogue where it was umbilically linked to the commandment not to 
steal: “a thief must certainly make restitution”.
460
 And not only the thief, but also the 




 or the person 
who caused damage to another’s property
463
 were subject to the same obligation. The 
canonists expanded its scope even further as a matter of substantive justice to include 
depriving a person not only of property, but of health, reputation, freedom or even 
the taking of a life.
464
  Restitution became so broad a concept that it could be 




In Roman law there was no equivalent general principle.
466
 The condictiones were 
actions restricted to particular fact scenarios and the famous maxim of Pomponius in 
the Digest, that no-one should be enriched at the expense of another,
467
 was not a 
specific rule of law but “only a formula for a general principle of commutative 
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 As early as the twelfth century the question whether or not there was a 







not one of the learned jurists would venture to oppose the canon law doctrine 
of restitution and to deny the general validity of the prohibition of enrichment 
….   What is at stake is rather the political question whether the Roman 
sources themselves entail this general validity. 
 
Here was a doctrinal dispute with political consequences. So widespread was the 
doctrine of restitution that if the civil law denied a remedy the public might resort to 
the church for relief. The response was to expand the existing condictiones to meet 
public demands. Roman law retained its position of supremacy by being sufficiently 
flexible to assimilate the doctrine of restitution. But there remained a fundamental 
difference of conceptualisation: for the civilians it was a gradual development of 
existing legal categories, but the canonists “continue[d] to think within the scope of 
their all-embracing doctrine of restitution”.
471
 The end result in the systems of 
Western Europe which received Roman law is a concept of restitution which has 
Romanist form but predominantly canonist content.   
 
However, it is the subsequent development of the doctrine of restitution, when it 
encountered Aristotelian philosophy in the moral theology of Thomas Aquinas, that 
led to its lasting impact on the later “natural law school” of jurists to which Stair 
belonged. Before looking at restitution in more detail, it is instructive to consider the 
theoretical framework within which justice was located. 
 
2. The Scholastic Concept of Justice 
One of the most profound influences on later medieval jurist-theologians was the 
work of St Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), whose Summa Theologiae provided an 
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account of justice which remains the “locus classicus for Western natural law 
theories”.
472
 Thomas was a Dominican, educated in Paris where he later became 
professor of theology at a period when works of Greek philosophy were becoming 
available in translation for the first time.
 473
 The full text of Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics became available around 1246
474





The greatest impact on the thought of the thirteenth century was made by the 
extended knowledge of Aristotelianism.  By means of the translations 
Aristotle was converted from being more or less a logician into the expounder 
of a comprehensive system ….  [which] came … to represent philosophy, 
while its author was known as “The Philosopher”. 
 
In the Summa Thomas drew on Aristotle to create a system of Christian ethics with a 
rational foundation.
476
 It could perhaps be said that he brought about the 
“Christianisation” of virtue ethics: the fusion of Aristotelian philosophy (based on 
reason) with Augustinian theology (faith).
477
 To that end, he engages with a variety 
of intellectual authorities some of which are spiritual (the Bible, the church fathers 
and Gratian); some philosophical (Socrates, Plato, Cicero and above all Aristotle); 
some legal (both canon and civil law). His was an ambitious project: to create an 
account of human good and human action which was philosophically literate and 
theologically sound.   
 
(a) The Influence of the Nicomachean Ethics 
Aristotle, referred to simply as “the Philosopher”, is the dominant source for 
Thomas’ treatment of justice and natural law. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle’s 
account of human action is teleological or purposive, in that man’s goal is to achieve 
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 Thomas’ vision is similarly teleological, but the goal is now 
spiritual rather than secular – knowledge of God rather than human happiness – even 




Justice is the greatest of the Aristotelian virtues for, uniquely, it operates in relation 
to other people.
480
 In the Ethics justice comes in two forms – distributive justice
481
 





The justice in transactions between man and man is a sort of equality indeed, 
and the injustice a sort of inequality. 
 
The principle of equality,
483
 crucially important for later scholastic thought, is 
articulated in terms of gain and loss. It denotes the rebalancing of transactions 
between individuals in order to preserve what is one’s own, for justice will restore to 
each his own where it has been interfered with either by punishment of the 
wrongdoer or by restoration of what has been lost.
484
 Corrective justice is served 




These names, both loss and gain, have come from voluntary exchange; for to 
have more than one’s own is called gaining, and to have less than one’s 
original share is called losing. 
 
The position of equilibrium is to be in undisturbed possession of “what is one’s 
own”, a concept which extended beyond notions of private property to the essence of 
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the person, or as one commentator puts it, “one’s own is an extension of the ego”.
486
 
Hence all acts of interference with what is one’s own are acts of injustice or 
inequality, the two being synonymous.  
 
A further Aristotelian classification is the division of human actions (and 
transactions) into those which are involuntary (involving ignorance or compulsion) 
and those which are voluntary (undertaken out of choice and knowledge). Only the 
latter constitute virtue, for only then is a person behaving as a rational creature who 
is capable of choice,
487
 but both demand the equalising function of justice. In relation 
to voluntary, or what we might now call consensual, transactions such as sale, loan, 
deposit or hire,
488




When [buyers and sellers] get neither more nor less but just what belongs to 
themselves, they say that they have their own and that they neither lose nor 
gain. 
 
Involuntary transactions, on the other hand, involve causing harm or injury to 
another.
490
 The equalising role of justice is carried out either by punishment of the 





(b) Aquinas and Justice 
Only a small part of Thomas’ Summa Theologiae deals explicitly with law
492
 for it is 
principally a work of moral theology. However, it is a crucially important part 
because natural law is integral to Aquinas’ broader ethical purpose of elucidating the 
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 Drawing on Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics, Thomas 
affirms that justice is the highest virtue for it relates to the common good.
494
 Its 




The proper characteristic of justice, as compared with the other moral virtues, 
is to govern a man in his dealings towards others.  It implies a certain balance 
of equality. 
 
Injustice is, therefore, inequality but only where the will is engaged
496
 for, like 
Aristotle, ignorance and unintentional consequences do not constitute injustice.
497
 
Legal consequences flow from the combination of external actions plus internal 
knowledge, a theme which he develops in his account of restitution.   
 
Aquinas brings to Aristotle’s ethical system two innovative elements: religion and 
law. The Summa is pervaded by references to the Bible and St. Augustine as well as 
statements of Christian doctrine.
498
 Secondly, Aristotle’s broad principles undergo a 
process of juridification. So the concept of “one’s own” is rendered in familiar 
civilian terms
499
 as jus suum unicuique tribuens.
500
 Likewise notions of loss and gain 
have a more legal or commercial flavour. For instance, “to have more than one’s own 
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Similarly, inequality is refashioned as a debitum: “each person’s own is that which is 
due to him [debetur] in proportion to making things equal”;
502
  or “a voluntary 
transfer comes under justice in so far as it involves the notion of something due [de 
ratione debiti]”.
503
 Conceptually, the modification of the more neutral terminology of 
loss and gain into the language of debt and owing allows Thomas to create a 
framework of obligations. Injustice and inequality now create both a moral and a 
legal obligation to restore in the one who has gained. And he thus creates the 
rationale for his discussion of the prime canonist obligation - restitution. 
 
(c) Stair’s Concept of Justice 
Given the dominance of scholastic thought in Scottish universities in the seventeenth 
century,
504
 Stair would have been exposed to these ideas of justice. The influence of 
both Aristotle and Aquinas on Stair’s work is not a novel discovery. The Institutions 
are said to “owe much in structure and content to the Aristotelian philosophy which 
he both learned and later taught in the old College of Glasgow”.
505
 His scheme of 
obligations similarly “owes much to the analysis of Aquinas, developed by later 
scholastic theologian-jurists”.
506
 Stair’s Glasgow theses as regent in 1646 are 
likewise characterised as “Aristotelian”;
507
 in his speech given on admission to the 
Faculty of Advocates in 1648 he is described as having “strayed into the domain of 
the moral theologians, [and having drawn] on his knowledge of Aristotelian 
philosophy”;
508
 and his later Vindication of the Divine Perfections
509
 is seen as an 
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In the introductory title of the Institutions Stair references the Nicomachean Ethics in 
his discussion of commutative justice (Aquinas’ terminology for corrective justice), 
which he renders as “the inclination to give every man his right”.
511
 But generally 
there are slim pickings in the search for explicit borrowings from either Aristotle or 
Aquinas
512
 for the Aristotelian character of Stair’s work lies in its underlying 
method, argument and conceptual framework.  
 
Stair’s approach in the Institutions (and in his other writings) is teleological, working 
deductively from first principles to desired ends. Hence, “material justice (the 
common law of the world) is, in the first place, orderly deduced from self-evident 
principles”.
513
 The purposive nature of law is most clearly seen in Stair’s discussion 
of the law of obligations. The source of obligations lies either in God’s will and the 
law of nature (obediential obligations) or in the human will (conventional 
obligations).
514
 Indeed, he rejects the scheme of Roman law on grounds that there is 
an inadequate explanation of cause and effect. The Roman four-fold division (intro 




insinuates no reason of the cause or rise of these distinct obligations, as is 
requisite in a good distinct division; and therefore, they may be more 
appositely divided, according to the principle or original from whence they 
flow, as in obligations obediential, and by engagement, or natural and 
conventional. 
 
His insistence on efficient and final causes, the “Aristotelian clothing”
516
 which he 
assumed in order to expound the most fundamental principles of law, shaped his 
legal reasoning and the nature of the law of obligations. In pride of place is equity: 
“The principles of equity are the efficient cause of rights and laws”.
517
 Stair 
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explicitly makes the connection between equity and the principle of equality in 




This law of nature is also called Equity, from that equality it keeps amongst 
all persons, from that general moral principle, Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri 
ne feceris, whereby just persons in their deliberations and resolutions state 
themselves in the case of their adversaries, and so change the scales of the 
balance; which holds most in commutative justice. 
 
This is the “alterity”
519
 of Aristotelian justice which, above all, looks to the good of 
the other or the common good.
520
 It is Stair’s belief that true equality in this sense 




Stair’s account of equity forms part of a lengthy discussion of the law of nature. It is 
here that we see most clearly the fusion of philosophy and religion which he was 
engaged in, whether consciously or unconsciously. The widespread failure to take 
account of the depth of Stair’s religious convictions leads to a distorted view of the 




In Stair’s Institutions the theology cannot be excised without irreparable 
damage to the whole. Scottish seventeenth- and eighteenth- century law, like 
Scottish seventeenth- and eighteenth-century life, is pervasively and 
ineliminably theological. 
 
This perhaps also explains Stair’s sometimes ambivalent approach to Roman law. In 
places his attitude is peremptory,
523
 in others critical,
524
 albeit more reliant on it in 
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his discussion of contractual obligations.
525
 From a contemporary perspective Stair is 
viewed as the founding father of Scots law, its starting point. However, he perhaps 
saw himself as much a reformer of the past as a prophet of the future and may have 
been reacting against what he perceived to be an over-reliance on the civilian texts 
and commentators.
526
 Intent on articulating a legal system which was both 
intrinsically religious and rational, Roman law was less likely to provide the tools he 
needed than the scholastic jurist-theologians who were the staple diet of his academic 





The classical Roman jurists stopped writing books around 235, and they were 
all pagans. Hence, no Christianity in the law in the Institutes. They were 
positivists, hence no philosophical notion of natural law. 
 
By contrast, Thomas and his scholastic commentators were, for their own eras, 
engaged in the task of creating a system of natural law with God at its centre, 
permeated by the philosophical genius of Aristotle, the doctrines of St Augustine and 
the church fathers, and integrated with established legal rules only in so far as the 
latter were compatible with the spiritual man. This was a task he could identify with.      
 
Stair’s Aristotelian account of equity
528
 is embedded within an account of the law of 
nature which is overwhelmingly religious, for the very essence of natural law is God 
himself, the “eternal law”.
529
 The source of natural law is the very nature of God, 
given human expression in the Golden Rule of Matthew’s Gospel: “Do to all, as you 
have would have them do to you [Matt.vii,12], which must be understood, if you 
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were in their case, and they in yours”.
530
 This positive (and religious) formulation of 
the Rule is preferred by Stair to what he describes as the “negative” expression given 




For Stair, the law of nature, the eternal or divine law, the moral law, reason, 
conscience and equity are used almost synonymously, a marriage of the 
philosophical with the religious. Purpose, efficient and final causes, equity as justice 
and equality working for the common good, the role of human reason and will – all 
derive from an Aristotelian view of the world. The more prescriptive rules of 
behaviour derive from God’s law, the Scriptures, mediated through St. Augustine 
and the church fathers for Aquinas and rooted in Stair’s Presbyterian and Calvinist 
faith. So, the first title of the Institutions locates the principles of Scots law explicitly 
within a moral and religious framework. This is what distinguishes Stair both from 
his peers and from the jurists who followed in his footsteps. His vision is most 
clearly expressed in his account of the obediential obligations, which represent 
natural law in its purest form. 
 
3. Scholastic Influence in Seventeenth Century Scotland 
One of the puzzling aspects of this historical investigation is why Aristotelian 
philosophy and Thomist moral theology had such lasting impact on legal 
development, long after the influence of the Catholic Church as a political and legal 
force had waned. Part of the answer lies in the revival of Aquinas’ writings in the 
sixteenth century by a group of jurist-theologians known as the late scholastics or the 
Spanish natural law school whose number included Francisco de Vitoria (c.1485-
1546), Domingo de Soto (1494-1560), Diego de Covarrubias (1512-77), Luis de 
Molina (1535-1600), Francisco Suárez (1548-1604) and Leonardo Lessius (1554-
1623).
532
 These Counter-Reformation thinkers wrote voluminous commentaries on 
the Summa
533
 and used Aquinas’ account of natural law and human rationality to 
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construct a renewed vision of the Catholic faith in order to combat perceived heresies 




The fundamental move which the Thomists made in discussing the concept of 
political society was to revert to Aquinas’ vision of a universe ruled by a 
hierarchy of laws.
535
   
 
The system of natural law and justice set out by Aquinas was used to restate the 
marriage between law and morality which Luther and Calvin were attempting to 
divorce in their determination to separate the spiritual from the secular in Protestant 
northern Europe. The success of the late scholastics lay in providing the law with an 
articulate ethical basis, but equally in fleshing out the detail of Aquinas’ skeletal 
principles. Their fusion of substantive law with the moral and philosophical 
underpinning of the Summa had profound repercussions on the natural lawyers of 
northern Europe in the seventeenth century.
536
 Grotius, on whom these influences 
have been clearly identified,
537
 is described as having outlined a system of law in his 
Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleerdheid which was “largely based on 
concepts of natural law, as developed by 16
th
  century theologians … who in their 




Stair lies within the northern natural law tradition, but the influence of the late 
scholastics on his work has been little explored. Nor is it within the scope of this 
chapter to do so in any detail. Their development of the doctrine of restitution into a 
fully-fledged legal concept is an important historical phenomenon which has 
received considerable academic attention.
539
 It is suggested here that Stair may also 
have gone to the original source: Aquinas. In addition, whilst he was undoubtedly 
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exposed to later scholastic accounts during his time as regent, they do not 
fundamentally modify Thomas’ conceptual scheme.   
 
However, this history is not one of seamless transition. For the Protestant 
Reformation in northern Europe not only fundamentally changed religious belief and 
practice, it also changed the role of law in society. No longer was it viewed as the 
means to a virtuous life: the new doctrinal emphasis on the fall of man meant that 
only God’s grace was able to offer salvation no matter how virtuous the individual.  
Aquinas’ medieval optimism about man’s innate ability to reason and to make 
virtuous choices in pursuit of the common good had been transformed by the 
Reformers into a deep sense of the depravity of human nature.
540
 In order to explain 
why Protestants such as Grotius and Stair were, therefore, able to preserve a view of 
man as a rational being, capable of choice and the exercise of the will, another piece 
of the historical jigsaw is needed. This lies in part with the phenomenon which has 
come to be known as “Protestant Scholasticism”. 
 
(a) The Protestant Scholastics 
In recent theological research there has been a re-assessment of the relationship 
between post-Reformation Protestant theologians and Catholic scholasticism.
541
 
Throughout Europe in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries there was an 
unexpected revival of interest in Aristotle, particularly in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
and in Aquinas, his best-known commentator. It was unexpected since both were 
associated with the doctrines of a discredited Catholic church and the revival took 
place in the humanities and theological faculties of both Protestant and Catholic 
universities. We do know that Scottish universities at that time were dominated by a 
version of “scholastic Aristotelianism”.
542
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Scotland is described as having had “a tremendous appetite for scholastic 
theology”,
543
 akin to a “reception”.
544
 The reasons are predictably complex. 
Undoubtedly the Kirk required a new and rational theology and the scholastic 
emphasis on reason, together with their enormous learning, may have proved 
attractive. Durkan has suggested that Covenanting attitudes “paradoxically worked in 
favour of Jesuit-inspired philosophy”,
545
 but does not explain the paradox any 
further. It is plausible that the Scottish Presbyterians may, equally paradoxically, 
have been able to make common cause with the political struggles of the Spanish 
scholastics. James I’s imposition of the Oath of Allegiance on his Catholic subjects 
in 1606, subsequent to the Gunpowder Plot, led to an outpouring of polemic from 
Counter-Reformation thinkers. Suárez’s treatise Defensio Fidei Catholicae, et 
Apostolicae Adversus Anglicanae Sectae Errores (1612) specifically refuted the 
Anglican “heresy” of the divine right of kings and attempts to place the church under 
the rule of the monarch.
546
 James had the work publicly burned. In view of the battles 
waged by the Scottish Presbyterians in the 1630s against the imposition of 
Episcopacy and the royal control which it represented,
547
 there may well have 
emerged an unlikely alliance. My enemy’s enemy ….. 
 
One commentator has suggested a more pragmatic reason for the turn to 
scholasticism: the fact that in the late sixteenth century Aristotle “was the only 
teaching aid on the market”!
548
 What we do know with certainty is that James 
Dalrymple personally encountered it at Glasgow University. 
 
(b) Scholasticism and Glasgow University 
Stair was a student at Glasgow University from 1633-37, where he pursued the usual 
course of study in the humanities and philosophy, and returned there to take up a post 
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as regent from 1641-47.
549
 The university at that time has been described as being “in 
essence a religious seminary”
550
 and the normal pattern was indeed for regents to 
become ministers of the Kirk rather than professors.
551
   
 
The arts curriculum of Scottish universities was overwhelmingly both Aristotelian 
and scholastic throughout the seventeenth century.
552
 Earlier attempts by Andrew 
Melville to sweep away the scholastic philosophers and to replace them with 
Protestant humanists had been temporarily successful in the sixteenth century,
553
 but 
the reinstatement of Aristotle and Aquinas in the seventeenth represented the return 
to “a safe rational theology”.
554
  Shepherd’s study of authorities cited by university 
regents shows a variety of traditional and more modern (humanist) commentators on 
Aristotle, but she concludes that the medieval scholastics were ubiquitous:
555 
 
[Aquinas, Scotus and Occam] appear in virtually every set of logic dictates 
and theses. Discussion of their views was considered an indispensable part of 
the course. 
 
Over the course of the century, scholasticism began to wane in the east, but Glasgow 
remained committed to it for longer and student lecture notes or dictates in Glasgow 
continued to be “more Aristotelian” and “less modern than their Edinburgh 
equivalents”.
556
 Curiously, it was in Presbyterian conservative Glasgow that the 
influence of scholastic Aristotelianism was strongest and lasted longest.
557
 It may be 
that those conservative instincts feared the impact of the progressive ideas of 
Hobbes, Newton, Descartes and Locke which were on the horizon and clung to the 
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familiarity of scholastic thought. However, it is clear that “whatever existed in 




Within nine months or so after resigning his post as regent Stair applied to be 
admitted to the Faculty of Advocates.
559
 Very little is known about his legal 
education but it does seem an implausibly short period in which to gain sufficient 
knowledge of Scots law, even for one so brilliant! Stair was not one of those who 
studied law abroad at French and Dutch universities,
560
 and although he satisfied the 
Faculty’s preference for “university educated men”,
561
 his training was in the liberal 
arts. He appears to have had no formal legal education
562
 and it is likely that he 
acquired his knowledge of the law “by private and undirected study during his time 
as a regent”.
563
 One source alleges that during his regency he studied “Latin and 
Greek literature, classical history and antiquities, and the civil law of Rome”.
564
 
Assuming that to be the case, it would be reasonable to assume that the resources of 
Glasgow University library would have been important. 
 
 
(c) Glasgow University Library in the Seventeenth Century 
As noted above, the university which Stair, its former student, returned to as regent 
from 1641 until 1647 was a predominantly religious institution, training its student 
for the Kirk.
565
 We cannot know with any certainty what Stair read during his time at 
the university since individual borrowing records do not date back that far.  
However, some indication of the library’s holdings at that time can be gleaned from 
the 1691 catalogue, the earliest systematic catalogue still extant.
566
 This early 
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catalogue is the best indication of the character of the library at this period, and 
consequently of the printed works which may have been available to Stair. 
 
The catalogue confirms the overwhelmingly religious character of the library’s stock 
at the end of the seventeenth century, which “corresponds to the strong orientation of 
the University towards Divinity”.
567
 The extensive holdings on religious polemics 
also suggest that the university’s mission was to educate right-thinking graduates 
who would emerge in a doctrinally correct state of mind as leaders of the Kirk. 
 
Legal holdings are relatively sparse, particularly Scottish legal resources, which have 
justifiably been described as “very scanty”,
568
 limited to three titles, two of which are 
collections of statutory materials,
569
 the third a copy of Regiam Majestatem.
570
 It is 
clear that Glasgow University Library had very little native (Scots) law available to 
Stair at the time he was a regent there. Certainly, the library had the key source 
materials of Roman law and its commentators, and we know that Stair acknowledged 
his acquaintance with the civil law to the Session, albeit describing himself as having 
“stragged in these bywayis without a guide”.
571
 In short, it is safe to assert that this 
was a library which was weak on the resources needed to equip a Scots lawyer 
attempting to teach himself the laws of the land.   
 
The strengths of the university library undoubtedly lay in philosophy and religion, 
and it was particularly well equipped with materials relating to the doctrinal debates 
typical of Protestantism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Works on 
theology and philosophy far outnumber those on law. Stair therefore “had to pursue 
his interest in law in an environment dominated by the study of theology”.
572
  It is 
perhaps surprising in light of Glasgow’s conservative Presbyterian tradition that 
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Catholic writers are so well represented.
573
 The sections on Catholic Biblical 
commentators and scholastics are well stocked and represent a sizeable proportion of 
the library’s holdings. Confessional issues clearly did not prevent the library from 
acquiring this material, nor regents from using it in their lectures.
574
 These are the 
sources he is likely to have relied on to pursue his private studies. It has previously 
been suggested that Stair’s Institutions were deeply influenced by Aristotelian and 
scholastic thinking.
575
 Here perhaps lies the evidence and the source material. Taken 
in conjunction with what is known about the character of the curriculum he taught, at 
the very least it seems reasonable to speculate that Stair’s early thinking was 
influenced by these texts. The works of Aristotle dominate the philosophy 
classification of the library and it held all of the major works of Aquinas, including 
the Summa Theologiae, together with Thomist commentaries too numerous to count.  
 
Of course, we cannot know with certainty which printed source materials Stair relied 
on in the writing of the Institutions and any attempt at historical reconstruction is at 
best speculative. As a well-connected man he would have had access to private 
libraries, and undoubtedly one of his own.
576
 When he went to the bar, he would 
have been exposed to civilian materials acquired by Scottish lawyers who studied 
abroad. However, it is not far-fetched to suggest that the overwhelmingly scholastic 
character of Glasgow University at a formative period in his education must be 
significant. Aristotle, Aquinas and their commentators dominated his learning and 
his intellectual framework for more than ten years, and shortly prior to the writing of 
the Institutions.
577
 It is highly plausible that the scholastic and philosophical 
influences he was immersed in were drawn on to create the conceptual scheme for 
which the Institutions are noted.   
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(d) Stair’s Legal Influences 
It is undoubtedly true that Stair’s legal knowledge would have continued to expand 
once he became a practising advocate and subsequently a judge of the Court of 
Session. Few of the jurists cited by Stair in his Institutions were available to him 
when he embarked on his study of the law.
578
 The extensive civilian materials 
apparently available to Scots lawyers in the seventeenth century may have circulated 
informally between colleagues, since the Advocates’ Library
579
 was only officially 
opened in 1689.
580
 However, Lord Cooper’s picture of the busy practitioner exposed 
on a daily basis to citations from learned civilians educated on the Continent is 
questionable at this early period of Stair’s career.
581
 Political events disrupted the 
administration of justice and the court was dysfunctional for long periods of time.
582
 
Stair may have had the benefit of more study time than he had anticipated, but what 
he did not have was daily immersion in the pleadings of the court. 
 
A short chronology of the events of the 1640s and 50s will demonstrate his very 
limited experience of the operation of the Scottish courts and of Scots or any other 
type of law in practice. Stair was admitted to the bar in February 1648, but the first 
meeting of the Session did not take place for over a year, in June 1649,
583
 the same 
month in which Stair returned to Scotland having been absent for four months as a 
member of a parliamentary commission sent to negotiate with Charles II.
584
 The 
Session operated for only nine months until it was again suspended in February 
1650,
585
 when the administration of Scottish justice was taken over temporarily by a 
committee of English officers.
586
 Even during the brief period when the Session was 
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functioning, its sittings were infrequent, for at least some of that period “confined to 




Only between 1652 and 1658 did Stair gain experience of law in practice, first as an 
advocate and subsequently, from July 1657, as a judge when, controversially, he was 
appointed to the bench as one of the minority Scottish judges in the “English” court 
during the period of the Commonwealth, confirmed by Cromwell himself.
588
 Of the 
seven Commissioners appointed as judges, four were English and three were Scots, 
the former being paid double the salary of the Scots and also its senior members.
589
 
Many Scots advocates and judges refused to co-operate with the English court
590
 and 
Stair was subject to criticism for his involvement,
591
 although he and other lawyers 
withdrew their participation for a short period in 1654 until the imposition of the 
“Tender”, an oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth, was withdrawn.
592
 This was 
certainly his most extensive period of practice prior to writing the Institutions and 
may have increased his knowledge of the workings of English law
593
 more than 
Scots, for it was an overt aim of the court to assimilate the law of Scotland to that of 
England.
594
 The Cromwellian vision was a more complete union of Scotland and 
England than in fact was achieved in 1707, amounting to “an enlarged England”.
595
 
However, the administration of justice ceased after Cromwell’s death
596
 and the 
Court of Session only began to function again as Scotland’s supreme court, applying 
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Stair’s first completed manuscript of the Institutions is known to have circulated 
from 1662,
598
 and it has been surmised that much of the writing took place during the 
“enforced period of leisure that preceded the restoration of the session [in 1661]”.
599
  
Hutton suggests that his writing of the first draft took place from the period of his 
elevation to the bench in 1657, when he began to record the court’s decisions, until 
1663. From Stair’s appointment, Hutton estimates that he only served for around 
fifteen months (since, as noted above, the court was closed after Cromwell’s death in 
1658 and the re-established Court of Session did not meet until April 1661). Hutton 





Therefore, between the time of his admission to the bar and the writing of the first 
manuscript lies a period of around thirteen or fourteen years and during that period 
Stair only had opportunities to practise law for a period of eight months in the Court 
of Session. It was only after 1652 that he would have gained practical knowledge of 
the law, but in a court which sought to minimise the differences between Scotland 
and England and where English law was applied whenever possible.
601
 It has been 
noted that “it was against the background of Dalrymple’s experience as an advocate 
and judge in the English court that the treatise first took shape”,
602
 a fact that does 
not seem insignificant. He perhaps felt a good deal of sympathy with the “sustained 
and largely successful struggle by the local lawyers against the Anglicization of their 
legal system”
603
 and the power of what amounted to an occupying force in Scotland 
may have provided the impetus to set down the law of Scotland in order to protect it 
from greater risk of Anglicisation or even demise. 
 
One final suggestion is that Stair may have borrowed references and citation of 
authority second-hand from other writers. The works of Suarez in particular, all of 
                                                 
598
 Watson (1981) p.31; Ford (1988) p.24; Sellar (1981) p.142; Hutton ((1981b) p.79) dates the 
earliest manuscript to 1664. 
599
 Ford (2004). 
600
 Hutton (1981b) p.81; Hutton also points out that this theory also rules out the influence of later 
writers such as Pufendorf or Voet, at least on early editions, ibid. p.80, n.1. 
601







which were available in Glasgow University library at this period and which are 
extremely well-referenced, would repay closer comparison with the Institutions. 
Suarez’s principal work on law, De Legibus, contains a less detailed analysis of 
substantive law than some of the other scholastic writers, for instance Lessius or 
Molina, but it is more philosophical and more theoretical. He begins with a 
discussion about the nature of law,
604
 its causes and effects, and goes on to expound 
the relationship between eternal law, divine law and natural law and the functional 
roles of law, reason and conscience.
605
 The foundations of law are derived from an 
Aristotelian account of justice overlaid with an account of God’s moral law.  
 
In Suarez’s De Legibus natural law could also be called divine, “being decreed, as it 
were, directly by God himself”.
606
 He quotes from Thomas (who, in turn, borrowed 
the quote from St Augustine): “for who save God writes the natural law in the hearts 
of men?”
607
 Natural law proceeds “immediately from a dictate of the reason”
608
 and 
is described both as “the natural light of the intellect”
609
 or reason, also written in the 
hearts of men,
610
 but illuminated by “the natural light of the intellect”.
611
 After a 
lengthy discussion he concludes that after all natural law is “truly and properly divine 




The parallels with Stair’s account of the interplay of eternal, divine and natural law 
are noteworthy, as are the roles attributed to reason and conscience. Suarez’s account 
of the nature of laws is lengthy, detailed and exceptionally well referenced. The 
Bible, St. Augustine, Thomas and Aristotle – in that order – are his constant 
companions, with no fewer than 210 index citations to the Summa Theologiae. But 
citations of Greek and Roman philosophers, Roman and canon law, civilian jurists, 
the church fathers and other scholastic theologians also abound, including 
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 Suarez II.6.13. 
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Covarruvias, De Soto and Molina. If Stair did indeed borrow references from another 
source, Suarez may be a contender, both conceptually and for the abundance of 
referenced material. Hutton comments that “much of Suarez’s legal and political 





From Aquinas onwards, the scholastics were characterised by an emphasis on human 
reason. They had a more optimistic view of human nature and human capacities than, 
for example, St Augustine. The “fallen man” of the Reformed church was weak, 
passive and sinful, entirely dependent on God’s grace. Perhaps Stair was drawn 
conceptually to the scholastic tradition because of the focus on God-given reason and 
the greater role given to human agency than in orthodox Presbyterian doctrine, 
attracted by the fusion of religion and reason and the strongly moral content of law. 
And in terms of substantive law, this crucially important piece of Stair’s conceptual 
jigsaw is worked out in what he calls the obediential (or natural)
614
 obligations, 
which derive directly from natural law, particularly in his account of restitution, 
recompense and reparation. 
 
4. The Scholastic Doctrine of Restitution 
It has been argued above that Stair was profoundly influenced by the pervasive 
Aristotelian and scholastic influence of seventeenth century Scotland. The question 
which then must be answered is whether or not this had any significant impact on the 
substantive law expounded in the Institutions. The parallels are most clearly 
observed by examining the scholastic doctrine of restitution, which occupied a 
pivotal place in the work of both Aquinas and Stair. 
 
(a) Restitution and Recompense in Thomas Aquinas 
In Aquinas’ account of justice, we have seen that Aristotelian equality is translated 
into a framework of debt and owing, gain and loss. Justice requires a rebalancing of 
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those positions, and the mechanism for doing so is restitution. Given its doctrinal 
importance within canonist thinking, it is unsurprising that the doctrine of restitution 
takes pride of place in Thomas’ account of law, as it did in other juristic and 
theological texts from Duns Scotus
615
 through to the late scholastics.
616
 The 
pervasive moral character of restitution, as well as its extensive scope, made it a 
fundamental building block in a theory of justice.   
 
For Aquinas restitution is an aspect of the virtue of justice, an act of commutative 
justice which governs equality in exchanges between private parties.
617
 Such 
exchanges can be involuntary and unilateral whereby one party causes harm (iniuria) 
or loss (damnum) to the other, or they can be voluntary reciprocal transactions.
618
 In 
the former category (equivalent to delictual harm or loss) restitution is due for injury 
caused to a person, their reputation or their property.
619
 In this broad canonist sense 
of restitution Old Testament justice – “an eye for an eye” – is the basis for a general 




In all such cases the nature of commutative justice demands that equal 
recompense according to equality be made, namely that the reaction as 
recompense is equal to the action. 
 
This form of justice amounts to carrying out right action: “right (ius) or the just thing 
(iustum) is a certain action which is equal in relation to another person according to a 
certain mode of equality”.
621
 An example of “right action” is the obligation to 
recompense by paying a wage for a service rendered.
622
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Recompense is translated in various ways and does not appear to be a term of art for 
Aquinas, or at least for his translators. Sometimes it is rendered punishment,
623
 
sometimes repayment, compensation or reparation.
624
 In the Summa it amounts to a 
general principle indicating a duty to restore equality in relation to a wide range of 
behaviour, but chiefly concerned with actions which cause harm or loss.    
 
Justice which concerns “things” belonging to another, as opposed to the actions of 
another, is the territory of restitution in a narrower sense: it is “the recompense of 
thing for thing”.
625
 Aquinas does, however, locate this type of exact restitution within 
the broad principle of recompense in that “restitution is a kind of recompense for that 
which has been taken away”.
626
 The function of exact restitution is to bring about 




 to the rightful owner or 
possessor: “to make restitution appears to be nothing else than to re-establish a 




The relationship between recompense and restitution appears to be based on whether 
or not the property in question can be restored. If it cannot (and therefore exact 





And so when the equal of what has been taken cannot be restored (non est 
restituibile), recompense (recompensatio) must be made as far as is possible. 
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Restitution is a central element in Thomas’s account of justice, but it is as much a 
moral and spiritual duty as a legal one. Not only is it necessary to address inequality, 




(b) Restitution and Recompense in Stair 
To a Scots lawyer the terminology of restitution and recompense is immediately 
recognisable. Together with reparation, Stair’s delictual category, they form a trilogy 
of substantive obediential obligations in the first book of the Institutions.
632
 Stair’s 
division of obligations into those which are “obediential” or “natural” (deriving from 
the will of God) or conventional (from the will of man) appears to be unique.
633
 The 
term “obediential” is thought to derive from theology
634
 and certainly these 
obligations have a strong moral and religious content.  
 




 are not exact equivalents of 
Thomas’ categories but there are enough similarities to warrant comparison. Stair 
explicitly relates both to the Aristotelian principle of equality, describing restitution 
as “extending the proportion of equality”;
637
 or recompense as “obliging to do one 
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good deed for another”.
638
  Even reparation for delictual harm involves the 




Damage is called damnum, a demendo, because it diminisheth or taketh away 
something from another, which of right he had …. The Greeks, for the like 
reason, call it ελαττον, by which man hath less than he had.  
 
Restitution is an obligation which arises from property, the restoring of “things” 
(property or money),
640
 “whereby that which is another’s coming into our power, 
without his purpose to gift it to us, and yet without our fault, ought to be restored”.
641
 
It is conceptually equivalent to Aquinas’ narrow sense of restitution. Stair does not 
replicate the breadth of the scholastic doctrine but is at pains to circumscribe the 
territory of restitution by excluding from its scope legal relationships created either 
by contract (“by voluntary engagement”) or by fault (“by delinquence”)
642
 although, 
as will be discussed in chapter 7, he is not entirely successful at doing so. Title I.7 of 
the Institutions is addressed to possessors, for the source of the obligation lies in the 
fact of possession,
643
 whether acquired unilaterally (for instance by finding lost 
things, or recovering property from thieves or pirates) or through a bilateral 




Recompense, on the other hand, is principally about actions rather than things, as it 
was for Aquinas, where deeds are done “not animo donandi, but of purpose to oblige 
the receiver of the benefit to recompense”.
645
 Recompense is based on the 
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presumption against donation, which would be activated by a gratuitous transfer of 
property (as he had already alluded to in relation to restitution),
646
 whereby “trust is 
rather presumed than donation”.
647
 Likewise, gratuitous actions are to be 
recompensed by negotiorum gestio
648
 or by the broader formulation of an obligation 
arising from “what we are profited by the damage of others without their purpose to 
gift, or as the law expresseth it in quantum locupletiores facti sumus ex damno 
alterius”.
649
 Recompense is, therefore, concerned with removing gain where it has 
not been intended: gratuitous benefits must be quantified and returned to whomever 
conferred them.  
 
However, although recompense ostensibly concerns deeds rather than things, when 
Stair refers to “the other obligation of recompense ... whereby we are enriched by 
another’s means, without purpose of donation”,
650
 it is clear that recompense also 
indirectly concerns property in two ways, both of which concern making profit from 
someone else’s property. First, its function is to remove profit gained through 
someone else’s property by any means other than simply possession (which is the 
territory of restitution), for instance by building on another man’s land or carrying 
out unnecessary repairs to his house.
651
 Secondly, (as was already adverted to in 
Stair’s discussion of restitution) if the bona fide possessor is no longer in possession 
(and restitution is, therefore, no longer possible) recompense is the appropriate 
response to remove any benefits gained during possession, such as fruits or profits 




The parallels with Thomas’ account of the relationship between restitution and 
recompense are evident. Restitution functions principally to restore property, 
recompense redresses gratuitous benefit gained either through the actions of another 
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or from the use or possession of another’s property if restitution can no longer take 
place. Recompense, therefore, involves a quantification of gain or profit (in quantum 
lucratus) for it is not about specific assets, more accurately it is only indirectly about 
those assets.
653
 By the time Stair was writing, the Aristotelian concept of inequality 
did not demand equal exchange. Instead, within the obligation of recompense, 
equality is translated into onerosity and it reinforces the different legal consequences 
which arise from onerous and gratuitous transactions. As was discussed in chapter 2, 
this was also considered an aspect of presumptive fraud.   
 
(c) The link with fraud 
The principle of inequality which was central to the Thomist account of justice and 
the scholastic doctrine of restitution permeated not only Stair’s Institutions, but the 
broad doctrine of fraud as expressed in the decisions of the courts.
654
 It has been 
shown that the doctrine of presumptive fraud was widespread and that its function 
was to restore balance and equilibrium in circumstances where an unequal advantage 
had been gained.
655
 The inequality could arise from a relationship of trust or 
dependence; from a weakness or facility in a person; from inequality of knowledge 
or legal advice; or from a gross inequality in the transaction itself, most obviously 
where it was gratuitous.  
 
It has already been noted that presumptive fraud has many similarities to the 




In Chancery the term “fraud” thus came to be used to describe what fell short 
of deceit, but imported breach of a duty to which equity attached its sanction.  
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Classic examples of equitable fraud were taking wrongful advantage of vulnerable 
people or of close relationships, breach of fiduciary duty or breach of trust. Fraud 
could even be presumed from the intrinsic unfairness of a bargain or from a gift.
657
 In 
search of common principles, Sheridan suggests that the doctrine of equitable fraud 
involved situations where consent was improperly obtained, or a position of power or 
authority was abused. The doctrine of notice (and constructive notice) was also part 
of equitable fraud.
658





Necessity and weakness on the one side, and advantage in fact on the other, 
gained by a representation untrue in fact, and materially inducing the bargain, 
render it contrary to good conscience.  
 
This is historically familiar “fraud” territory for Scots law, but the route taken to 
reach similar results was different as was the underlying theoretical basis: the 
unifying principle for the exercise of the equity jurisdiction was whether behaviour 
was contrary to good conscience; in Scotland it lay in the expression of injustice as 
inequality. Inequality could perhaps be seen as a more objective standard than 
“conscience” or even equity itself. And in the early decisions of the Scottish courts 
involving presumptive fraud we do not find an unfettered exercise of discretion.  
Rather discrete categories of inequality are developed to deal with situations in 
which the law ought to intervene, and the doctrine of presumptive fraud is the tool 
employed. Had the Scottish courts continued down this path of judicial development 
the modern law might be a more coherent entity. 
 
5. A Change in the Zeitgeist: the Scottish Enlightenment 
However, the world was changing. Stair’s moral and religious view of law could not 
survive the seismic shift that was happening all over Europe, one which was 
especially relevant in Scotland: the phenomenon now known as the Scottish 
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Enlightenment. Although the most obvious changes in the law of fraud took place in 
the nineteenth century,
660
 one of the sources of that transformation must lie in the 
change of worldview which took place over the course of the eighteenth century. A 
vast literature now exists on the Scottish Enlightenment and no attempt is made here 
to provide anything other than a brief overview.
661
 My purpose is to reflect the fact 
that the writers and thinkers of the Enlightenment changed the way people thought 




As has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, for at least a century after the 
publication of Stair’s Institutions fraud – whether proven or inferred – had been a 
broad overarching doctrine designed to deal with a spectrum of behavior from deceit 
through to simply private knowledge. It was the equalising force which the courts 
used to deliver substantive justice. However, over the course of the nineteenth 
century the courts increasingly lacked confidence in this use of the doctrine, and the 
definition of fraud gradually narrowed to the point where it became more or less the 
equivalent of criminal fraud. The question is why this development took place. Cases 
still came before the courts which raised the same problems, and indeed the court 
developed other means to deal with some of them (for instance, the doctrines of 
facility and circumvention and undue influence, and – with regrettable consequences 
– the law of error).  
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it seems likely that influences outside the law were 
having an effect on the Scottish bench as well as on wider civil society. This was the 
aftermath of what is now known as the Scottish Enlightenment, a period in which 
philosophical giants like Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith and David Hume were 
writing and debating about the way in which human beings formed a “moral sense”; 
about how society should be governed; and crucially, about the separation between 
morality and the rules of positive law. Gone was the older scholastic concept of 
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justice as virtue, or for the natural lawyers, justice as God’s moral law. For Hume 
“the sense of justice and injustice is not deriv’d from nature”; rather it “arises 




For the Enlightenment thinkers it was not the function of law to make men “good”, 
indeed it seems that an agreed concept of the good was no longer possible.
664
 This 
does not mean they had no concept of morality, and indeed justice was a central 
pillar of the theories of both Smith and Hume, for the law would still punish men 
who were “bad”. However, law was now a reactive rather than an active force for 
good in the ordering of society. Reacting against the natural law theories of the 
seventeenth century, Hume described justice as a negative virtue which demanded 




Mere justice is, upon most occasions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders 
us from hurting our neighbour. The man who barely abstains from violating 
either the person, or the estate, or the reputation of his neighbours, has surely 
very little positive merit. He fulfils, however, all the rules of what is 
peculiarly called justice, and does every thing which his equals can with 
propriety force him to do, or which they can punish him for not doing. We 
may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing. 
 
This runs in parallel with Smith’s economic theory, which argued that the most 
successful model for growth was one in which every person was “left perfectly free 
to pursue his own interest in his own way”.
666
 The function of law, therefore, was not 
to regulate consumption nor to interfere or “watch over the economy of private 
people”;
667
 rather individuals should be left alone to pursue their own interests.
668
 
This was a non-interventionist model of justice, and of the role of government more 
generally, classically known as laissez-faire. Just action was “inaction”, refraining 
                                                 
663
 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, III.2.1. 
664
 MacIntyre (1988) p.207. 
665
 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, II.2.1.9. 
666
 Smith, Wealth of Nations, IV.9.51. 
667
 Ibid. II.3.36. 
668
 Berry (1997) p.129. 
129 
 
from hurting one’s neighbours.
669
 The logical consequences of this view is that the 
law must be neutral regarding moral behaviour, its proper role is to regulate relations 
between independent moral agents, each capable of choosing their own ethical path. 




In a Scottish context, the contrast with Stair, for whom the perfect ideal of law was 
the law of nature, the divine law, the moral law, could not be clearer. It was no 
longer regarded as part of human nature, fashioned in the image of God and in the 
light of human reason, to act justly. For Stair, rooted in the Aristotelian tradition, 
justice was the prime virtue; for the Enlightenment thinkers law was merely an 
“artificial” virtue,
671
 a social construct or convention which was essential for social 
cohesion.  
 
Hochstrasser argues that one of the changes brought about by the Enlightenment was 
an “invention of autonomy”,
672
 a change of focus from a metaphysical (and religious) 
understanding of the world to “the anthropological understanding of the 
individual”.
673
 This is matched by a paradigm shift in legal thinking, from the 
language of duties and obligations (characteristic of Stair)
674
 to that of natural 
rights.
675
 Smith and Hume were dismissive of the natural lawyers (although they 
admired Grotius), because “they tried to do too much”
676
 in that “[t]hey were 
concerned with what the good man, the man with the most delicate scruples of 
conscience, should think himself bound to perform”.
677
 In the new world 
jurisprudence “is concerned not with what the good man should be disposed to do, 
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Whether in these contracts there be a moral necessity to keep an exact 
equality, that whosoever ex post facto, shall be found to have made an 
unequal bargain, the gainer ought to repair the loser.  
 




In all voluntary contracts, both parties gain. For a long time, however, people 
were possessed of the idea, that one man’s gain is another’s loss. 
Unfortunately, legislation proceeded on this fallacy, and consequently busied 
itself with restrictions, prohibitions, compensations and the like.  
 
The thinkers of the Enlightenment were reconceptualising philosophy, but perhaps 
more importantly they were reconceptualising Scottish society. Their view of justice 
reflects and underpins their whole idea of society as a community of strangers, 
motivated by self-interest, which is restrained by the rules of justice for the sake of 
utility (Hume) or the common good (Smith) or conscience (Thomas Reid). They 
were driven by the need to provide an analysis of a commercial society in which the 
goal was both opulence and freedom: opulence because all human beings want to 
increase their wealth; freedom because commercial society, unlike its feudal 
predecessor, offers the opportunity to all who labour to increase their wealth. Justice 
is the foundation stone for the operation of commerce. However, its functions are 
limited to upholding property transactions and contracts, and to providing rules of 
certainty, accuracy and predictability so that people can have confidence in their 
trading partners and in the markets in order for commerce to flourish.  
 
So the ground shifts from a concept of justice which is inextricably linked with 
morality and conscience, to justice which is only negative and can be fulfilled by 
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sitting still. The function of justice is now to maintain social order and to serve 
commerce rather than embodying principles of right living, virtue and godliness. 
This worldview represented a complete break with the traditions of the past – both 
intellectual and legal. As Scotland moved into Smith’s fourth stage of 
development,
681
 commercial utility became a strong driving force, and the values of 
the market and economic growth were increasingly to prevail.
682
 It is no surprise that 
the Court of Session in the nineteenth century gave voice to those values. 
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Chapter 4: The Transformation of Fraud 
 
The modern law of fraud is very different from the broad picture outlined in chapter 
2. This chapter will examine the reasons why the history of fraud presented above is 
almost unrecognisable today. It examines in some detail the case law of the 
nineteenth century, the crucial period in which the definition of fraud was 
transformed, focusing on two particular aspects of the process: the changing attitude 
of the Scottish courts over the course of the nineteenth century and the impact of the 
English decision Derry v Peek,
683
 the most frequently cited authority for the modern 
definition of fraud in Scots law. 
 
Instances of presumptive fraud became more infrequent over the course of the 
nineteenth century, as has been shown, and it was in this period that the definition of 
fraud was fundamentally altered. In the later decades of the nineteenth century there 
are few instances where fraud was presumed or inferred in the broader sense of 
inequality or unwarrantable behaviour outside the by-now established categories of 
facility and circumvention or undue influence.
684
 The broader doctrine of 
presumptive fraud was lost to the Scottish judiciary. Although individual judges 
attempted to invoke it in hard cases from time to time, there was insufficient 
familiarity with the historical material, accompanied, often explicitly, by the sense 
that commercial men demanded a more robust definition of what amounted to fraud.  
 
However, it would be inaccurate to say that the emasculation of fraud was entirely 
the work of the English judges in Derry v Peek. Although Derry provided an ideal 
case study for legal nationalists in the twentieth century seeking to redeem Scots law 
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from pernicious English influence,
685
 the transformation of fraud cannot be laid at the 
door of English law. There is evidence that the Scottish courts were already reaching 
for a narrower definition of fraud on their own, with the result that there is 
considerable inconsistency in the case law of the nineteenth century and great 
difficulty in reconciling the often contrary views expressed by individual judges. 
Indeed, perhaps the tension had always existed to some extent at an ideological 
level.
686
 However, despite the fact that fraud, encompassing non-intentional deceit, 
had been a familiar legal concept in Scotland, over the course of the nineteenth 
century a narrower definition was emerging. Nevertheless, there remained instances 
where the broader concept of fraud was resorted to by the courts in circumstances 
where unfair practices were combined with aggravating factors.  
 
This very inconsistency suggests that an ideological battle was being waged in the 
Scottish courts. To some extent they were simply reacting to the cases which came 
before them in the aftermath of a period of economic turmoil after the collapse of 
two Scottish banks.
687
 Fraud became a key issue as shareholders with the prospect of 
bankruptcy before them argued they had made investments on the basis of a 
misrepresentation. However, the court was clearly divided, as was wider Scottish 
society, about the appropriate role the law should play in such an economic and 
social crisis. This was a classic policy dilemma in which competing concepts of 
substantive justice and commercial expediency battled for supremacy. And fraud was 
in the centre of the debate. Some judges used a broad concept of fraud to provide a 
remedy; others interpreted it narrowly in order to give more protection to 
entrepreneurs, in particular the directors of companies and financial institutions. 
Their judgments often contain pronouncements on the havoc that would be wreaked 
by putting individual fairness before the interests of a growing economy.  
 
The battle for the definition of fraud began, therefore, long before Derry v Peek. A 
flavour of the conflicting views held by the court can be seen in Railton v Mathews 
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 in which the judges of the Inner House disagreed as to whether an 
issue of “undue concealment or deception” contained two different standards of 
dishonesty or whether both amounted to intentional deceit. The majority held that the 
creditor in a bond of caution was under no duty to disclose information which bore 
on the debtor’s reliability and creditworthiness; and furthermore, that withholding 
facts to the other party’s disadvantage must be done willfully and intentionally 
before there would be liability.
689
 In a dissenting judgment Lord Cockburn was of the 
view that deception and undue concealment amounted to two different species of 
fraud: even if the creditor was “perfectly honest”, if he had concealed material facts 
which induced the cautioner to sign the bond, it would be “undue” concealment.
690
 
Both sides appealed to Scottish authorities. Lord Moncreiff claimed he could find no 
previous case where a bond of caution was reduced without evidence of “unfair or 
fraudulent purposes”;
691
 Lord Cockburn, on the other hand, could not reconcile the 
majority decision “with justice, or with the object of the law” or even with 
established Scottish practice “which always uses the word “undue” as something 
short of fraud”,
692
 a category he described as the “negative” form of fraud.
693
 These 
arguments typify the uncertainty that surrounded the meaning and scope of fraud as 
the nineteenth century progressed, even among such eminent Scottish jurists.  
 
There is, therefore, considerable inconsistency in mid-century cases dealing with 
questions of fraud, error and misrepresentation and it is not possible to reconcile all 
of the statements made about the definition of fraud. There was no clear linear 
progression from the broad concept of presumptive fraud to the modern concept of 
fraud as deceit. However, despite the evident contradictions, there is a discernible 
pattern of decisions which will be outlined in this chapter. The view presented here is 
that a broad concept of fraud was familiar in the Scottish courts well into the 
nineteenth century and that the narrowing of fraud to intentional deceit took place in 
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the second half of the century once liability for misstatements had been transferred 
from the law of fraud to the law of error in a way that was inconsistent with the 
history of those doctrines. Derry v Peek then provided the authority required to make 
the change permanent.  
  
 
1. Divergent Views of Fraud in the nineteenth century 
 
(a) The broad view 
The conflict between law and morality was – and is – a far wider debate than 
questions of Scottish legal doctrine, but its effects can be felt in the growing 
reluctance of the Scottish bench to use legal principles to enforce moral standards. It 
is suggested that the change of worldview which the Enlightenment represents, 
combined with economic growth, should be recognised as the context within which 
the law of fraud was transformed from being a barometer of conscience, intrinsically 
moral, and containing many shades of grey, to a legal rule which penalised only 
criminal behaviour causing harm by means of intentional deceit. Of course, no 
seismic philosophical shift is ever explicitly articulated in legal judgments. 
Underlying values rarely are. But that is not to say that they do not have a profound 
effect on legal principles and on the people who pronounce them. Seen through the 
lens of Scottish intellectual history, the growing reluctance of the Scottish bench to 
label as “fraud” behaviour which was morally dubious but not intentionally deceitful 
becomes more comprehensible. The law was no longer seen as an instrument for 
enforcing moral standards, and legal rules were gradually being transformed into the 





Another important factor in all of this was religion. Scotland was not only becoming 
more commercial, it was also becoming more secular and the Kirk was no longer 
regarded as the arbiter of thought and behaviour. With religious freedom came a 
moral relativism in which different conceptions of what was “good” or “right” could 
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compete for supremacy. The legal positivists of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries went on to provide a jurisprudential framework to justify the separation of 
law and morality which came to represent legal orthodoxy. It is difficult to see how 
any legal doctrine which involved making moral judgements about conduct and 
motive, as fraud had done, could survive intact in such an intellectual climate.  
 
Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that behaviour which fell short of deceit could 
be and was described as “fraudulent” well into the nineteenth century, while at the 
same time resistance to that broad definition of fraud was gaining ground in some 
quarters. In Gillespie v Russel,
695
 a disadvantageous transaction was not reduced, 
accompanied by dicta expressing the non-interventionist policy of the law where the 
parties were capable of looking after their own interests. However, despite the 
apparent application of a caveat emptor principle,
696
 the court did leave open the 




it may vary, according to the relative position of the parties, – the strength of 
weakness of their minds, – their respective means of knowledge, – or the 




 is, arguably, another example of a refusal by the courts to 
countenance any version of fraud short of deception. It involved an unintentional 
error (an “innocent” misrepresentation) in a lease which turned out to include less 
land than in the original advertisement. The pursuer covered all bases, arguing fraud, 
misrepresentation and essential error and the Lord Ordinary refused the claim, 
making a clear distinction between fraud and error when he said that there was “no 
room or authority, or sound principle, for any mid plea between fraud and 
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 In Oliver it can also be seen that the meaning of culpa lata 
was shifting from the broad idea of lack of due care to the narrower “gross 
negligence” (“in law it is notorious that culpa lata dolo equiparatur, and if the 
pursuers had truly been able to substantiate a case of gross culpa, it should have been 
set forth clearly and distinctly on record; and then it is probable that the case would 
have been treated as one of fraud; as where a party has been injured by the gross fault 
of another, it would be difficult to draw any distinction in a question of reparation 
between moral and legal fraud.”)
700
 However, it is also important to pay attention to 
context. In Oliver the lease was already at an end and it was an action for damages. 
The Lord Ordinary was, arguably, correct to refuse to award damages for anything 
less than deceit, but the result might have been different had this been a contractual 
action. Stein points out that Oliver v Suttie cannot be regarded as having rejected the 
doctrine of innocent misrepresentation,
701
 as some commentators have alleged,
702
  
because it was an action for damages and he suggests that the pursuers might have 
been entitled to reduction.  
 
It is worth remarking that in many modern commentaries on the law of fraud (and 
even some court decisions) there is indiscriminate use of the case law with little 
attention to whether or not it is being discussed in a contractual or a delictual 
context.
703
 This goes some way to explaining the definitional confusion which 
emerged. Derry v Peek was a delictual (tort) action, and yet it was (and is) cited as 
representing the definition of fraud in all contexts despite the fact that contractual 
fraud had always had a wider meaning. Cases like Oliver v Suttie and others like it 
are used in a similarly indiscriminate way.  
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The same issue arose in Campbell v Boswall
704
 in which a lease of a mine which had 
been advertised with an engineer’s report turned out to have no workable coal. The 
court discussed what was required to show that there had been false representation, 
and – foreshadowing Derry v Peek – held that the seller had been “in perfect bona 
fide” and therefore could not be made liable for the error.
705
 However, two important 
points should be made about the decision. In the first place, this was again an action 
for damages because, like Oliver, the lease was already at an end, and to send the 
issue to the jury “either gross negligence or fraud must be proved”.
706
 Once again, 
this would not support any rejection of a broader definition of fraud in contract, 
because it was a delictual action. The second point is that even in a delictual context 
it was a relevant factor that the tenant had the opportunity to inspect the ground and 





Up to the 1860s and 1870s fraud (or “circumvention”) was, generally speaking, still 
given a wide meaning. It was still regarded as “fraudulent” to take advantage of 
someone else’s vulnerability or a relationship of confidence, both in a contractual 
context
708
 and, particularly, where will-making was concerned.
709
 Lord Cockburn 
explained in Clunie v Stirling that “[t]he inference of fraud may be drawn from the 
whole case, although no one act can be pointed out as in itself a direct instance of the 
practice of deceit”.
710
 There is also evidence that inequality was still the underlying 
principle which unified the cases and, consistent with historical practice, aggravating 
factors such as family relationships in succession cases, or personal friendships in 
contracts of caution, were significant. The context of the transaction and the 
relationship of the parties remained important factors to be taken into account, 
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particularly if there was an imbalance, or an inequality, of power or of knowledge 
between the parties:“[i]f the party who is to lose is in ignorance, and the party who is 
to gain is well-informed, it is a case of the grossest fraud.”
711
   
 
Even in a more commercial context, fraud was relevant in situations which fell short 
of outright deceit. There was a considerable amount of litigation following the 
collapse of two large Scottish banks in the 1860s and 1870s. In facts which closely 
mirror Derry v Peek, two separate shareholder actions were brought against the 
Western Bank’s liquidators to reduce share purchases,
712
 alleging that the company’s 
financial statements had grossly overstated the bank’s capital with the knowledge of 
the directors. By the time the actions were raised the whole capital of the bank had, 
in fact, been lost and the company was insolvent. The difficult issue in many of these 
cases was the effect of a misstatement made by company directors which had, 
apparently, not been made with intention to deceive.  
 
In Addie v Western Bank
713
 the Inner House was prepared to accept that it would not 
constitute fraud so long as the directors had reasonable grounds for believing the 
misstatement to be true.
714
 If there were no reasonable grounds for that belief, i.e., if 
the directors had failed in their duty to acquaint themselves with the facts, it would 
be “equivalent to fraud”.
715
 There are obvious resonances with the way in which the 
culpa lata principle was used to deem behaviour as fraudulent in order to impose 
liability. In the context of negligent company directors, the broad notion of fraud was 
used in a similar way. It was said that fraud would not be “imputed”
716
 if the 
directors had fulfilled their duty. Addie was reversed on appeal
717
 but the majority of 
the House of Lords did not disagree with the fact that, where misstatements were 
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concerned, company directors must honestly believe the statements to be true and 




Fifteen years of economic turmoil later, the Inner House was not quite so sure and in 
Lees v Todd
719
 shareholders of the failed City of Glasgow bank had less success with 
the same argument. The court found various reasons to hold the directors not liable, 
such as the fact that they were entitled to rely on the officers of the company who 
had prepared the reports, or that the misstatements were not material. In principle, 
the court still recognised that negligent misrepresentations could be regarded as a 
species of fraud in some circumstances, even if it was becoming more difficult in 




A man making a statement on any subject which he believes to be untrue, 
though he does not know it to be false, is dishonest, but if he merely makes a 
statement which he does not actually believe to be true, that is a negative state 
of mind, and his honesty or dishonesty will depend on his relation to the facts 
which he states, and to the persons whom he addresses. A statement on a 
matter of indifference both to the speaker and the listener, even though the 
speaker has no actual belief in the truth of the statement, provided he does not 
believe it to be false, will not infer dishonesty on his part. He is not seeking to 
mislead anybody. But a statement of facts made regarding a matter of interest 
to both speaker and listener stands in a very different position. If the speaker, 
having no actual belief in the statement, though not believing it to be untrue, 
volunteers the statement, inconsistent with facts, to a person interested in the 
statement, and likely to act on it, he is dishonest and guilty of deceit, because 
he produces, and intends to produce, on the mind of the listener a belief 
which he does not himself entertain.... it must be bona fide. 
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These cases can be seen as an incremental development by the Scottish courts of the 
principles which underlay both the culpa lata principle and the doctrine of 
presumptive fraud, particularly where non-fraudulent misstatements were at issue.  
As illustrated in the passage quoted above, a range of criteria could be applied, all of 
which would have been familiar from the historical scope of fraud, to determine 
whether or not the misrepresentor was liable: an assessment of his bona fides in 
making the statement; a requirement that an “honest” belief in the truth should be 
based on reasonable grounds; or that the misstatement should be material; or the 
extent to which the misrepresentee relied on it. In this mix of factors the courts could 
take account of the relative positions of the parties and their relationship to each 
other. It would have been a short step to develop these principles, in particular the 
culpa lata principle,
721
 as a means of deeming unintentional but reprehensible 
behaviour – or what in English law was described as legal fraud
722
 – to be the 
equivalent of fraud and to re-fashion the concept of presumptive fraud for a modern 
commercial society. However, the extended litigation in Boyd & Forrest
723
 probably 
marked the demise of culpa lata as a historically appropriate means of dealing with 
unintentional misrepresentations, other than in a fiduciary context.
724
 Boyd & Forrest 
was also the culmination of an ill-fated process by which Scots law turned to the law 
of error for a solution. 
 
 
(b) The narrow view 
Of greater significance are cases where the courts refused to find a relevant averment 
of fraud in circumstances where it would almost certainly have been recognised at an 
earlier period.
725
 This development was also accompanied by an emphasis on 
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requiring proof of fraud
726
 (albeit this had always been a requirement, even for the 
Institutional writers, but it had not prevented fraud from being inferred) or the need 
to show a pre-existing duty before disclosure could be required.
727
 It also involved a 
dilution, even a dismissal, of principles which had previously been applied in similar 
circumstances. An example of the direction the law was taking can be seen in 





 the caveat emptor principle was explicitly affirmed by the Inner 
House in the context of a property transaction in which the seller had concealed the 
existence of a mid-superiority. The court held that the law agent responsible for the 
misstatement had had an honest belief in its truth, thereby excluding fraud. This in 
itself was fairly unexceptional: the innovation lies in the criteria for determining 
when such a belief was honest. Lord Shand referred to the objective test laid down in 
Addie (that it must be based on reasonable grounds) and shared Lord Cranworth’s 
scepticism, saying that it “cannot be accepted as settled that a statement or 
representation may be held to be fraudulent because false in fact, and made upon 
what some persons would regard as insufficient grounds, if made in an honest belief 
in its truth.”
730
 Brownlie also marks a subtle, and somewhat circular, shift in 
emphasis in that instead of the honest belief being subject to a reasonable grounds 




But if he refrained from inquiry, not from any unwillingness to know the 
truth, but because he was really satisfied he had reasonable grounds of belief, 
and his belief be thus honestly entertained, I do not think his statements, 
though false, can be held to be fraudulent in law, as it certainly is not in fact. 
A statement made in an honest belief in its truth cannot be fraudulent. 
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 Broatch v Jenkins (1866) 4 M 1030; Menzies v Menzies (1890) 17 R 881; Robinson v National 
Bank of Scotland Ltd 1916 SC 46. 
728
 Addie v Western Bank (1865) 3 M 899 rev. Western Bank of Scotland v Addie (1867) 5 M (HL) 
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Brownlie is often cited as a leading authority for the narrow definition of fraud, but 
two things should be noted: first, as is evident from the quotation, Lord Shand left 
open the possibility of inferring fraud from a lack of reasonable grounds for an 
honest belief; and secondly, alongside this apparently definitive statement there 





(c) The problem of unintentional misrepresentation 
There was certainly a strand of Scottish judicial opinion which allowed only a 
narrow scope for fraud. However, there was a stronger inclination – perhaps rooted 
in a sense of historical familiarity – to continue to use fraud to deal with substantive 
unfairness, particularly where loss was caused by another party’s misstatement. The 
debate crystalised around the question of non-fraudulent misrepresentations.
733
 False 
statements, and not only those fraudulently made, had been firmly part of the law of 
fraud in an earlier period but this was beginning to change.  
 
British Guarantee Association v Western Bank of Scotland
734
 concerned 
representations made by the bank about the way in which cash was handled. These 
were not fraudulent misrepresentations, they were at most negligent, or even 
“innocent” in that the bank alleged this was their usual practice. In turned out that a 
bag marked £1000 gold was weighed but not opened or inspected and it turned out to 
contain only silver and copper. Lord Cockburn did not question the fact that a 
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 I never heard the general principle even questioned, that a contract entered  
into on a material misrepresentation by one of the parties, is voidable on this 
account by the opposite party, who is thereby injured.   ....Since even 
substantial error is a ground of reduction, I cannot comprehend how 
substantial misrepresentation – or a substantial representation of a future 
practice not adhered to – should not be a ground of reduction also. This 
principle is so familiar to every Scotch lawyer – so perfectly rudimental – that 
it is really needless to say more about it. 
 
The court was also clear that the relevant tests were the materiality of the 
misrepresentation combined with the reliance of the other party,
736
 both of which 
have been restated in the leading modern authority on misrepresentation,
737
 both 
classically part of the law of fraud. 
 
However, as the nineteenth century progressed the courts had considerable difficulty 
marking a clear line between fraud and error and a number of cases turn on whether 
the issue is one or the other.
738
 It remains something of a mystery why the question 
of misstatements caused such difficulty, since this was no new phenomenon. Stein’s 
view that the turning point was the Mercantile Law (Scotland) Amendment Act 
1856, which in effect embedded the principle of caveat emptor in Scots law, may be 
correct.
739
 Whatever may be the cause, the ultimate outcome towards the end of the 
nineteenth century was a migration from fraud to error, a development which is 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 5. Mid-century there is merely confusion and a 
good deal of disagreement in the Inner House.  
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When Lord Carmont later reviewed the law relating to essential error and 
misrepresentation he acknowledged even in 1936 that it was “in a state of 
confusion”.
740
 That very confusion suggests that the courts were not familiar with 
essential error being used as an alternative to fraud or misrepresentation, i.e. induced 
error was not a familiar concept in the Scottish courts. However, the “error” analysis 
was gaining ground, particularly in relation to careless or “innocent” misstatements. 
As will be shown in chapter 5, it was only at the end of the nineteenth century that it 
was finally accepted that non-fraudulent misstatements were part of the law of error, 
and only after the definition of fraud had become so narrow that it was no longer 
capable of providing a remedy. Derry v Peek played a part in that development. 
 
 
2. The Impact of Derry v Peek 
No case has had more influence on the Scots law of fraud than the English decision 
in Derry v Peek.
741
 It has been said that “[i]n both Scotland and England the principle 
applicable in both the civil and criminal law [of fraud] is that laid down by the House 
of Lords in Derry v Peek”.
742
 Despite a host of contrary native authorities, this case 
cemented a restrictive definition of fraud fundamentally and (probably) irreversibly. 
Lord Herschell’s oft-quoted dicta meant that the broad scope of civil fraud set out in 
detail above was narrowed to denote only intentional or reckless deceit.    
 
The late nineteenth century was a period of economic turmoil when, during a 
previous “credit crunch”, falling markets led to stock market losses and the collapse 
of companies, banks and other financial institutions. During this period many 
challenges were made to contracts for the purchase of shares or other investment 
instruments on the grounds that the investor had been fraudulently induced to enter 
into the agreement,
743
 leading the Lord Chancellor (Cairns) to comment that “during 
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the last quarter of a century actions in every shape and form have been brought or 
attempted to be brought arising out of dealings in shares alleged to have been 
fraudulent”.
744
 This was the climate in which Derry v Peek
745
 was decided. 
 
It will be argued that the Scottish courts used Derry to reinforce a process of 
narrowing which was already well underway in the Scots law of fraud. It is clear 
from subsequent case law that the definition of fraud laid down in Derry was 
relatively quickly limited to common law fraud by the English courts, and was firmly 
distinguished from the much broader meaning of fraud in equity. The lack of a 
separate equitable jurisdiction in Scotland meant that the same process of 
reinterpretation never took place for Scots law, despite the fact that the Court of 
Session had ample Scottish authority at its disposal had it wished to do so. The end 
result is that different interpretations of Derry prevail north and south of the border 
with the important consequence that by adopting an unrevised version of Lord 
Herschell’s definition of fraud Scots law lost its mechanism for dealing with 
substantive unfairness in one fell swoop and, unlike English law, had nothing to 
replace it with. Despite the oft-acclaimed inherent equitable jurisdiction of the Court 
of Session, which arguably could have done for Scotland what, as we shall see, 
Nocton v Lord Ashburton
746
 did for England, the judges of the late nineteenth century 
showed themselves unwilling to use it for that purpose. It has also meant that Scots 
law has, at significant moments,
747
 continued to use the language of fraud in its older 
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and broader sense of unfairness with no underlying rationale for why this should be 
so, no analysis of the content of fraud when used in this sense, and no discussion of 




(a) The Decision in Derry v Peek748 
Derry v Peek was an action in tort, in substance typical of the late nineteenth century, 
where the plaintiff had bought shares in a tramway company relying on the company 
prospectus which claimed that it had the right to use steam instead of horse power, 
thus making it considerably more profitable than its competitors. In fact, permission 
to use steam power was subject to the consent of the Board of Trade, and was not 
granted. The shareholder brought an action of deceit against the directors of the 
company alleging they had made a false statement and claiming damages for 
fraudulent misrepresentation. The arguments turned on whether or not an action in 
deceit required intention, whether a negligent misstatement would suffice, and the 
effect of honest belief on the part of the defendants. There are various important 
elements in the House of Lords decision, which, given its influence on Scots law, 
warrants detailed analysis.  
 
On the question of intention versus negligence, the court insisted that a successful 
action in tort required “mens rea” on the part of the directors.
749
 Lord Herschell, in 
the leading judgment, held that “without proof of fraud no action of deceit is 
maintainable”
750
 and his definition of fraud meant that a misstatement must be 
wilfully or knowingly made.
751
 Mere inaccuracy was not enough,
752
 nor was 
carelessness.
753
 To repeat the influential definition:
754
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fraud is proved when it is shewn that a false representation has been made (1) 
knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless 
whether it be true or false.   
 
The third aspect, he said, is merely an instance of the second for it cannot be fraud if 
there is honest belief in the truth of the statement.
755
 In an earlier Scottish appeal 
with similar facts, Western Bank of Scotland v Addie,
756
 the question of honest belief 
had been addressed. Lord Cranworth, disagreeing with the Lord President, held that 
honest belief was a defence to a charge of fraud, even if there were no reasonable 
grounds for that belief. The court in Derry v Peek, reversing the Court of Appeal on 
this point, was firmly of the same view.
757
 Despite the fact that Lord Bramwell 
accepted that the defendants “knew that what they said was untrue”
758
 (in the sense 
that they knew permission had not been granted when the prospectus was written, 
although they were confident it would be granted), this was not fraud.  
 
The court may also have been influenced by the fact that the defendants were 
“respectable and intelligent men”
759
 (one was a member of the bar) and they certainly 
considered it their duty to support free enterprise. Lord Bramwell quoted with 




mercantile men dealing with matters of business would be the first to cry out 
if I extended the notion of deceit into what is honestly done in the belief that 
these things would come about, and when they did not come about, make 
them liable in an action of fraud.  
 




 Western Bank of Scotland v Addie (1867) 5 M (HL) 80. 
757
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He went further, for “to say that there is a “right to have true statements only made” 
[as the Court of Appeal had held], I cannot agree, and I think it would be much to be 
regretted if there was any such right. Mercantile men, as Stirling J. says, would 
indeed cry out”.
761
 It was acceptable, even essential, for speculators to speculate, 
even if members of the public relied on those speculations to their detriment.  
 
Moral philosophers these judges were not, albeit they ventured forth with confidence. 
Some of their pronouncements make little sense, but they demonstrate the confusion 
which the idea of negligence engendered at this time. Lord Bramwell said that 




 there are “absolute” untruths which 
constitute fraud and untruths that are honestly made which do not. He also appears to 




But if there is moral culpability, I agree there is responsibility. But to believe 
without reasonable grounds is not moral culpability, but, (if there is such a 
thing) mental culpability. 
 
Lord Fitzgerald reached for the same nebulous distinction and appeared to suggest 
that there was a distinction in law between moral truth and actual truth, the former 
being as acceptable as the latter. He did not consider the misstatement in the 
prospectus to be “untrue in a popular or business sense”,
764
 for although it was 





Lord Herschell’s views were more measured, and in obiter remarks he considered 
that there may be a “moral duty” on company directors to be vigilant that a 
prospectus contains truthful facts. He conceded that “there is much to be said for the 
view that this moral duty ought to some extent to be converted into a legal 
obligation, and that the want of reasonable care to see that statements, made under 
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such circumstances, are true, should be an actionable wrong. ... If it is to be done the 
legislature must intervene”,
766
 and indeed it did. The following year, in response to 
Derry v Peek and other similar cases, the Directors’ Liability Act 1890 was enacted 
to impose liability on directors who made false statements, whether intentionally or 
negligently. Mercantile men did not appear to cry out, at least in public. 
 
A further point is worth noting in the decision, of crucial importance to the reasons 
why fraud was given such a narrow definition, but which appears to have been 
ignored in the application of the case to Scotland. First, the court made clear that 
Lord Herschell’s definition only applied to an action in deceit. It was explicitly stated 
that the decision was limited to the law of tort. Had this been a contractual action, the 




I think it important that it should be borne in mind that such an action [“an 
action of deceit, a mere common law action”] differs essentially from one 
brought to obtain rescission of a contract of the ground of misrepresentation 
of a material fact. The principles which govern the two actions differ widely. 
Where rescission is claimed, it is only necessary to prove that there was 
misrepresentation; then, however honestly it may have been made, however 
free from blame the person who made it, the contract, having been obtained 
by misrepresentation, cannot stand. In an action of deceit, on the contrary, it 
is not enough to establish misrepresentation alone; it is conceded on all hands 
that something more must be proved ...  
 
Lord Bramwell referred to “the equitable rule (which is not at issue here), that a 
material misrepresentation, though not fraudulent, may give a right to avoid or 
rescind a contract where capable of such rescission.”
768
 This was an action in tort, 
not in contract. Furthermore, this was a common law action, not an equitable one; 
and it left untouched the much broader doctrine of fraud in equity which labelled as 
“fraudulent” activities far beyond the scope of fraudulent misrepresentation. This 
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distinction, as we shall see, was firmly reasserted by the English courts in the 
aftermath of Derry v Peek in order to preserve the territory of equitable fraud. There 
was no equivalent Scottish rehabilitation of a broader doctrine of fraud.  
 
 
(a) The Response to Derry v Peek in England: Nocton v Lord Ashburton 
The decision in Derry v Peek was almost immediately reversed. It was clearly 
perceived to be a wrong decision by Parliament, by other members of the judiciary 
and by academic commentators.
769
 The Directors’ Liability Act 1890 was 
Parliament’s response to the decision, albeit limited to statements made in company 
prospectuses, and it directly addressed the question of honest belief. Despite 
opposition at the Committee stage from some of the same judges who had decided 
Derry v Peek,
770
 legislation was passed which made directors liable for untrue 
statements made in company prospectuses unless they believed them to be true and 
had reasonable grounds for such a belief.
771





[T]he general effect of the judgments in Derry v Peek was to give an 
impression to the courts, and to the legal profession as a whole, that only 
when actual fraud had been proved could misrepresentors be held liable for 
damages: it was fraud, properly so-called, or nothing. 
 
In fact, it took twenty-five years before the decision in Nocton v Lord Ashburton
773
 
authoritatively held that Derry v Peek had been applied too widely. Nocton firmly 
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reasserted the principle that there were different meanings of fraud at common law 
and in equity, and the latter encompassed liability for statements which were false 
but which had not been made with intention to deceive. Nocton is also considered in 
some detail because of its significance for the definition of fraud, and while it is an 
English decision, it has been relied on in Scots law.
774
 Moreover, two of the judges in 
the House of Lords were eminent Scottish jurists (Lord Dunedin and Lord Shaw of 
Dunfermline) and their speeches are of particular interest. Nocton also became a 
foundational case in the law of negligence. It was the principal authority used half a 
century later to establish a general principle of liability for negligent misstatements 
in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd 
775
 and was instrumental in 
transforming the law of negligence in both jurisdictions. 
 
The plaintiff in Nocton argued that he had been induced to make a risky property 
investment on the improper advice of Nocton, his solicitor, who also had a financial 
interest in the property. He argued that the advice given to him had not been given in 
good faith but for Nocton’s own financial advantage and the question for the court 
was whether or not this amounted to fraud. The defendant relied on Derry v Peek to 
argue that it was not.  
 
Viscount Haldane gave a lengthy speech which focused on the definition of fraud 
and the distinction between the tort of deceit and the broader doctrine of fraud in 
equity. He explained that “[i]n the old cases in equity the term “fraud” was 
frequently applied to cases of a breach of fiduciary obligation”.
776
 He held that the 
solicitor had committed such a breach and that damages were available to the 
plaintiff. However, the court had to deal with the consequences of Derry v Peek, 
because “[t]here appears to have been an impression that the necessity which recent 
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authorities have established of proving moral fraud in order to succeed in an action 
of deceit has narrowed the scope of this remedy [fraud as breach of fiduciary duty]. 





The court did not deny that where an action for deceit was concerned the rule in 





it should not be forgotten that Derry v. Peek was an action wholly and solely 
of deceit, founded wholly and solely on fraud, was treated by this House on 
that footing alone, and that—this being so—what was decided was that fraud 
must ex necessitate contain the element of moral delinquency.  
 





In reality the judgment covered only a part of the field in which liabilities 
might arise.  There are other obligations besides that of honesty the breach of 
which may give a right to damages.  
 
The key effect of Nocton v Lord Ashburton with respect to the law of fraud is that it 
reinterpreted the scope of the decision in Derry v Peek. The court did so by first 
limiting its application to the law of tort, and then by insisting that fraud in its 
equitable sense was an entirely separate doctrine. Viscount Haldane explained that 
“fraud” was used in a much wider sense in the Chancery jurisdiction, particularly in 
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in this strict sense it was quite natural that Lord Bramwell and Lord Herschell 
should say that there was no such thing as legal as distinguished from moral 
fraud. But when fraud is referred to in the wider sense in which the books are 
full of the expression, used in Chancery in describing cases which were 
within its exclusive jurisdiction, it is a mistake to suppose that an actual 
intention to cheat must always be proved. A man may misconceive the extent 
of the obligation which a Court of Equity imposes on him. His fault is that he 
has violated, however innocently because of his ignorance, an obligation 
which he must be taken by the Court to have known, and his conduct has in 
that sense always been called fraudulent, even in such a case as a technical 
fraud on a power. It was thus that the expression “constructive fraud” came 
into existence. The trustee who purchases the trust estate, the solicitor who 
makes a bargain with his client that cannot stand, have all for several 
centuries run the risk of the word fraudulent being applied to them. What it 
really means in this connection is, not moral fraud in the ordinary sense, but 
breach of the sort of obligation which is enforced by a Court that from the 
beginning regarded itself as a Court of conscience.  
 
Fraud in the Courts of Chancery amounted to breach of a moral standard which could 
be enforced in law and he was mildly critical of the lack of recognition given to this 




If among the great common lawyers who decided Derry v. Peek there had 
been present some versed in the practice of the Court of Chancery, it may 
well be that the decision would not have been different, but that more and 
explicit attention would have been directed to the wide range of the class of 
cases in which, on the ground of a fiduciary duty, Courts of Equity gave a 
remedy. 
 
Viscount Haldane also provided a more general lesson in jurisprudence on the 
meaning of “fraud” in its equitable sense:
782
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the Court of Chancery exercised an exclusive jurisdiction in cases which, 
although classified in that Court as cases of fraud, yet did not necessarily 
import the element of dolus malus. The Court took upon itself to prevent a 
man from acting against the dictates of conscience as defined by the Court, 
and to grant injunctions in anticipation of injury, as well as relief where 
injury had been done. Common instances of this exclusive jurisdiction are 
cases arising out of breach of duty by persons standing in a fiduciary relation, 
such as the solicitor to the client...  I can hardly imagine that those who took 
part in the decision of Derry v. Peek imagined that they could be supposed to 
have cast doubt on the principle of any cases arising under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery.  
 
Fraud was the broad term used to indicate behaviour which was contrary to 
conscience, the most common example of which was found in cases relating to 
fiduciary duties (the heart of the Chancery jurisdiction), but Viscount Haldane took 
care to explain that it was not limited to a fiduciary context. Broadly speaking, fraud 
was a “nomen generalissimum” for dealing with circumstances “in which the Court 
is of opinion that it is unconscientious for a person to avail himself of the legal 
advantage which he has obtained”.
783




contracts obtained by persons from others over whom they have dominion, 
contracts obtained by persons in a fiduciary position, contracts for the sale of 
shares obtained by directors through misrepresentation contained in the 
prospectus, in respect of which it was never necessary to allege or prove that 
the directors were wilfully guilty of moral fraud in what they had done. 
 
What is most interesting from the perspective of this study is that most of the 
examples given of equitable fraud correspond closely to those which the Scottish 
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courts historically dealt with as presumptive fraud.
785
 In Scotland the rule was based 
on the Aristotelian notion of justice as equality; in England as a manifestation of 
conscience. In both, justice demanded that additional protection should be given to 
weaker contracting parties or to persons standing in a relationship of trust which had 
been abused, both of which were labelled fraud, neither of which required intentional 
deceit or mens rea. Fraud was constituted by a legal advantage gained in 
unconscionable circumstances, as judged to be so by the court. Negligence also came 
within the ambit of equitable fraud because it was against conscience that those 
responsible for making false statements, regardless of their motives, should benefit 
from them. 
 
So how was the law to be applied in future cases where the broader meaning of fraud 
was at issue? Three different scenarios were identified by Viscount Haldane.
786
 First, 
there was dishonesty or fraud in the strict (Derry v Peek) sense which required 
intention to deceive. This was part of the law of torts.
787
 Secondly, there was 
dishonesty which led to rescission of a contract because of a misrepresentation, even 
if innocently made. No intention to deceive was needed; but it was subject to the 
condition that restitutio in integrum must be possible.
788
 Thirdly, there was a 
category of cases based on relationship which would create a duty of honesty and – 




But side by side with the enforcement of the duty of universal obligation to 
be honest and the principle which gave the right to rescission, the Courts, and 
especially the Court of Chancery, had to deal with the other cases to which I 
have referred, cases raising claims of an essentially different character, which 
have often been mistaken for actions of deceit. Such claims raise the question 
whether the circumstances and relations of the parties are such as to give rise 
to duties of particular obligation which have not been fulfilled. Prior to Derry 
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v. Peek the distinction between the different classes of case had not been 
sharply drawn, and there was some confusion between fraud as descriptive of 
the dishonest mind of a person who knowingly deceives, and fraud as the 
term was employed by the Court of Chancery and applied to breach of special 
duty by a person who erred, not necessarily morally but at all events 
intellectually, from ignorance of a special duty of which the Courts would not 
allow him to say that he was ignorant. 
 
The question of liability would then depend on whether or not such a special duty 
existed. It might arise “from the circumstances and relations of the parties”
790
 and, 
reinforcing the point that it was not limited to discrete fiduciary relationships, such a 
duty could be “inferred”. In Derry v Peek no such special duty was inferred, but that 




They must indeed be taken to have thought that the facts proved as to the 
relationship of the parties in Derry v. Peek were not enough to establish any 
special duty arising out of that relationship other than the general duty of 
honesty. But they do not say that where a different sort of relationship ought 
to be inferred from the circumstances the case is to be concluded by asking 
whether an action for deceit will lie. 
 
The starting point, therefore, was the relationship between the parties which could 
give rise to a special duty to exercise care that any statements made were accurate. 
That relationship might be contractual (or one which was equivalent to contract), or 
fiduciary, or it might be another relationship of trust.
792
 Viscount Haldane clearly 
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The two Scottish Law Lords were largely in agreement with Viscount Haldane’s 
general analysis of the circumstances in which a duty to take care arises. Lord 
Dunedin, who was arguably over-confident that Scots law would have dealt with the 
situation better,
794
 recognised that a legal duty might arise from a general obligation 
not to harm others, or from contract, or from relationship. In addition, he considered 
(betraying his Scottish background) that all of these breaches would be based on 
culpa.
795
 Lord Dunedin’s speech is sometimes taken to have held that, in respect of 
misrepresentations, a duty to take care can only arise where there is a fiduciary 
relationship.
796
 However, read carefully, the passage in which he claimed that all 
Chancery cases of this type were fiduciary in nature was part of his summing up of 
his understanding of the history of the Chancery jurisdiction.
797
 It was neither a 
statement of the present law nor a prescriptive rule for the future. If in fact he did 
understand equitable fraud to be confined to fiduciary obligations then he was wrong, 
as Viscount Haldane’s lengthy exposition of equitable fraud demonstrates.
798
 In 
addition, Lord Dunedin then went on to extrapolate from the particular breach of a 
fiduciary duty to a more general analysis of breach of duty, with a particular focus on 
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negligence, which suggests he understood the issue before the court to be of wider 
significance than a rule relating to fiduciaries.  
 
Had the issue been in any doubt, the following year in a Scottish appeal case (not 
involving a fiduciary relationship) Viscount Haldane reiterated and clarified what he 
had said in Nocton. In Robinson v National Bank of Scotland
799
 the Court of Session 
had occasion to consider the impact of Nocton. This was a cautionary obligation in 
which a cautioner raised an action for fraud against the bank alleging that he had 
relied on misleading information provided by the bank about the financial position of 
his co-cautioners, who subsequently became bankrupt. Derry v Peek could not be 
applied without considering the significance of Nocton. However, the Court of 
Session interpreted it narrowly, as might be expected having applied the principles in 
Derry for almost two decades, and the issue was reduced to the question of whether 
or not there was a duty of disclosure on the part of the bank’s agent. Such a duty 
would only arise in the case of a special type of relationship and on the facts there 
was no special relationship and, therefore, no duty. Lord Dundas held that Nocton 
had no relevance to the case before the court, relying on Lord Dunedin’s speech to 




It was an English decision, in regard to which Lord Dunedin explained that 
no difficulty would arise “in any system in which law and equity were not 
separated”... Our own books afford numerous examples of the liability of a 
solicitor to his client for erroneous (though not fraudulent) advice in regard to 
his affairs, and of similar cases arising from a fiduciary relationship between 
the parties. 
 
The Scottish courts reverted to the rule in Derry v Peek, together with Erskine’s 
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The House of Lords
802
 did not reverse the decision in Robinson but they were clearly 
uncomfortable with it and mitigated its effect by refusing to award costs.
803
 Viscount 
Haldane agreed that there were no special circumstances arising from an enquiry 
from one banker to another so as to create a duty of honesty, but he reasserted the 
principles laid down in Nocton and made clear that those principles applied to many 
kinds of relationships, not only those considered to be fiduciary:
804 
 
it is a great mistake to suppose that, because the principle in Derry v Peek 
clearly covers all cases of the class to which I have referred, therefore the 
freedom of action of the Courts in recognising special duties arising out of 
other kinds of relationship which they find established by the evidence is in 
any way affected. I think, as I said in Nocton’s case , that an exaggerated 
view was taken by a good many people of the scope of the decision in Derry 
v Peek. The whole of the doctrine as to fiduciary relationships, as to the duty 
of care arising from implied as well as express contracts, as to the duty of 
care arising from other special relationships which the Courts may find to 
exist in particular cases, still remains, and I should be very sorry if any word 
fell from me which should suggest that the Courts are in any way hampered 
in recognising that the duty of care may be established when such cases really 
occur. 
 
The other Scottish Law Lord in Nocton, Lord Shaw, agreed that the crucial question 
was first to establish the relationship between the parties but he appeared to apply the 




What was the relation in which the parties stood to each other at the time of 
the transaction in respect of which the claim for damage, compensation, or 
restitution is made? In the answer to that question, in my judgment, may be 
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found a solution of not a few of the difficulties which arise in such actions....
  
Once, my Lords, the relation of parties has been so placed, it becomes 
manifest that the liability of an adviser upon whom rests the duty of doing 
things or making statements by which the other is guided or upon which that 
other justly relies can and does arise irrespective of whether the information 
and advice given have been tendered innocently or with a fraudulent intent.  
 
Lord Shaw’s analysis of the “relationship” question was later relied on by the court 
in Hedley Byrne to formulate the concept of proximity. However, his framing of the 
issue also reflects a view which was gaining ground in Scotland in the latter decades 
of the nineteenth century, namely the detachment of misrepresentation from the law 




the principle to be found running through this branch of the law is, in my 
opinion, this: That once the relations of parties have been ascertained to be 
those in which a duty is laid upon one person of giving information or advice 
to another upon which that other is entitled to rely as the basis of a 
transaction, responsibility for error amounting to misrepresentation in any 
statement made will attach to the adviser or informer, although the 
information and advice have been given not fraudulently but in good faith.  
 
The final nail in the coffin for the decision in Derry v Peek in respect of English law 
came in Hedley Byrne v Heller,
 807
 in which Nocton was the leading authority. It was 
argued for the respondents that “Derry v Peek 
 
ruled out any liability not arising from 
a fiduciary relationship and that indicates that the area was not covered by Nocton's 
case.”
808
 Lord Reid acknowledged that “[m]uch of the difficulty in this field has been 
caused by Derry v Peek”.
809
 As far as Lord Bramwell’s formulation that "[t]o found 
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an action for damages there must be a contract and breach, or fraud"
810
 is concerned, 




But it was shown in this House in Nocton v Lord Ashburton that that is much 
too widely stated. We cannot, therefore, now accept as accurate the numerous 
statements to that effect in cases between 1889 and 1914, and we must now 
determine the extent of the exceptions to that rule. 
 
Lord Reid quoted at length the passages referred to above from Viscount Haldane’s 





did not think that a duty to take care must be limited to cases of fiduciary 
relationship in the narrow sense of relationships which had been recognised 
by the Court of Chancery as being of a fiduciary character. He speaks of other 
special relationships, and I can see no logical stopping place short of all those 
relationships where it is plain that the party seeking information or advice 
was trusting the other to exercise such a degree of care as the circumstances 
required, where it was reasonable for him to do that, and where the other gave 
the information or advice when he knew or ought to have known that the 
inquirer was relying on him.  
 
Lord Devlin took a similar view:
813 
 
The House clearly considered the view of Derry v. Peek, exemplified in Le 
Lievre v. Gould, too narrow. It considered that outside contract (for contract 
was not pleaded in the case), there could be a special relationship between 
parties which imposed a duty to give careful advice and accurate information. 
The majority of their Lordships did not extend the application of this 
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principle beyond the breach of a fiduciary obligation but none of them said 
anything at all to show that it was limited to fiduciary obligation. Your 
Lordships can, therefore, proceed upon the footing that there is such a general 
principle and that it is for you to say to what cases, beyond those of fiduciary 
obligation, it can properly be extended. 
 
I have argued above that the standard interpretation of Nocton in subsequent Scottish 
cases (that a broader definition of fraud was limited to the context of fiduciary 
relationships) is a misreading of the case. This argument was confirmed by the 
highest judicial authority in Hedley Byrne.  
 
It is also interesting to note that although Derry v Peek was an action in tort, Nocton 
was a contract case, founding on misrepresentation to seek a remedy. The court 
began with the relationship of trust between the parties and used the concept of 
reliance to extend that relationship beyond status or fiduciary relationships. It 
developed far beyond contract law and is the foundation for the “neighbourhood 
principle” so familiar from the law of negligence,
814
 which created a duty of care 
between parties not in any special relationship with each other, neither fiduciary, nor 
contractual, nor even known to each other.  However, the principle is the same.  
 
In English law, therefore, Derry v Peek was very quickly qualified both by the 
legislature and by the judiciary. The wider definition of fraud as unconscionable 
behaviour or taking undue advantage was, first of all, reinstated in Nocton v Lord 
Ashburton by confining Derry to actions of deceit and by using the concept of a 
special relationship which would create a special duty to ensure the accuracy of 
statements. That same principle was further developed in Hedley Byrne to formulate 
the concept of proximity as a determinant of liability for negligent misstatements. A 
duty of care would arise not only in contractual and fiduciary relationships, but in 
other relationships which were “equivalent to contract”
815
 such as solicitors and their 
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clients or bankers and their customers,
816
 although the list is not closed. The key 
criteria for the imposition of liability appear to be: the relationship between the 
parties (whether fiduciary, contractual, or a relationship of trust, or whether it is 
described as proximity); reliance by one party on the advice given or statements 
made by the other, in circumstances where the party giving advice knew or ought to 
have known there would be reliance; loss caused to the party who acted on the advice 
given or statements made. 
 
There is nothing remarkable about these criteria from a contemporary perspective, 
for they have become part of the standard formulation for ascertaining negligence in 
cases of economic loss. However, the route through which those criteria were 
developed – essentially from the law of fraud, first (briefly) narrowed by Derry v 
Peek, subsequently expanded in Nocton v Lord Ashburton, then reformulated into a 
general principle in Hedley Byrne v Heller – provide an important insight. Narrowing 
the meaning of fraud to intentional deceit was considered too restrictive (and wrong) 
outwith the tort of deceit. The English courts required a more flexible device to 
deliver justice when loss was caused by unintentional but careless misstatements and 
they used the principles inherent in equitable fraud to create one.  
 
Those same principles are closely analogous to what was previously known in Scots 
law as presumptive fraud. As intellectual constructs equitable fraud and presumptive 
fraud were not identical. The former was rooted in the notion of conscience, the latter 
in a more objective concept of Aristotelian inequality. The former worked from the 
basis of the fiduciary relationship, extrapolating general principles such as duty, 
proximity and reliance, which were put to service to develop the law of negligence. 
Presumptive fraud, however, was broader even than equitable fraud. Relationship 
provided only one category of cases where a remedy was given, for the underlying 
principle of inequality was able to touch unequal relationships, even in a commercial 
context in a way that equitable fraud could not (in particular, the liability of the seller 
for latent defects). Inequality in the relationship; inequality in the balance of power 
or the relative strength and weakness of the parties; inequality in their respective 
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states of knowledge; all could be addressed by extending the reach of fraud. 
However, the end result was similar north and south of the border up to the end of 
the nineteenth century. English law found a way to reassert those equitable principles 
and to re-invent them within the modern tort of negligence. Nocton had no equivalent 
in Scots law. 
 
 
(b) The Aftermath of Derry v Peek in Scotland 
While Derry v Peek was fundamentally reinterpreted to limit its impact in English 
law, it was accepted as an accurate statement of the Scots law of fraud with little 
protest. Unlike its history in English law, there were only half-hearted attempts by 
the Scottish judiciary to distinguish different definitions of fraud for different 
contexts; and there was little recognition that contractual fraud and delictual fraud 
might involve different standards, different definitions or different motives. There 
was no particular focus on the relationship in which the parties stood to each other. 
Nocton may have prompted a radical shift in English law but it had little effect north 
of the Tweed.   
 
Perversely, it may have narrowed the scope of fraud even further in that it was 
(inaccurately) relied on as authority for the principle that disclosure was only 
required where there existed a pre-existing duty between the parties. Whereas the 
idea of special relationship or special duty in Nocton was broadly interpreted in the 
English Chancery courts to open the way for a general duty of care in negligence, in 
Scots law it had the opposite effect. Nocton was relied on to narrow the duty of 
disclosure in cases of misrepresentation: liability for false statements would only 
exist where there was a special relationship which created a special duty of 
disclosure. Scots law not only lost the heart of the law of fraud, and hence the ability 
to work from general principles of fault or culpa, but in the process it gained a law of 
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Presumptive fraud and fraud proper had co-existed into the nineteenth century in 
Scots law, admittedly in a way which was largely unarticulated, but familiarity with 
the underlying principles allowed the Scottish courts to exercise a broad discretion 
and to offer protection in situations ranging from intentional deceit, through 
negligent misstatements and omissions, to taking advantage of vulnerability or to 
providing redress where transactions showed manifest inequality. However, the very 
fact that there was little analysis, judicial or other, meant that Scots law lacked a 
structure within which to assimilate Derry v Peek. It would have been possible, as 
happened in England, to use Derry to distinguish between different species of fraud 
and different legal contexts, and to reformulate a taxonomy of fraud using familiar 
Scottish principles. This would probably have meant recognising that Scots law did 
not operate a unitary concept of fraud and, arguably, would have been a more honest 
recognition of the historical scope of fraud. However, the reassertion of a unified 
notion of fraud across the legal spectrum meant that all definitions of fraud which 
ranged beyond intentional or reckless deceit were laid to rest. Moreover, this took 
place with little recognition that Derry v Peek was a tort case
818
 and with little 
analytical subtlety in relation to English law. As will be demonstrated, this did not 
mean that lawyers and judges did not continue to seek solutions for non-intentional 
fraud. Once the door to a broad notion of fraud was closed, they turned to a 
combination of misrepresentation and error in an attempt to regain some of the 
territory that had been lost.  
 
There are various possible explanations for the enthusiastic reception of Derry v 
Peek in Scots law and the depth and longevity of its influence. First, Lord 
Herschell’s definition of fraud cannot really be described as a foreign concept or as 
having a contaminating effect on the purity of Scots law as is sometimes said or 
implied. It was consonant with the native definition of fraud as “a machination or 
contrivance to deceive”,
819
 which, from the time of Erskine, was the most commonly 
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used definition. On one view, Lord Herschell was merely restating what was already 
there. This, in turn, appears to contradict the long history of presumptive fraud 
explored in detail above. However, it should be remembered that Erskine’s definition 
– like those of Stair and Bankton before him – only touched the primary meaning of 
fraud. The Institutional texts had also clearly allowed a place for presumptive fraud 
as a separate legal concept, which the courts applied expansively. Intentional fraud 
and presumptive fraud sat alongside one other as weapons in the armoury of the 
courts.  
 
As has already been noted, instances of presumptive fraud became more infrequent 
over the course of the nineteenth century. Post-Derry v Peek there are no instances 
that I can find of the application of fraud which was presumed or inferred in the 
broader sense of inequality or unwarrantable behaviour outside the established 
categories of facility and circumvention or undue influence.
820
 The concept of 
presumptive fraud had all but disappeared, and although individual judges continued 
to rely on old principles, by and large the battle had been lost. As Stein puts it, “the 
industrial revolution, and a resultant increase in commercial activity, brought before 
the Courts cases where it was impossible to infer fraud, or even culpa lata”.
821
 One 
consequence of the narrowing of fraud, as already indicated, was that the Court of 
Session judges found their judgments being regularly reversed by the House of Lords 
in cases involving unintentional manifestations of fraud: this was the pattern where 
“fraud” indicated misrepresentations which were either negligent or innocent; or 
where “fraud” indicated abuse of a relationship, both fiduciary and non-fiduciary.  
 
By the end of the century fraud had one meaning: intentional deceit requiring mens 
rea, relying either on Erskine’s definition or on Lord Herschell’s later formulation of 
fraud in Derry v Peek. Civil fraud had become almost indistinguishable from 
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criminal fraud, although, ironically, as the civil law was narrowing the definition, so 
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Chapter 5: Fraud, Error and Misrepresentation 
 
The doctrine of error is a perplexing one in Scots law and perhaps no other topic has 
attracted so much attention from academic commentators.
823
 At the start of this 
investigation into the law of fraud it was certainly not my intention to investigate 
error at the same time. However, it has proved impossible to give a coherent account 
of the development of fraud, including its changing definition, without some 
explanation of its somewhat tortuous relationship with the law of error. I do so with 
some trepidation and in the knowledge that others have explored the topic in greater 
depth. Furthermore, this is not an exhaustive account of the history of error, but 
focuses solely on the relationship between fraud, error and misrepresentation.
824
 My 
aim is to demonstrate that the modern category of induced error is not a historical 
one, as some have claimed and others assumed. It is argued in this chapter that the 
difficulties encountered by the courts in finding a way to deal with unintentional mis-
statements led both to a narrowing of the definition of fraud and simultaneously to a 
broadening of the scope of error; furthermore, that this was a misconceived process 
of judicial lawmaking which did irremediable damage to the law of fraud and set the 
law of error on a path to which it was ill-suited. 
 
The process of mutation from fraud to error began in the middle of the nineteenth 
century. The “mischief” which the courts were attempting to address was the issue of 
misstatements which were not intended to deceive. Despite the fact that Scots law 
contained native solutions to the problem of misrepresentation, social, economic and 
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legal conditions in nineteenth century Scotland were such that the courts looked for 
new ways to deal with old problems. Over the course of the century, particularly the 
second half, there was a conceptual relocation of misrepresentation from the law of 
fraud to the law of error. In 1889 the decision in Derry v Peek marked the end point 
of any attempt to reinvent the doctrine of fraud and cemented the invention of a 
category of induced error to deal with unintentional misstatements. What follows is 
an account of the relationship between fraud, error and misrepresentation which is 
controversial and stands in contrast to the analysis of almost all modern 
commentators.
825
 It will argue that Scots law took a wrong turn and that 
misrepresentation – whether or not intended to deceive – is a more comfortable 
bedfellow of fraud than of error. 
 
McBryde has pointed out that “[i]f there had been a major textbook writer on 
Contract, writing at the beginning of the 1850s it is doubtful if the law on error 
would have been taken much further than the institutional writers”.
826
 This is an 
accurate statement, and begs the question: what was the doctrine of error in the 
Institutional writers, and particularly in Stair’s Institutions which appears to me still 
to be a theoretically coherent account of the law? 
 
The most striking comparison with the modern law and its obsession with error is the 
fact that the topic is dealt with so briefly by the Institutional writers. Unlike their 
treatment of fraud, error prompts little discussion and authority is sparse.
827
 And in 
almost complete contrast to the modern law of error, there is a very clear distinction 
between fraud and error. It appears from the historical sources that induced error is 
an almost entirely modern concept. 
 
1. Fraud and Error in Stair and Bell 
Conceptually fraud is part of Stair’s discussion of obediential obligations. It is a civil 
(as well as a criminal) wrong, perhaps the paradigm of a civil wrong, and it occupies 
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a considerable part of his title on reparation.
828
 We have already examined the 
breadth of his account of fraud, including the concept of presumptive fraud explored 
in chapter 2, and shown its relationship to the older scholastic tradition of the moral 
theologians.   
 
Error, on the other hand, is discussed in title I.10 on conventional obligations and 
Stair makes a crystal clear distinction between error and fraud. He briefly states that 
“[t]hose who err in the substantials of what is done, contract not .... “.
829
 In the same 
sentence he explicitly states that he is not going to discuss the traditional “vices of 
consent” (including fraud) because, in structural terms, they are delicts and he has 
already discussed them in the previous title:
830 
 
We shall not here debate of the effect of extortion, error, or circumvention, 
what influence they have upon contracts, of which in the former title.” 
 
In a crucially important passage, he reinforces the distinction by focusing attention 
on the “cause” of the contract:
831 
 
and though deceit were used, yet where it was not deceit, that was the cause 
of the obligation or deed, but the party’s proper motion, inclination or an 
equivalent cause onerous, it infers not circumvention.  So neither doth error 
or mistake, though it be the cause of the obligation or deed and be very 
prejudicial to the erring party.  And though, if it had been fraudulently 
induced by the other party, it would have been sufficient; yet not being so, 
there is no circumvention; and the deed is valid, unless the error be in the 
substantials of the deed, and then there is no true consent, and the deed is null 
…. But if the error or mistake, which gave the cause to the contract, were by 
machination, project or endeavour, of any other than the party errant, it would 
be circumvention.  So that there is nothing more frequently to be adverted, 
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 Ibid. I.9.9, emphasis added. 
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than whether the error be through the party’s own fault, or through the deceit 
of another; and therefore errore lapsus and dolo circumventus are distinct 
defects in deeds.  
 
To paraphrase:  
a) If error is the cause of the obligation, it will not infer fraud, and there can 
only be reduction if the error is in the substantials because there is no consent 
between the parties. 
b) If, however, the error has been fraudulently induced by the other 
contracting party, it amounts to circumvention (fraud). 
c) Therefore, great care should be taken (it is to be adverted) to establish 
whether the error is unilateral or induced. 
 




The fifth common exception is that of errore lapsus: for generally lawyers 
treat these two as congenerous allegiances, errore lapsus et dolo 
circumventus.  But the exception upon error is seldom relevant, because it 
depends on the knowledge of the person erring, which he can hardly prove. 
Neither will error have any effect, if it be not in substantialibus.  For it will 
be no defence for a purchaser to allege, that he was deceived in the value of 
the thing bought, or that the thing bought was insufficient, by a visible fault: 
for in these the answer will only be, caveat emptor; and if it be a latent 
insufficiency, it will rather be esteemed that he was dolo circumventus, than 
errore lapsus: for it will rather be presumed, that the seller knew that fault 
and concealed it, than that the other was ignorant of it. 
 
While Stair recognises that there is a close relationship between error and fraud 
(although proving error is a considerable hurdle to overcome and even latent 
insufficiency amounts to presumptive fraud), there is a clear distinction between the 
two in his mind. 
                                                 
832




There is one passage where Stair appears to acknowledge a concept of induced error, 
using a Biblical example. In the story of Jacob and Rachel in Genesis 29 v 21-30 
Jacob fell in love with Rachel and worked seven years for her hand, but on the 
wedding night her father deceived Jacob by sending her older sister Leah to lie down 
with him instead of Rachel. He then had to work another seven years for the younger 
sister too. Did he make an error or was he deceived? A nice question. Stair’s view is 
that he was certainly deceived, but it “was by his own fault”.
833
 Had he spoken to her 
in the dark he would immediately have known. This may seem a somewhat far-
fetched example, and Stair does not end with a definitive statement, but he appears to 
suggest that it might be both error and fraud. However, taken in conjunction with his 
earlier clarity on the subject, it can be assumed this would amount to fraud. McBryde 
acknowledges that “to the extent that the example of Rachel and Leah reflected the 
thinking on the subject the Scots law of error was being built on a shaky 
foundation”.
834
 The foundations would undoubtedly be shaky because Stair saw this 
as fraud rather than error. 
 
The clear message is that fraud and error are two distinct, albeit related, doctrines, 
with different consequences. And, importantly, if an error is induced by machination 
or intrigue, it amounts to fraud and not error. For Stair at least, error was a no-fault 
category. It could annul a contract if it was in substantialibus and could be proved, 





Bell is the Institutional writer who deals with the law of error in most detail. In early 
editions of his Principles, there is similarly no category of induced error.
836
 In the 
second edition he begins, “Error in substantials, whether in fact or in law, invalidates 
consent, where reliance is placed on the particular in question”, and then goes on to 
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outline the five categories which amount to error in the substantials.
837
 If we compare 
this same passage in later editions, we can see how the law was developing in the 
nineteenth century. In the fourth edition, also written by Bell himself in 1839, he 




Error by fraud of the former kind, though not in substantials, if induced by 
stratagem sufficient to deceive a person of ordinary capacity; or accompanied 
by imbecility and loss on the party of the obligor; or induced in a case in 
which the obligor relied on the obligee for his information, as in insurance 
contracts; will ground an action for reducing the contract, or an exception in 
defence against an action grounded on it: error by fraud of the latter kind, will 
give relief by damages only. 
 
Arguably, since the remedy is in damages, this is still essentially fraud and not error. 
It is therefore questionable whether Scots law had a category of induced error even 




However, by the tenth edition of the Principles, edited by Guthrie in 1899, at a time 
when the definition of fraud was hotly debated,
840
 error caused by misrepresentation 




Error has in itself no legal effect. It becomes operative on a man’s legal 
position only in exceptional cases... Error is operative only when it prevents 
an act or deed from being done or executed, or an agreement from being 
concluded, according to the true intention of the actor or granter or 
contracting parties. The effects in such cases are: that obligations and 
contracts are annulled or dissolved on the ground either of essential error, or 
                                                 
837








 Stein points out that in support of his treatment of error several of the cases cited by Bell were 
decided on grounds of fraud (Stein (1958) p.185).  
840
 “Much of the Scottish case law on error ... was after Bell’s death in 1843” (McBryde (2000) p.78; 
McBryde (2007) para 15-08). 
841





of error produced by misrepresentation or fraud; testamentary writings are 
avoided on like grounds; and what has actually been paid or delivered in error 
may be recovered back. 
 
The discussion of error is now interlaced with a discussion of fraud and 
misrepresentation in a structure which lacks clarity.
842
 However, this is probably 
consistent with what was happening in the courts at the same period and Guthrie 
cannot be blamed entirely for being unable to provide a coherent account of how the 
three concepts related to one another. 
 
There are few cases of error in older Scots law sources. Morison’s Dictionary, for 
instance, contains no title on error, but has a very significant title on fraud which 
covers a vast range of situations, with sub-categories of False Misrepresentations, 
Fraudulent Concealment and Underhand Dealing. It is noteworthy that the majority 
of cases discussed under the title Fraud are instances of presumptive fraud. Most 
cases involving error are related to the condictio indebiti, although there are a few 
examples of error in expression in the eighteenth century.
843
 Error clearly did not 
come before the courts often although the historical waters are muddied by a modern 
tendency to re-classify fraud or presumptive fraud cases retrospectively as 
illustrations of error.
844
 This seems unhelpful in attempting to delineate the correct 
application of either doctrine. 
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2. The Problem of Unintentional Misrepresentation 
The doctrine of induced error emerged over the course of the nineteenth century and 
it did so in response to the problem of unintentional misrepresentation. And yet this 
begs the question: how did Scots law historically deal with misrepresentations which 
were not intended to deceive? Misleading statements are as old as humankind, and 
this was not a new legal problem but it appeared to require a new legal solution. 
There was not so much difficulty with misstatements made negligently. The culpa 
lata doctrine was capable of dealing with any form of negligence by equating it to 
fraud, as has been shown. However, “innocent misrepresentation” was the mischief 
the courts were attempting to address. 
 
Stein has suggested that relief was given for innocent misrepresentation “by applying 
the implied warranty in the case of sale, or by inferring fraud where a representation 
had been made negligently, on the principle culpa lata dolo aequiperatur”.
845
 In my 
view, this is a more accurate assessment of historical developments than can be 
found in most recent commentaries.
846
 Both of Stein’s suggested solutions are 
considered below, and they are arguably both part of presumptive fraud. 
 
 (a) Latent Insufficiency 
It is undoubtedly the case that the seller’s liability for latent insufficiency, regardless 
of his state of knowledge or honesty, gave protection to buyers prior to the 
Mercantile Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 1856. There is considerable case law on 
the soundness of horses or the viability of grass seed which attest to this. For 
instance, in Ralston v Robertson
847
 the seller argued that if he had upheld the horse as 
sound he would be liable in contract, and if he had “wilfully deceived or imposed 
upon the pursuer” he would be liable in delict, but as neither was the case “it is not 
easy to see upon what principle of law re-payment of the price can be demanded”.
848
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Nevertheless, the contract was reduced and the seller was liable to the buyer for the 




That when a man sells a horse for full value, there is an implied warrandice, 
both of soundness and title, nor is there any necessity to prove the knowledge 
of the seller.  
 
This was a form of presumptive fraud, the essence of which is lack of mens rea or 




Though this case, and that of latent insufficiency, be rather lata culpa, quae 
dolo aequiperatur. 
 
Similarly, in Baird v Pagan
851
 strong ale, which was being exported to the West 
Indies, turned bad owing to the heat, and the seller was held liable because he knew 
it had been bought for export and needed to be prepared for the climate. In Kames’ 




It was not supposed the brewer had been guilty of any wilful wrong; but this 
defence was sustained upon the following rule of equity, that a man who 
purchases goods for a certain purpose, is not bound to receive them unless 
they answer that purpose.  
 
Not only did the seller require no intention or deceit, but even uncertainty was 
enough to reduce the sale. The buyer in Adamson v Smith
853
 wanted perennial seed 
and his purchase turned out to be annual seed. The seller argued he did not know if it 
was annual or perennial and did not warrant it to be perennial, but the court held that 
he was liable (in damages) apparently because the buyer believed it to be perennial, 
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and the seller conducted the sale “without explaining his own uncertainty”.
854
 There 
was certainly no caveat emptor principle at work in these cases.
855
 In Adamson the 
implied warranty appears to amount to a duty of disclosure, which bears an 
anachronistic resemblance to a requirement of good faith where the buyer’s 
expectations are known to the seller. It is certainly not the case that “[t]he 
institutional writers were not concerned with misrepresentation, unless there was 
fraud”
856
 unless fraud is intended in the broad sense of presumptive fraud. 
 
However, it is perhaps predictable that solutions designed to deal with the agrarian 
economy of seventeenth and eighteenth century Scotland, with unsound horses and 
unreliable seed, would prove inadequate to deal with the complexities of the financial 
services world which emerged in the nineteenth. As commerce and industry grew, as 
companies formed and shares were listed, as a certain creativity was brought to 
finance and banking, the political and legal pressure grew to protect entrepreneurs 
and company directors. This had a substantive impact on the law of 
misrepresentation.  In addition, there is little doubt that the Mercantile Law 
Amendment (Scotland) Act 1856 had a role to play.  
 
 
(b) The Impact of the Mercantile Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 1856 
It is no coincidence that most of the problematic cases of misrepresentation which 
perplexed the Scottish courts arose in the second half of the nineteenth century, and 
that there was an increase in litigation after the passing of the 1856 Act.
857
 The rule 
in contracts of sale up to that point had been that there was an implied warranty of 
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quality in Scots law. This, in effect, dealt with misrepresentations in the context of 
sale and the seller would be liable regardless of his intention. Under the new 
legislation, the seller’s obligation was reduced from a general implied warranty of 
quality so that he would only be liable for unknown defects where he had given an 




It is difficult from the distance of a century and a half to assess the impact of 
legislation on the law of the period. However, the serialisation of an article (by an 
unknown author) on the law of fraud published in the Journal of Jurisprudence in 
1857 provides some insight.
859
 The author is specifically responding to two things: 
the 1856 legislation
860
 and criticism of the state of Scottish pleading in matters of 
fraud by the House of Lords.
861
 He explicitly sets out to give an account of the 
general principles of the law of fraud, with extensive reference to case law, because 
those will be required now that the legislation has removed the seller’s warranty, and 
he acknowledges from the start that unlike error and force, fraud is complex as “a 
colour of fraud may be thrown over any transaction”.
862
 His starting point is that 
contracts are governed by the caveat emptor principle, otherwise “much of the 
incentive to mercantile enterprise and invention would be withdrawn”.
863
 Hence, 
fraud must be proved and is seldom presumed, and in words that echo Stair he 
affirms that there is no redress “for every inequality” or “for every slight 
misrepresentation”.
864
 However, he does concede that there are also cases where the 
rule ex re presumitur dolus “seems to have been acted on”, cases involving 




He also outlines the different forms fraud can take:
866
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All fraud must consist in misrepresenting; or allowing a party to be ignorant 
of; or misconceive the facts material to the bargain; or in inducing or 
permitting him to draw false conclusions from the real facts. 
 
Redress for fraud (he is mainly concerned with misrepresentation) depends on 
various criteria: it must be material; it must have happened prior to the transaction; 
and it must have been relied on by the other party.
867
 These are familiar long-
standing criteria for fraud, and incidentally – error notwithstanding – they are also 
the oft-repeated criteria in the modern law of misrepresentation.
868
 But it is not only 




on the position of the parties in regard to knowledge of the circumstances 
material to the contract; on the manner in which fraud is effected; on the 
nature of the contract; on the general relations of the parties; and on the 
capacity of the party deceived. 
 
Despite the fact that fraud is not to be presumed, these are categories inherent in 
presumptive fraud and it is clear they were familiar, yet perhaps reluctantly 
acknowledged, in 1857. 
 
The writer uses fraud and misrepresentation almost interchangeably, and his 
treatment extends to unintentional misrepresentation. He distinguishes between 
intentional and unintentional misrepresentations by using the labels of moral and 
legal fraud. So, for instance, “[t]he degree of moral fraud in misstatement or 
concealment, will generally depend very much on the inequality of the parties in 
point of actual information, supposing that the party well-informed is aware of the 
ignorance of the other party”;
870
 or again “A party may misrepresent through 
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inadvertence or through rashness, without intending to deceive, yet the contract 
induced thereby will be reducible on the ground of legal fraud”.
871
 It seems clear that 
all forms of misrepresentation are included in his definition of fraud, if they meet the 
relevant criteria, and regarless of whether they amount to moral or legal fraud there is 
a legal remedy. It is also highly significant that there is absolutely no mention of the 
doctrine of error, or any possible relationship to misrepresentation. 
 
Even after the passing of the 1856 Act we still find remnants of the principle that if 
statements are false they are assumed to be fraudulent. In Lees v Todd,
872
 a 
shareholder case, Lord President Inglis appears to suggest that false statements may 





If the speaker, having no actual belief in the statement, though not believing it 
to be untrue, volunteers the statement, inconsistent with facts, to a person 
interested in the statement, and likely to act on it, he is dishonest and guilty of 
deceit, because he produces, and intends to produce, on the mind of the 
listener a belief which he does not himself entertain.  
 
On this definition, many, if not most, misrepresentations could be considered not 
“innocent”. However, a much more restrictive view, namely a requirement of 
knowledge and intention to deceive, had been expressed several years earlier in 
Brownlie v Miller
874
 and it is this view that has prevailed in modern law. It is a subtle 
distinction, but in Lees Lord President Inglis presumes deceit from a lack of positive 
belief in the truth of the statement made; in Brownlie there is no such presumption, 
rather a requirement to show intention or recklessness, in effect the test set out in 
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I cannot see that a statement can be characterised as fraudulent either in fact 
or in law when it is made with an honest belief in its truth. To found a claim 
on fraudulent misrepresentation it is, in my opinion, necessary to prove not 
only that the representation was false in fact, but that the person making the 
representation knew it to be false, or at least did not believe it to be true. The 
state of knowledge or belief of the person making the representation is to be 
determined on the evidence, and if he have refrained from making inquiries 
which would have disclosed the truth it may often be a legitimate inference 
that he did not believe in the truth of his assertion. But if he refrained from 
inquiry, not from any unwillingness to know the truth, but because he was 
really satisfied he had reasonable grounds of belief, and his belief be thus 
honestly entertained, I do not think his statements, though false, can be held 
to be fraudulent in law, as it certainly is not in fact. A statement made in an 
honest belief in its truth cannot be fraudulent. 
 
The analysis in Lees was adopted more recently in the Outer House where a 
government department had misrepresented that potatoes being exported were free 
from a particular disease. Clearly, there was no intention to deceive on the part of the 
officials, but the Lord Ordinary relied on Lees to find the department liable in 
damages for a fraudulent misrepresentation:
876
 
where both parties have an interest in what is said, the law regards it as 
dishonest for a person to make an assertion having no actual belief in its truth.  
 
His decision was reversed and both the First Division and the House of Lords found 




There is no doubt that it would be possible, even using a restrictive definition of 
fraud, to interpret the test of honest belief to include most forms of 
misrepresentation, and to situate them conceptually within the law of fraud. 
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Insistence on honest belief in the truth of a statement, and that the belief should be 
reasonable, would import in most cases a duty to enquire. Most examples of 
negligent misrepresentation would fall within this test, and arguably many cases of 
innocent misrepresentation as well. In the shareholder cases, requiring directors to 
have an honest belief in statements made in a share prospectus would have the same 
effect. In cases where one of the parties has been provided with false information by 
the other and has subsequently relied on it,
878
 it would surely be reasonable to insist 
that, for instance, technical specifications should be based on an honest belief that 
they contain accurate information. It is not difficult to see how this could legitimately 
come within the scope of a fraudulent misrepresentation, and therefore be subject to 
the traditional criteria for fraud. 
 
However, despite occasional signs of sympathy for this approach by individual 
judges, the modern tendency is to restrict the definition of fraud to intentional deceit 
and the interpretation of honest belief to a lack of knowledge of falsehood. So in 
Milne v Gray
879
 Lady Dorian held that a defender must be a “knowing party” to a 
false misrepresentation,
880




The case based on failure to inquire is at heart a case that by ordinary 
diligence or with very little further inquiry the defenders might have satisfied 
themselves that the representations were inconsistent with fact. Such 
averments are clearly insufficient to establish a lack of honest belief. 
 
There is arguably no “clearly” about the matter, and to my mind it represents a lack 
of attention to doctrinal history and legal authority. 
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(c) The culpa lata principle and misrepresentation 
Modern commentators assume that misrepresentation was historically part of the law 
of error, as discussed in chapter 6, but an alternative view is that it was historically 
assumed to be part of the law of fraud, regardless of whether there was intention to 
deceive. The confusion in the case law would seem to suggest that it was, at least, 
unsettled. Stein suggests that Scots law had historically used the principle that culpa 
lata dolo aequiperatur to deal with unintentional misrepresentation.
882
 It is more 
accurate to say that that principle was used after the passing of the 1856 Act to find a 
new solution. Most of the relevant cases date from the second half of the century. 
 
The culpa lata principle was used in an unsuccessful argument for unintentional 
misrepresentation in Oliver v Suttie
883
 in the mid-nineteenth century, the point at 
which the conflation of fraud and induced error began to take place. The Lord 
Ordinary held that there was “no room or authority, or sound principle, for any mid 
plea between fraud and unintentional error”
884
 although had the pursuers been able to 
prove culpa lata it would have been treated as a case of fraud (and not error).   
 
The issue was addressed again in Adamson v Glasgow Water-Works 
Commissioners
885
 which concerned the building of the Mugdock tunnel and 
reservoir. The pursuers had tendered for the work relying on technical information 
supplied by the defenders which turned out to be wrong, so that the cost of the work 
was significantly higher than anticipated. The court held that the combined effect of 
a misrepresentation and essential error was a relevant and sufficient ground of 
liability.
886
 As Lord President McNeill expressed it: “I think, when a party is induced 
by misrepresentation to enter into a contract, that implies that he is under error as to 
the contract.”
887
 This was a difficult case, and there was considerable debate with 
counsel on the correct form of the issue. The majority of the Inner House thought it 
amounted to essential error induced by misrepresentation, but as Stein points out they 
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“did not address .. the question whether misrepresentation merely inducing a contract 
was a ground for rescission”.
888





The case is in a very embarrassing predicament, for the parties have agreed 
upon an issue, and at the same time differ as to its meaning. The Court also 
differ as to its interpretation, for I do not agree with Lord Curriehill that the 
substance of the case is essential error. I think it is misrepresentation on an 
essential point; - misrepresentation, involving culpa lata, which the law holds 
equivalent to fraud. If the case does not come up to that, there is no case at 
all. I would have kept out essential error altogether. 
 
He is arguably right but he was ploughing a lonely furrow. 
 
Lord Deas took the same position in the important case of Hogg v Campbell
890
 and 
his doubts about this use of the law of error to my mind support the analysis that it 
was a novel argument.
891
 In Hogg it was argued that a deed had been “fraudulently 
impetrated”, also that it had been signed under essential error induced by fraud. 
Much of the debate turned on the correct form of the issues, and whether an induced 
essential error could be pleaded at all, but it is clear that the four judges of the First 
Division, all of whom expressed their difficulty with the question, held it to be fraud 





We have not many cases of pure essential error. They are generally 
accompanied with some circumstances that characterise them – essential error 
in regards to deeds granted without value, or cases in which there has been 
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mutual error; at all events, if it is a deed of this kind, there ought to be 
something which is to connect the defender, the principal party, with that 
essential error. 
 
The focus was firmly on the behaviour of the defender rather than the consent of the 




Now the difficulty which I had mainly in regard to that, was a difficulty in 
seeing exactly what case could be presented to the jury of error, induced by 
William Campbell, which was not also a case of fraud. 
  
Lord Deas (who, in a dissenting judgment, would not allow a separate issue of 
induced error) thought the behaviour amounted only to fraud and nothing else.
894
  
However, in Hogg, we see the majority of the court in obiter remarks beginning to 
outline the territory of induced essential error. The Lord President speculated that 




by his silence, or by his actings – by his silence after previous actings – 
whether silence fraudulently maintained, or inadvertently, or it may have 
been in failing to make [the pursuer] aware of doubt as to whether the clause 
had been included or no [sic].  
 
Lord Curriehill considered that an error arising as a result of “a mistake or 
misunderstanding or carelessness”
896
 could be an issue of essential error. We can see 
in Hogg the separation beginning: the relegation of fraud to intentional behaviour, 
while behaviour amounting to carelessness or negligence becomes the territory of 
induced error rather than the older culpa lata principle.  
 




 Ibid. at 860. 
895
 Ibid. at 858. 
896
 Ibid. at 859. 
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“Innocent” misrepresentation shortly afterwards made the same transition. In Hare v 
Hopes
897
 the question was whether there could be separate issues of fraud and 
induced essential error, in the context of an alleged fraudulent balance sheet on the 
basis of which the pursuer became a partner. It was held to be a case of fraud and not 





if the misrepresentations and concealment averred had been innocent it might 




By now Lord Deas, somewhat reluctantly, seemed to have accepted the competence 
of a plea of induced essential error and he commented that essential error would 
rarely be granted in conjunction with “assumed innocence”; rather, “[i]t is probably 
only applicable to cases in which error is alleged with regard to the subject matter of 




When Lord Carmont later reviewed the law relating to essential error and 
misrepresentation he acknowledged even in 1936 that it was “in a state of 
confusion”.
900
 That very confusion suggests that induced error was not a familiar 
concept in the Scottish courts. However, the “error” analysis was gaining ground, 
particularly in relation to careless or “innocent” misstatements. Hence, we find 
statements such as, “essential error is a well established ground of reduction. It is 
properly connected with misrepresentation, in the case of an onerous contract, in 
which both parties are not said to have been deceived, but one to have misled the 
other”.
901
 And yet essential error combined with inducement clearly was not well 
established, as the case law shows. It was only at the end of the nineteenth century, 
post-Derry v Peek, that Scots law finally accepted that non-fraudulent misstatements 
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were part of the law of error, and only after the definition of fraud had become so 
narrow that it was no longer capable of providing a remedy.  
 
 
3. The Final Transition from Fraud to Error 
Even after Derry v Peek Scots law did sporadically attempt to found on the broad 
concept of culpa expressed in cases of presumptive fraud, albeit with decreasing 
enthusiasm and a growing lack of familiarity with the underlying principles and 
authorities. By the end of the century presumptive fraud had all but disappeared. In 
addition, the law relating to unintentional misrepresentation was subsumed in its 
entirety into the law of error. Two important cases are examined below because they 
mark the end point in the process of detaching fraud from its historical roots, and 
together they demonstrate that, rather than attempting to restrict the meaning of 
Derry v Peek as the English courts had done, Scots law looked to the law of error to 
solve the problem of misrepresentation. A third case, Mair v Rio Grande Rubber 
Estates Ltd, suggests that another older maxim emerged to fill the gap. 
 
 
(a) Menzies v Menzies 
In Menzies v Menzies
902
 a son raised an action to have an agreement with his father 
reduced on grounds of fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment. The son was in 
debt to the tune of £6000 and had been led to believe that signing it was the only way 
to avoid financial ruin. He argued that he would not have agreed to it had he known 
his legal rights, but he was under the mistaken belief that he would not otherwise be 
able to raise money to pay his debts, a belief induced by the representations of his 
father’s solicitor. The development of the case is worth exploring because it 
represents the transformation described in this chapter.  
 
It begins with the Lord Ordinary’s (Lord Low) judgment which concludes that 
misrepresentations had been made which were not fraudulent. Nevertheless, the 
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agreement should be reduced because of a combination of factors: this was a family 
relationship; the pursuer had no independent legal advice; and the misrepresentations 
caused lesion to the pursuer, who had surrendered valuable rights for inadequate 
consideration.
903
 The decision appears to be based on non-fraudulent 
misrepresentation which caused lesion, with a range of aggravating factors in the 
mix. In an earlier era this would have been a classic case of presumptive fraud.  





Finds that the pursuer was induced to enter into the agreement ... by 
representations in regard to a material matter of fact..; that the said 
representations, although not made fraudulently or with intent to deceive the 
pursuer, were not consistent with fact; and that the said agreement was to the 
lesion of the pursuer, he having thereby surrendered rights of great value for a 
wholly inadequate consideration; and finds that in law these facts constitute a 
sufficient ground for reduction of the documents libelled. 
 
However, the definition of fraud having narrowed to intentional deceit, the Inner 
House held that there was no fraud on the part of the solicitor, and certainly no fraud 
could be inferred despite the fact that the son had no independent legal advice and 
was acting on the advice of his father’s agent to his great lesion. Moreover, they were 
censorious of the son’s character (describing him as a “scapegrace son loaded with 
debt” and referring to “his mere selfish ends”
905
), in the process attracting the 
opprobrium of the House of Lords.
906
 Lord Rutherfurd Clark dissented on grounds 
that would have been commonplace in an earlier era: that the son had been “stripped 
of an inheritance secured by deed of entail, that he had no legal advice, and that those 
who took the deed from him knew that he could procure the money at infinitely less 
cost”.
907
 When the case came before the Inner House for the second time, the issue 
                                                 
903
 (1893) 20 R (HL) 108 at 114-115 per Lord Low. 
904
 Ibid. at 111 per Lord Low. 
905
 (1890) 17 R 881 at 892 per Lord Young. 
906
 Lord Watson comments that he cannot approve of the comments of the Second Division “upon the 
character and truthfulness of the applicant” ((1893) 20 R (HL) 108 at 143). 
907
 (1890) 17 R 881 at 892 per Lord Rutherfurd Clark. 
190 
 
was whether there could be misrepresentation without fraud, the answer to which 
was negative. The solicitor had merely been expressing an opinion, giving reasonable 
advice. There could be no misrepresentation unless there was also fraud and the 




However, on appeal the House of Lords reversed the Inner House decision, relying 
on the judgments of Lord Low and Lord Rutherfurd Clark. Lord Watson held that the 
representations made by the father’s agent induced the son to surrender valuable 
rights and that those allegations were “sufficient to infer the appellant’s right to 
rescind”.
909
  He then made his infamous pronouncement about the law of error, 
which had not been argued up to that point and appears to come out of the blue. 
Menzies is not a case about the law of error, it is about the effect of non-fraudulent 
misrepresentation. The decision of the Law Lords relied heavily on the fact that the 
son was not independently advised and was therefore in ignorance as to his legal 
rights, as well as the relationship between the parties (father and son), and concluded 
that in these sorts of cases “moral fraud” was not required.
910




Necessity and weakness on the one side, and advantage in fact on the other, 
gained by a representation untrue in fact, and materially inducing the bargain, 
render it contrary to good conscience. 
 
This was the classic Chancery formulation of behaviour contrary to conscience. It 
could have been decided on grounds of inequality, but by this time presumptive fraud 
was an unfamiliar concept. Had that been the case, the English doctrine of innocent 
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The significance of Menzies for the law of error is well-known
913
 but insufficient 
attention has been given to the context, and the reason why error was even referred 
to. Menzies began as a fraud case.
914
 It raised questions of definition and motive, and 
the legal issue was whether a non-fraudulent misrepresentation was actionable. In the 
second appeal to the Inner House – fraud having been rejected in the first – Lord 
Rutherfurd Clark adopted a formula which runs in parallel with the narrowing of 
fraud, namely the expansion of error. He suggested that the pursuer’s agreement was 
induced either “by fraudulent misrepresentation, or by misrepresentation which led 
him into essential error”,
915
 and it is against that background that the case was 
appealed to the House of Lords. It began as non-fraudulent misrepresentation and 
ended up being framed in terms of induced error,
916
 a pattern repeated time and again 
in the case law of the nineteenth century. A hundred years earlier it would have been 
dealt with using presumptive fraud or the culpa lata principle. 
 
 
(b) Boyd  & Forrest v Glasgow & SW Railway Co 
Boyd & Forrest v Glasgow & SW Railway Co has become the leading case on the 
doctrine of innocent misrepresentation, a case which engendered a good deal of 
litigation, including two separate appeals to the House of Lords.
917
 In its early stages 
appeal was made to the older principle culpa lata dolo aequiparatur to find a remedy 
for an “innocent” misrepresentation and this was probably the final attempt to do so. 
The principle was accepted by the Scottish courts, but on appeal to the House of 
Lords Lord Atkinson applied the narrow definition of fraud set out in Derry v Peek
918
 
with apparent disregard for the fact that he was applying a delictual definition in a 
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 The facts were that contractors had been given inaccurate 
information in relation to the geology of the ground being used to construct a railway 
line. The Scottish courts accepted the argument that this amounted to culpa lata, 
which was equivalent to fraud. It is highly significant, as well as historically 
consistent, that in the Scottish courts it could still be argued that the whole of the law 
of misrepresentation – fraudulent, negligent or innocent – could be conceptually 
located within the doctrine of fraud. The Lord Ordinary (Johnstone) held that the 
defender was not guilty of “intentional fraud, but I cannot acquit him of such 
recklessness as aequiparatur dolo.”
920
 This was affirmed by the Second Division in a 
judgment which is worth quoting at length because it demonstrates the territory 
which the Scottish courts attributed to the culpa lata principle and the attempt to 
distinguish fraud, as the author of the 1857 article had done, by reference to motive 




I agree with the Lord Ordinary in not imputing direct mala fides to Mr. 
Melville. … I have no doubt he thought that he was drawing a sound 
inference, but he must have known that he was putting forward his inference 
and passing it off as ascertained fact, stated by the borer, which it was not. I 
cannot acquit him of legal fraud in doing so… This was, in my opinion, a 
most reckless thing to do; although possibly not done in conscious fraud, yet 
it was equal to dole…. But, if there is unfair dealing, as I hold there is here, a 
party cannot take benefit by his own fraud, or reckless conduct quod 
aequiparatur dolo. 
 
This decision was overturned by the House of Lords relying on the narrow definition 
of fraud laid down in Derry v Peek.
 922
 Lord Shaw found the defender’s behaviour 
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Of the charge of fraud preferred against him by the pursuers it is not for me to 
pronounce whether it was unscrupulously made; it is sufficient that it is 
unfounded in fact. I think that the attempt to bring Mr Melville's conduct into 
the same range as to be equal to fraud also fails; that the plea of fraud is as 




The action failed on the facts, but Lord Shaw did accept that the culpa lata principle 
could have been relevant had relevant facts been established. In the second round of 
appeals, fraud having been rejected, the Inner House held that although not 
fraudulent, Mr Melville’s behaviour amounted to essential error induced by innocent 
misrepresentation and a remedy was granted (of quantum meruit, which the House of 
Lords points out was in effect the equivalent of damages). In terms of legal doctrine, 
fraud had been rejected, as had the culpa lata principle. The only route left to provide 
a remedy –which the Scottish courts clearly wanted to do – was to look to the law of 
error. As in the earlier case of Adamson v Glasgow Water-Works Commissioners,
924
 





I consider that the pursuers entered into this contract under essential error, 
induced by misrepresentation and concealment (though without any fraud).  
 
This is an understandable development. In the history of this case the House of Lords 
had rejected the notion that innocent misrepresentation could be equiparated with 
fraud by an enlargement of the notion of culpa. The only remaining option was to 
situate it somewhere else, removing any suggestion of fault, dishonesty or bad faith 
and dissociating it from the moral overtones inherent in the word “fraud”. Boyd & 
Forrest was the last serious attempt to use the culpa lata principle outwith the 
context of fiduciaries. After Derry v Peek Scots law had closed the door to any broad 
concept of fraud, and it was finally received into Scots law in Boyd & Forrest.
926
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For cases of unintentional misrepresentation error was the tool of the future and a 
misstatement causing error, whether made intentionally, negligently or “innocently”, 




(c) Mair v Rio Grande Rubber Estates Ltd 
Mair v Rio Grande Rubber Estates Ltd
927
 also deals with unintentional 
misrepresentations and takes a slightly different approach to the issue. It was also a 
shareholder case, alleging that the shares had been bought on the basis of false and 
fraudulent misrepresentations. The argument was unsuccessful before the First 
Division which found the misrepresentations neither false nor fraudulent, but it was 
reversed on appeal to the House of Lords. In this context, which raises questions of 
agency, Lord Shaw now appears to lower the standard required for fraud: it was 
enough that the representations were not true, and not necessary to prove that the 
directors knew they were false for “if it were proved that the statements were, in fact, 
false, then they must have been fraudulent as well.”
928
 His definition of fraud harks 





Fraud is not far away from – nay, indeed, it must be that it accompanies – a 
case of any defendant holding a plaintiff to a bargain which has been induced 
by representations which were untrue; for it is contrary to good faith and it 
partakes of fraud to hold a person to a contract induced by an untruth for 
which you yourself stand responsible. It is elementary that a party cannot take 
advantage of a benefit derived from a contract sprung out of his own fraud, 
and I think it is equally sound that a party cannot take a benefit from a 
contract sprung out of a falsehood which he has placed before the other party 
as an inducing cause.  
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Under this definition all that was required was falsehood, reliance and loss and it 
would involve a renaming of “innocent” misrepresentation. What is interesting about 
Mair is that another principle is drawn on, which I refer to as the “fraud principle” or 
the “no benefit from fraud” rule. The company could not evade liability for the false 
statements on the basis that it could not benefit from its own fraud.
930
 The fraud 
principle is discussed in greater detail in chapter 7 but it is probably no coincidence 
that it took on new life after fraud in the strict sense had been redefined and could be 
interpreted as searching for an alternative to the doctrine of error. 
 
 
4. Steuart’s Trs v Hart: Fraud or Error? 
One further aspect of the law of error is relevant to a discussion of the borderline 
between fraud and error. There is an apparently anomalous group of cases
931
 in 
which one party is labouring under an (uninduced unilateral) error and the other party 
knows about the error and takes advantage of it, a type of concealment in other 
words. In these cases the caveat emptor principle does not seem to apply, hence their 
exceptional nature, and the party in error has been granted a remedy in some 
circumstances: where the error in question is an error of expression, known to and 
taken advantage of in an unwarrantable fashion. In modern law the rule is considered 
controversial
932
 and a narrow exception to the rule that an uninduced unilateral error 
is not sufficient to annul a contract.  
 
In the leading case, Steuart’s Trs v Hart,
933
 a property owner accepted a lower price 
for land because he mistakenly believed it to be burdened with a higher feu duty than 
it was (he claimed that getting rid of the feu duty was one of the reasons for selling). 
However, the purchaser knew that only a small feu duty was payable and that the 
seller had made an error. The court reduced the sale “on grounds of essential error 
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known to the purchaser and taken advantage of by him”.
934
 It is clear that a remedy 
was granted because of the defender’s behaviour and because of the element of fault, 
or “unfair advantage”,
935
 or as Lord President Inglis put it, “I am not prepared to say 
that this is a wrong without a remedy”.
936
 In the Outer House Lord Shand also found 
it to be an essential error known to and taken advantage of by the seller, but 




If it were necessary, however, that fraud should be established in order to 
give the pursuers that remedy, I am disposed to think there is enough in the 
case to entitle the pursuers to succeed. 
 
There is of course hesitation on the part of the judges to find that mere private 
knowledge is effective to set aside a property sale, particularly at this period in the 
nineteenth century. After all, the purchaser had done nothing other than remain 
silent. In an earlier era these cases could have been examples of presumptive fraud, 
in that they demonstrate the application of the principle of equality, whereby one 
party’s ignorance is taken advantage of and has suffered lesion, but they are 
generally considered to be part of the law of error.
938
 Many fall within the category 
of personal relationships or relationships of confidence; but others are commercial 
arms’-length transactions. 
 
The case might have come within the scope of presumptive fraud, because of the 
imbalance of knowledge between the parties, but there are two reasons for doubting 
whether it would have been effective. First, the courts were now too unfamiliar with 
the categories of presumptive fraud for it to be a useful device. Instead, once again, 
they turned to the law of error. Secondly, the traditional roles are reversed in 
Steuart’s Trs in that it would normally be the seller who was in a position of 
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knowledge or who had access to information about the property. Had the mistake 
been the purchaser’s it would be easier to see how fraud might operate.  
 
However, this does appear to be another instance of importing what amounts to 
wrongful behaviour or fault into the law of error, and it presents great difficulties. 
The court is clear that the defender’s behaviour has been “injurious”
939
 to the 
pursuer, but despite the fact that this is the language of delict, the remedy comes 
from the law of contract and enrichment: reduction of the sale, plus reimbursement 
of expenditure (although Lord Ardmillan calls it “restitution”
940
).  Perhaps this is 
reparation in the broad sense in which Stair used it, whereby it can encompass 
restitution of property as well as pecuniary damages.   
 
In other examples of the rule, some cases fall within the category of relationship 
cases, and are more easily classified as fraud, in the presumptive sense. In Purdon v 
Rowatt’s Trs
941
 the action was to reduce a deed, alleging that it had been granted in 
error as to its effect and obtained by fraud. The granter was a person not fully 
capable of understanding the deed, he had no independent legal advice and, in 
addition, the transaction was gratuitous. Separate issues of fraud and error were sent 
to the jury, who did not find fraud but found the deed was obtained by “unfair 
practices on the part of Mr Gebbie, their agent, unduly taking advantage of the 
situation of Robert Purdon in the absence of his legal advisor”.
942
 On appeal, the 
court was clearly of the view that in circumstances where the lawyer took advantage 
of the other party’s ignorance in order to procure the deed, it could amount to fraud. 
Lord Murray thought such a claim competent and said that it was not clear why the 
jury did not return a finding of fraud.   
 
Similarly, Inglis’ Trs v Inglis
943
 is a succession case where a sister had elected for 
legitim instead of a testamentary provision in the belief that the trustees of the estate, 
who included her brother, had agreed she was entitled to the whole legitim fund, 
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subsequent to which her brother asserted his claim to one half. The First Division 
allowed her to revoke the election on grounds of essential error. The reason for the 
decision appears to be an error which is taken advantage of by the other party, 
relying on Steuart’s Trs.
944
 The court’s focus was clearly on the behaviour of the 





key question for the court was not the error per se, but “how was the 
misapprehension brought about”?
947
 As discussed above, this appears to be typical of 
the approach of the Scottish courts. They are, of course, concerned with vitiated 
consent, but the way in which it was vitiated (the cause) is more important than the 
flawed consent in itself (the result).  Of course, both are necessary for a successful 
challenge to a deed previously granted. Hence, on the face of it, this was a successful 
challenge on grounds of essential error, but in reality it was the taking advantage of 
her ignorance, in the context of a family relationship, which was conclusive. It was 
an “erroneous belief” brought about by “the fault” of the brother,
948
 and could 





I think it is a principle of the law that whatever may be the real intention of 
any person interested in a transaction, wherever an intention has been 
manifested, so as to induce another to act upon it, the person who has so 
induced another to act will be barred from afterwards denying that the 
intention he manifested was his real intention. 
 




That doctrine has been made part of the law for the purpose of enforcing 
honest dealing between parties to pecuniary transactions, and has been 
                                                 
944
 (1875) 3 R 192. 
945
 (1887) 14 R 740 at 746, per the Lord Ordinary (Trayner). 
946
 Ibid. at 758 per Lord President Inglis. 
947
 Ibid. at 751 per Lord President Inglis. 
948
 Ibid. at 758 per Lord President Inglis. 
949
 Ibid. at 760 per Lord Shand. 
950
 Ibid.  
199 
 
enforced in many cases with the result of compelling parties to act honestly 
towards each other.  
 
This is the territory of substantive justice, of “unfairness” or “dishonest dealing”, 
once the territory of the law of fraud, now identified as essential error, but the key 
determinant of liability is the “fault” of the other party.   
 
Cases where there is no relationship of trust are more difficult because in a 
commercial context, in theory, each party should look out for his interests without 
the law’s intervention. However, as in Steuart’s Trs, it is the behaviour of the parties 
which is under scrutiny and the courts appear to be enforcing a standard of honesty, 
particularly where there is inequality in the knowledge of the parties. So, in Sword v 
Sinclairs
951
 it is clearly relevant that an inexperienced apprentice who copied down a 
mistaken price without querying it, was taken advantage of by an experienced 
buyer.
952
 However, again the difficulty presents itself that the roles are reversed, as in 
many of these cases, in that the law normally offers greater protection to buyers than 
to sellers. Some more recent cases exhibit the same role reversal. In Angus v 
Bryden
953
 it was again the purchaser who took advantage; in McLaughlin v The New 
Housing Association Ltd
954
 it was the tenant who took advantage of the Housing 
Association’s error ; and in the Singaporean case Chwee Kin Keong and Others v 
Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd
955
 it was students who took advantage of the commercial 
giant Hewlett Packard’s error. Perhaps therein lies the clue, for had the more 
powerful party in these cases been the one taking advantage of the other’s ignorance 
it would probably fall on the fraud side; fault by the weaker party appears to raise 
different issues. 
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Cases like Steuart’s Trs are an interesting case study of where the border lies 
between fraud and error. They are probably at the extreme edges of both and do not 
fit entirely comfortably with either. The determining factor is whether the contract is 
reduced because of the error (for instance, if an error as to price is an essential error) 
or because of the defender’s fault, in which case it is more suited to the law of fraud. 
 
 
5. Fraud or Error: does it matter? 
It might be argued that so long as a legal remedy is provided it matters little where 
that remedy is structurally located. On the other hand, the modern law of error – still 
unsettled and confusing – is testament to the view that it may matter from the 
perspective of understanding and developing the law in a coherent and predictable 
way. In my view, the law of error is no place to develop rules and limitations for the 
morally complex circumstances engendered by conduct which the law regards as 
unconscionable or, in Scottish parlance, unwarrantable. Error solves problems by 
looking at issues of consent;
956
 fraud is essentially about making distinctions between 
behaviour which is culpable or non-culpable. Error, therefore, concerns itself with 
the consent of the pursuer; fraud with the behaviour of the defender. Error does not – 
or should not – concern itself with questions of fault; hence the reason why 
traditionally the limiting criteria in the law of error concern the type of error 
(whether it is in substantia), rather than how it was caused.
957
 Fraud, on the other 
hand, is quintessentially about fault and the rules of fraud – intentional or 
presumptive – are honed to make fine distinctions about whether the behaviour of the 
defender is culpable.   
 
                                                 
956
 Modern debates on the law of error tend to focus on whether consent is subjective or objective; 
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scholastic-natural law tradition. Stair may have been pragmatic in relation to the operation of error, 
but only because error was not his “fault” category. His treatment of fraud demonstrates that he was 
deeply concerned with questions of motive and fault. 
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Hence, in the law of fraud subjective motive is important, whether intentional, 
negligent or “innocent”; if the latter, then the test of honest belief, and the 
reasonableness of the grounds for that belief can be scrutinised (even if modern 
courts appear to reject the opportunity to do so). The matrix of liability could also 
include questions of whether or not there was gross inequality in the terms of the 
bargain (the most obvious example being whether or not the transaction in question 
was gratuitous); whether or not both parties stood on equal terms and had equal 
access to legal advice; whether there was a relationship of confidence, all historically 
familiar categories from the old law of presumptive fraud. Error, in theory, does not 
concern motive. And nor should it, because in its essence error is a category of strict 
liability, it is about “no fault”. The attempt to transform it into an overarching 
category which encompasses all forms of unintentional misrepresentation, without 
regard to motive or culpability, is therefore flawed.  
 
Perhaps the most compelling reason to regret the fact that error has become the 
repository for unintentional misrepresentation is a structural one. Dempster v Raes
958
 
was an action to reduce an agreement entered in by legatees on grounds that their 
consent had been obtained by fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment, greatly 
to their prejudice. There was also a separate issue of induced essential error. One of 
the defender’s arguments was that there was no duty to disclose, hence no relevant 
issue of concealment. Lord Justice-Clerk Moncreiff held that “[i]f the party who is to 
lose is in ignorance, and the party who is to gain is well-informed, it is a case of the 
grossest fraud.”
959
 This is particularly so in the context of succession, but there are 
clear echoes of earlier presumptive fraud criteria, namely the relationship of the 
parties, and the inequality in their knowledge. Indeed, Lord Moncreiff foreshadows 
his later judgment in Steuart’s Trustees v Hart
960
 when he comments in Dempster 
that “the pursuers were ignorant, and known to be ignorant by the defenders, who 
took advantage of this to make a most unfair bargain. It is not so much any specific 
error that is alleged as general ignorance.”
961
 It is significant that three of the judges 
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 took the view that there was no need for an issue of error induced by 
misrepresentation, only one of fraud.
963
 Lord Benholme objected to the issue of 
induced error on the grounds that the onus is quite different depending on whether 




My objection to the second issue is that there is no sufficient statement of 
essential error on record. Besides, if the issue were allowed without the word 
“fraudulent” it would change very much the nature of the onus. Now, in this 
case the onus ought to be as heavy on the pursuers as is implied in the word 
“fraudulent”.  
 
It is worth repeating the fact that fraud has a stable set of criteria for its application, 
consistent over centuries, which apply to all forms of fraud, including 
misrepresentation: materiality, reliance and causation. If the focus is on the 
fraudulent conduct of the defender, the traditional criteria of the law of fraud come 
into play and the focus is on the defender’s behaviour. The misstatement must be 
material, the pursuer must have relied on it to his detriment, and there must be a 
causative link between the conduct and the loss caused.
965
 However, if the focus of 
the enquiry is on the consent of the pursuer, the limiting criteria are whether or not 
the error was “essential” using Bell’s five categories, and (possibly)
966
 whether the 
error was just and reasonable. It is not necessary to investigate the misrepresentor’s 
honesty or good faith or whether or not there were reasonable grounds for his belief 
that his statement was true.
967
 And, arguably, Lord Watson’s ostensible redefinition 
of essential error in Stewart v Kennedy
968
 and Menzies v Menzies,
969
 which has 
attracted the criticism of almost all academic commentators, was simply an attempt 
to grapple with the impossible task of marrying the criteria of fraud with the content 
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of error by preserving a test of causation from the former (the “but for” test) and 
lowering the standard from “essential” to “material” in the latter.   
 
If the issue is one of error rather than fraud, it changes not only the onus, but the 
whole structure of the legal argument. In Birksian language,
970
 framing the issue in 
terms of the law of error is to make the mistake of starting with the result rather than 
the causative event. It is axiomatic that fraud causes error, for it is in the very nature 
of deceit or imposition. The error of one party is the sina qua non of the fraud of the 
other. But to start with the outcome rather that the behaviour which caused the error 
is to put the cart before the horse. It is submitted that this is part of the explanation 
for the state of confusion in the court decisions of the nineteenth century, as well as 
the problems inherent in the modern law of error.  
 





Following its tradition of eclecticism, [Scots law] could have adopted either 
the English rule or the Continental rule. Either course would have constituted 
an innovation, but neither would have violated the basic principles of the 
Scots law of contract. The adoption of the English rule would have meant 
extending the grant of reduction for fraud to cover also innocent 
misrepresentation dans causam contractui. The adoption of the Continental 
rule would have meant extending the grant of reduction for error in 
substantials to cover also error not in substantials. But instead of making a 
deliberate choice, the exponents of Scots law adopted a muddled mixture of 
the two, taking the rules laid down in English cases, and clothing them in 
pseudo-civilian dress. The law thus laid down was difficult to apply, and 
                                                 
970
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some judges were unaware that any extension of the law had taken place, and 
continued to apply the old law.  
 
Lawson made a similar point even earlier, namely that both civil and common law 
probably reached the same end result but by different routes: in English law the work 
is done by “equitable fraud with its sub-departments of innocent misrepresentation 
and undue influence”;
972
 whereas, Continental law has a more subjective concept of 
error, with safeguards which he identifies as culpa in contrahendo, negative interest 




More recently Sefton-Green’s comparative analysis demonstrates that Scots law is 
not alone in its confusion. The broad pattern which emerges from her survey of 
European jurisdictions is that civilian systems employ the concept of mistake but 
bolstered by other criteria (culpa in contrahendo, good faith, reliance interest), 
whereas the English common law makes a clear separation between mistake and 
misrepresentation. She points to a helpful conceptual distinction in how different 
jurisdictions use the doctrine of mistake: some focus on the mistake itself, others 
emphasise how the mistake was caused.
974
 The former she characterises as a “static” 
concept of mistake, which does not look under the mistake, in contrast with a 
“dynamic” one which focuses on the cause, and on the basis of her study she 
suggests that there is a perceptible tendency to move towards the latter. Her study 
shows “that the law is putting more emphasis on the parties’ behaviour” across 
Europe,
975
 which she claims goes in tandem with “a raising of standards of 
contractual behaviour more generally”.
976
 Whether or not this proves to be the case, 
Scotland historically had a static concept of error, and arguably still has, the key 
being the content of the error and whether or not it is in substantia. However, the use 
of error to deal with unintentional deceit has meant an inevitable move to a more 
dynamic concept. Unlike English law, where mistake is static, and misrepresentation 
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is the dynamic part of the law, Scotland no longer separates the two, but is 
attempting to make the law of error do both jobs. In Scots law we are trying to have 
both a static and a dynamic concept of error, perhaps one explanation for its current 
unhappy state.  
 
To some extent the choice of one or the other is a policy choice, although such a 
choice ought to be made from a well-informed position. Stein’s point about the lack 
of conscious analysis on the part of the courts is well made and, as has been shown, 
the picture has been one of confusion. It might have fallen to academic lawyers to 
provide analysis of the change that was taking place, but instead they may have 











Chapter 6: Fraud as Deceit - the modern law 
 
As has been demonstrated, historically fraud encompassed an enormously wide range 
of behaviour which the law was prepared either to prevent or otherwise remedy. 
However, the definition of fraud was considerably narrowed towards the end of the 
nineteenth century and, as a consequence, the scope of error was expanded to 
incorporate misrepresentation and to do part of the job fraud had previously done. 
Commentators (and teachers of the law) then had to grapple with the structural 
difficulties which this change represented. This chapter looks at the way in which 
fraud is represented in modern legal literature. The focus remains on the question of 
definition, and, in line with the views presented in the previous chapter, it also 
considers the account which modern commentators give of error and 
misrepresentation and their relationship with fraud. It will be evident to those 
familiar with modern Scots private law that my analysis differs from the accepted 
modern view in several respects: in particular, the limitation of fraud to intentional 
deceit; the related view that “innocent” misrepresentation was not part of the law of 
fraud; that all forms of unintentional misrepresentation were, rather, part of the law 
of error. On the contrary, I have presented the case that historically misrepresentation 
was part of the law of fraud and, consequently, that the category of “induced” error is 
misconceived. In this chapter, therefore, I offer a critical review of the modern 
taxonomy of fraud in light of the historical account previously given. 
 
Three important academic treatments represent a wide spectrum of views as to the 
meaning and substance of fraud. At one end of the spectrum is TB Smith
977
 who 
laments the narrowing of the scope of fraud to intentional deceit through malign 
English influence, and who argues for a more expansive meaning as the modern 
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expression of dolus or bad faith. At the opposite end is Thomson
978
 who takes the 
authorities to support a much narrower definition, one which he views as being more 
appropriate for modern Scotland’s market economy and the application of the caveat 
emptor principle. McBryde’s work perhaps occupies the middle ground although his 
views have altered over time, moving from a broad view closer to a narrow one. In 
order to establish how these writers eliminate part of the older definition of fraud 
from modern accounts of the law, it is necessary to examine how they deal with the 
doctrines of misrepresentation and error in their work. 
 
 
1. The Modern Law of Fraud, Error and Misrepresentation 
Undoubtedly, the view which emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, namely 
that unintentional misrepresentation was part of the law of error, presented 
taxonomical difficulties for those attempting to systematise Scots law in its wake. 
The result of creating a category of induced error meant that misrepresentation had to 
be divided into two basic categories: intentional misrepresentation and unintentional 
misrepresentation (whether negligent or “innocent”). The former remained part of the 
law of fraud; the latter was part of the law of error. 
 
 
(a) Gloag, The Law of Contract 
In the first major treatise on Scots contract law, Gloag’s Law of Contract, the author 
structures his account into three chapters: chapter 22 deals with error; chapter 23 
with misrepresentation and concealment; and chapter 24 with fraud.
979
 There is some 
overlap in that within misrepresentation he has to include a section on the “Meaning 
of Essential Error”,
980
 but it is a sensible treatment of the issues given their history.  
Gloag preserved the same division in the second edition (1929), but the substantive 
content had significantly changed in that his treatment of error was considerably 
expanded and included a new section on “error induced by fraud”. However, within 
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each of the three chapters there is frequent cross-referencing. Gloag’s discussion of 
error and fraud is laced with the concept of misrepresentation; that of 
misrepresentation frequently digresses into fraud and error, including an explanation 
of essential error.
981
 The attempt to treat each separately is only partly successful and 
involves considerable repetition of the same point within different chapters. 
 
Gloag treats fraud and facility and circumvention together, considering the latter a 
species of fraud. Fraud, therefore, “may consist in misrepresentation ... or in taking 
an unfair advantage in circumstances where the word misrepresentation is hardly 
applicable”.
982
 In relation to misrepresentation, if the defender “was aware that his 
representations were untrue, or made them recklessly” it would amount to fraud.  
However, if he was not so aware, “the case may be one of misrepresentation, but not 
of fraud”, because “the essence of fraud consists in the deceitful intention of the 
party”.
983
 He then goes on to distinguish the effects of different types of 
misrepresentation. For a misrepresentation to be fraudulent it “always implies a 
moral wrong. Mere negligence is not fraud”.
984
 Negligent misrepresentation is 





The principle is not that an innocent misrepresentation amounts to a wrong, 
but that a man has no right to insist on a contract which he would not have 
obtained if he had not led the other party into error by misrepresenting the 
facts, or that, if fraud is necessary, it is involved in maintaining an advantage 
so derived.  
 
Gloag does include the tentative possibility that innocent misrepresentation might 
sometimes amount to fraud because of “a wider principle, which covers the case of 
innocent misrepresentation by the agent, viz., that a man cannot take any advantage 
obtained by his agent’s misstatements. In cases of fraud this has, in recent cases, 
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been treated as a commonplace”.
986
 Here he relies on the authority of Mair v Rio 
Grande Rubber Est. Ltd, as discussed above,
987
 and would appear to relate innocent 
misrepresentation loosely to fraud in an agency context. His account of fraud proper 
is, however, narrow and he asserts that the principles laid down in Derry v Peek “are 




Gloag could be accused of following the pattern of English law, which clearly 
separates mistake and misrepresentation, but his account does accurately reflect the 
difficulties inherent in the decisions of the Scottish courts at that time.   
 
 
(b) The Aberdeen contribution 
There was further interest in the law of error in the 1950s and 1960s when a group of 
scholars from Aberdeen University were exercised about its scope. This renewed 
examination of error by the Aberdeen scholars, JJ Gow, TB Smith and (later) Peter 
Stein,
989
 was prompted by the publication of an article by the comparative scholar 
FH Lawson which contained the heresy that the English law of mistake and the Scots 
law of error were “almost interchangeable”.
990
 In contrast to Continental law, as 
Lawson called it, which adopted a subjective concept of error and focused on the 
effect of the error on the consent of the parties, English law had a much more 
restrictive (and objective) doctrine of mistake and only allowed relief in exceptional 
cases where the thing bargained for no longer existed. Lawson suggested that 
Steuart’s Trs v Hart might be wrongly decided,
991
 as it appeared to go against the 
English rule in Smith v Hughes
992
 which, Lawson claimed, would be “fully accepted” 
in Scots law.
993
 If that were the case, it would rule out unilateral mistake, including 
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knowledge and taking advantage of another’s mistake, because there was no question 
of English law granting a remedy for an error in motive.
994
 The English law of 
mistake is a very restrictive category, and it was Lawson’s implication that the Scots 




Gow and Smith were what might be called legal nationalists,
996
 alert to the 
independent identity of Scots law and the risk of its being subsumed into the law of a 
larger and more powerful neighbour. They, therefore, pointed the finger of blame at 
the influence of English law for any confusion about the law of error: Gow took a 
dim view of borrowings from England;
997
 and for TB Smith any such confusion was 
the result of “incautious use of English precedents and references to English legal 
treatises”.
998
 In a flurry of publications they attempted to clarify the Scots law of 
error, relying on a historical analysis, arguing that since the time of Stair a remedy 
had been granted for unilateral error and, logically therefore, how much more would 
the pursuer deserve a remedy if the error was induced. 
 
In essence, both Gow and Smith were arguing for a broader doctrine of error in 
Scotland, one capable of dealing with innocent misrepresentation. Gow’s view was 
that “Scots law has, in practice, failed to enlarge the ambit of error in substantia, or, 
if it did, has of recent years restricted it, and also failed consciously to develop what 
Professor Lawson describes as the equitable relief of innocent misrepresentation.”
999
 
Gow raised a bigger question, namely whether “Scots law has not fallen between the 
two stools of Roman error in substantia and English equitable fraud”.
1000
 He then 
embarked on a historical analysis of Scots law “prior to the English invasion”
1001
 
which, broadly summarised, made the case that historically Scots law accepted a 
doctrine of error in substantia even if the error was unilateral, limited only by 
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proving that the error was justus et probabilis.
1002
 It should be pointed out that Gow 
cited no Scottish authority for this proposition, the only footnote citation being to 
The South African Law of Obligations,
1003
 the only cases cited being cases of fraud or 
presumptive fraud.
1004
 Having established that unilateral error was operative, by 
analogy so must induced unilateral error be. Crucially, Gow then asserted that 
innocent misrepresentation was not a distinct category in Scots law but “merely one 
of the inductive causes of error”.
1005
 In fact the “gulf” which existed between the 
English and Scottish concepts of misrepresentation lay in the fact that in Scots law 
misrepresentation “enables a pursuer to get into the category of essential error”.
1006
 
In a later article Gow expressed the view that innocent misrepresentation was 
unknown to Scots law,
1007
 and he was also particularly critical of Lord Watson’s 
reinterpretation of essential error in Stewart v Kennedy and Menzies v Menzies.
1008
 In 
terms of the Institutional writers, many of Gow’s propositions are questionable. As 
discussed above, Stair relies on fraud and not error to deal with misrepresentation (as 
do Bankton, Erskine and cases up to the mid-nineteenth century), and unintentional 
misrepresentation was part of the law of presumptive fraud.   
 
TB Smith’s views are considered in more detail below, but the importance of this 
academic debate is that both Gow and Smith took considerable pains to show that 
unilateral error, including error which was induced, was historically part of Scots 
law. Gow referred to “the indigenous principles of Scots law”;
1009
 TB Smith’s 
interpretation of history was that “in the field of contract fraud either inducing 
contract or creating error in substantialibus was recognised by the Institutional 
writers”;
1010
 since, therefore, the Institutional writers recognised unilateral error in 
substantialibus “it followed a fortiori that innocent non-fraudulent misrepresentation 
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by one party has always been relevant to explain and establish fundamental error in 
substantialibus.”
1011
 With respect, it is suggested that this was not how error was 
historically conceptualised in Scots law, indeed the expansion of error was a 
battleground throughout the nineteenth century. However, these articles on the law of 
error are important in that they set the pattern for the modern law, and the narrative 





The articles also give a very different view to the one presented in this thesis, namely 
that “induced error” was not a historically accurate category, but that it was part of 
the law of fraud. No-one has questioned the wisdom of creating a category of 
induced error: it has simply been accepted as the way forward. This can be seen as an 
attempt to make sense of a body of case law that was inconsistent and confusing. 
Alternatively, for some, adherence to what looked like a civilian rule was an 
attractive option for the future of Scots law. However, much of the focus of academic 
critique has been on the damage done to the law of error by Lord Watson’s 
redefinition of it in Stewart and Menzies. No-one appears to have noticed the damage 
done to the law of fraud in the process except perhaps Peter Stein, whose short 
account of the way in which error and misrepresentation merged seems to me the 





(c) TB Smith 
TB Smith is an important part of the story of fraud and error, and, in a sense, he can 
be seen as the bridge to modern commentary on the law of fraud. Many eminent 
modern scholars were his students in Edinburgh’s Old College and his influence as a 
writer and as a Law Commissioner was considerable. The overall scheme presented 
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in his Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland, written later than his article on 
error, is somewhat perplexing in relation to these topics and he might be accused of a 
lack of joined-up thinking. 
 
In the Short Commentary, error and misrepresentation are both considered as 
grounds of nullity to a contract and are treated together.
1014
 However, in this chapter 
there are also frequent references to fraud, and indeed even a fraudulent 
misrepresentation is presented simply as an aspect of induced error, albeit it also has 
delictual effect. It appears that the whole of the law of misrepresentation is now 




It is important to recognise that when it is said that reduction may be sought 
on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or concealment, this is only a short 
way of stating that error or misapprehension induced regarding certain 
matters, by these means, may justify reduction of contract. Misrepresentation 
which does not in fact deceive has no effect upon the validity of an 
agreement; error of some kind must be proved. Indeed, so far as the law of 
contract is concerned, misrepresentation merely widens the scope of the 
doctrine of error to include cases of error in motive which would not per se 
justify reduction without the element of misrepresentation. 
 
Fraud, on the other hand, is treated as a delict under the heading “Wrongs to 
Property”, where he considers fraud and misrepresentation together in one short 
paragraph.
1016
 However, Smith’s views on the general concept of culpa are well 
known and are relevant in this context. In his discussion of culpa as a general fault 
principle, he argued that it could be used to encompass liability for negligent 
misstatements. Clearly this was prior to Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners 
Ltd 
1017
 and the creation of a statutory basis for liability,
1018
 but the fact that he 
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regarded some forms of unintentional misstatements as based in a principle of culpa 
and at the same time as part of the law of error is arguably a systemic difficulty.  
 
Smith’s treatment of fraud is curious because on the one hand he acknowledged the 
traditional breadth of fraud beyond intentional deceit, a type of fraud which he 
described as being “inconsistent with bona fides”
1019
 and which was analogous to 




at times construed dolus in the wider meaning of the Civil law, i.e., not in the 
restricted delictual sense, but in the broader sense of conduct inconsistent 






In exercise of inherent equitable powers, the Court of Session was on 
occasion prepared to grant reduction in cases of fraud in the sense of mala 
fides, where there had been unconscionable dealing, misrepresentation or 
unconscionable concealment.  
 
Furthermore, he insisted that the definition of fraud in Derry v Peek should be 
restricted to the law of delict. It was, therefore, important to Smith to maintain two 
different definitions of fraud: one consistent with Derry v Peek which was the 
territory of delict; the other a broader notion of bad faith which, he claimed, was still 
effective to reduce a contract.
1022
 He attempted to square the circle by taking the 
view that innocent misrepresentation involved situations where “there has been 
neither dolus nor culpa”
1023
 and rejected “the peculiarly English idea that 
misrepresentation which is not deliberately fraudulent is not culpable”.
1024
  However, 
because of his adherence to the error analysis, this is a somewhat unsatisfactory 
                                                 
1019
 Smith (1962) p.833. 
1020




 Ibid. p.833. 
1023





account of fraud, error and misrepresentation and lacks coherence at a conceptual 
level. Given the influence he had on future generations, had Smith extended his 
argument about the broad notion of fraud into the territory of unintentional 
misrepresentation, the modern law might look quite different. 
 
 
(d) Professor McBryde 
The most detailed examination of fraud in Scots law is the work of Professor 
McBryde which spans more than three decades, from his doctoral thesis in 1976
1025
 
through to the third edition of The Law of Contract in Scotland in 2007.
1026
 Like his 
predecessors McBryde regards it as important to separate fraud from 
misrepresentation and in all three editions of The Law of Contract misrepresentation 
is treated as a subcategory of error, thus creating some repetition because fraudulent 




McBryde’s treatment of error 
In the chapter entitled “Error and Misrepresentation”,
1028
 McBryde deals at length 
with the development of negligent and innocent misrepresentation, acknowledging 
that “[i]n the classical law of essential error there was no distinction between 
uninduced and induced error”.
1029
 McBryde’s position is that Scots law historically 




To be relevant, innocent misrepresentation must induce essential error. In the 
context of the development of Scots law up to the middle of the 19
th
 century 
this proposition was correct.  
                                                 
1025
 McBryde (1976). 
1026
 McBryde (2007). McBryde’s account of fraud was first set out in his PhD thesis. Much of the 
material in The Law of Contract is based on his thesis and the broad structure has not changed, 
although some aspects of his thinking have, and these will be noted. 
1027
 McBryde (2007) paras 14-10 – 14-12. 
1028
 References are given to the third edition of The Law of Contract in Scotland, except where 
previous editions are relevant. McBryde (2007) ch.15. Misrepresentation is the largest single topic in 
this chapter, see paras 15-42 – 15-87; for his analysis of the law of error see also McBryde (1977) and 
McBryde (2000). 
1029
 McBryde (2007) para 15-43. 
1030




It is, however, at least arguable that the link between innocent misrepresentation and 
error was only confirmed at the end of the nineteenth century, and that it was part of 
the law of fraud up to that point. McBryde would take issue with that argument. 
 
On the question of innocent misrepresentation, like Smith, McBryde also regrets the 
redefinition of essential error by Lord Watson and the ensuing confusion.
1031
 He 
disagrees with Stein’s analysis
1032
 that innocent misrepresentation was a concept 
known to Scots law and dealt with by using categories of presumptive fraud. As 
mentioned above, I regard Stein’s interpretation as convincing; Professor McBryde 
would, therefore, presumably disagree with the analysis presented in this thesis. 
There are, however, areas of agreement: for instance McBryde acknowledges that the 
classical law of error “denied any importance to whether or not error was induced. 
Uninduced essential error and induced essential error had the same effect on a 
contract. The contract was void. Innocent misrepresentation came into Scots law on 
the back of an extended doctrine of essential error”.
1033
 We would, therefore, agree 
about the general development of error, albeit not about the timing of it, but that is 
only part of the story. The missing part of the accepted narrative is that innocent 
misrepresentation was dealt with as a species of fraud, and not error. McBryde 
specifically denies that the Institutional writers were concerned with 
misrepresentations other than where there was fraud (deceit)
1034
 and provides 
evidence that the courts did not give a remedy for misstatements which were false 
but not fraudulent. However, the cases used to illustrate this point were actions for 
damages, where presumptive fraud was not relevant unless it amounted to culpa 
lata.
1035
 He regards fraud and error as separate and distinct doctrines with no overlap, 
                                                 
1031
 Ibid. paras 15-61 – 15-64 . 
1032
 Ibid. para 15-47 n.116, referring to Stein (1958) chs. 14 and 15. He also disagrees with Professor 
Walker’s view that innocent misrepresentation was recognised as a separate doctrine from error (ibid. 
referring to Walker, DM “Equity in Scots Law” 1954 JR 103 at p.130). 
1033
 McBryde (1977) p.19. 
1034
 McBryde (2007) para 15-43. 
1035
 The cases cited are Oliver v Suttie (1840) 2 D 514 and Campbell v Boswell (1841) 3 D 639, see 
McBryde (2007) paras 15-43 - 15-44. He does acknowledge that the latter was an action for damages. 
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despite abundant evidence that the Scottish courts had a good deal of difficulty 




Traditionally, Scots law took little notice of misrepresentation, unless it 
amounted to fraud … it prefers to draw a fundamental distinction between 
fraud on the one hand, and error induced by misrepresentation on the other. 
  
McBryde’s exposition of the law of error has been influential, particularly his “error 
plus”
1037
 analysis, namely that error will only be an effective ground of challenge 
where there is an additional factor: misrepresentation; taking advantage of the error; 
“mutual”
1038
 error or a gratuitous transaction. It is interesting to note that similar 
“aggravating factors”
1039
 are found in the older law of presumptive fraud, but perhaps 
this is consistent with an analysis which places most of the law of unintentional fraud 
within the law of error. 
 
 
McBryde’s treatment of fraud 
McBryde’s treatment of the history of fraud is one which is in substantial agreement 
with my account of presumptive fraud in chapter 2 above. He does concede that 
historically fraud had a broader meaning and (in his PhD thesis) that there was “a 
tendency to infer fraud”
1040
 although “[n]o clear indication is given of those 
circumstances in which fraudulent intent must be proved and those in which it may 
be inferred”.
1041
 He recognises that facility and circumvention “developed from the 
Scots law of fraud”
 1042
 albeit it was “a very different form of fraud”
1043
 which did 
                                                 
1036
 Du Plessis & McBryde (2004) p.122. 
1037
 McBryde (2007) para 15-23. 
1038
 McBryde is somewhat vague about the meaning he attributes to the term “mutual”, but he appears 
to use it as a catch-all category for errors that are either shared by the parties or where the parties are 
at cross purposes (ibid. para 15-34). Most modern commentators make a distinction between “mutual” 
error (where the parties are at cross purposes usually leading to dissensus) and “common or shared” 
error, “where both parties contract under the same mistaken belief” (Gloag and Henderson (2007) 
paras 6.23-6.24).  
1039
 McBryde (2000) p.78. 
1040




 McBryde (2007) para 16-01. 
1043
 Ibid. para 16-07. 
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not require deceit, merely taking advantage of weakness or facility.
1044
 In addition, 
fraud was readily inferred in two other situations: unequal bargains with vulnerable 
people;
1045
 and transactions by insolvents who either alienated goods to defeat 
creditors or purchased goods aware of their own insolvent status.
1046
 His view is that 
this type of fraud has “disappeared”
1047
 and its place has been taken by the discrete 
rules which exist for facility and circumvention,
1048
 or by the legislation governing 
the behaviour of bankrupts. 
 
Another common category of presumed fraud involved taking advantage of a 
confidential or fiduciary relationship. There is an obvious connection with the 
modern law of undue influence or that of fiduciary relationships. However, McBryde 




Facility and circumvention involve an element of fraud (in a special sense of 




The reason for excluding undue influence is because “there need not be corrupt 
motive, or deceit or fraudulent conduct.”
1050
 It might be pointed out that in his 
account of facility and circumvention he recognises that no deceit is required, so it is 
not clear why one is said to derive from fraud and the other not.
1051
 It may be 
because he takes the view that undue influence came to be accepted in Scotland as a 
result of English influence.
1052
 He concedes that cases of parental “undue” influence 
would “probably have been considered evidence of fraud” in earlier case law, 
although again it is not clear why only the parental relationship is singled out, as 
there is ample evidence that the abuse of other confidential relationships was 
                                                 
1044
 Ibid. para 16-17. Gloag offers a similar analysis, Gloag (1929) pp.484-486. 
1045
 McBryde (2007) para 16-03. 
1046
 Ibid. paras 14-25 ff. 
1047
 Ibid. paras 16-04 – 16-07. 
1048
 See McBryde (2007) ch.16 for a full account of those rules. 
1049
 Ibid. para 16-39; and on the distinction between fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, see para 14-
34. 
1050
 Ibid. para 16-39. 
1051
 “It is clearly the law that there need not be deceit”, ibid. para 16-17. 
1052
 Ibid. para 16-24. 
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presumed to be fraud.
1053
 In Ross v Gosselin’s Exrs Lord President Clyde took the 





I think it would be extravagant and fallacious to refuse to recognise the 
distinction between these two different kinds of questions, merely because 
they are both ultimately referable to the same broad category of fraud. Cases 
vary infinitely in their special circumstances; and there are no doubt cases in 
which the holding of a position of influence may be no more than an item of 
evidence of circumvention. 
 
McBryde identifies the turning point away from inferred fraud: “When it was settled 
that fraud needed specific averments, it must have been difficult to reconcile this 
with cases of facility in which the proof of fraud was absent but fraud was 
inferred.”
1055
 This is, of course, to ignore the fact – as do all modern courts and 
commentators – that when the Institutional writers insisted on proof of fraud it went 





The modern law of fraud is, therefore, limited to intentional deceit and no more than 
that. Furthermore, McBryde’s account of the law of fraud, other than its history, is 
strongly influenced by Gloag. McBryde analyses fraudulent behaviour under three 
headings: fraudulent representation, fraudulent concealment and unfair activities.
1057
 
This closely mirrors Gloag’s taxonomy in which fraud “may consist in 
misrepresentation ..., or in taking an unfair advantage in circumstances where the 
word misrepresentation is hardly applicable”, active concealment being an aspect of 
                                                 
1053
 See ch.2 pp.74-87. 
1054
 Ross v Gosselin's Executors 1926 SC 325 at 334 per Lord President Clyde; see also Log’s Trs v 
Reid (1885) 12 R 1094 in which Lord Kinnear said, “It would appear to me, therefore, that 
conveyances obtained by undue influence, whether actually exercised or presumed by law in 
consequence of the relation of the parties, are in precisely the same position as conveyances obtained 
by fraud” (at 1100). 
1055
 McBryde (1976) p.94. 
1056
 See ch.2 pp.66-68. 
1057





 McBryde is clear that for a misstatement to constitute “fraud” 




A contract induced by a false statement is not necessarily a contract induced 
by fraud. The falsity of the statement could arise from an innocent or 
negligent mistake ... A statement honestly made, but wrong, is not fraudulent. 
 




[W]here a misrepresentation is involved, fraud always implies a moral wrong. 
Mere negligence is not fraud. 
 
In relation to fraudulent concealment, McBryde distinguishes active concealment 
(which, following Gloag, is an aspect of misrepresentation) from silence, presumably 
passive concealment. He notes that in earlier Scots law concealment of private 
knowledge to gain an advantage could amount to fraud, but over the course of the 
nineteenth century – under the influence of “English ideas of caveat emptor”
1061
 – 
concealment became a relevant challenge only where there was deemed to be a duty 
to disclose information. That duty arises in particular types of contracts (usually 
referred to as contracts uberrimae fidei) such as insurance, or where fiduciary or 
quasi-fiduciary relationships are involved.
1062
 However, even if such a duty exists the 
concealment must be “part of a machination or contrivance to deceive” in order to 




It might be thought that McBryde’s third category of “unfair activities” would offer 
scope for a broader definition of fraud. However, this category is principally to 
address “cases which cannot easily be classed as a representation or a concealment 
but which involve a plan to deceive”, the classic example being the use of a white 
                                                 
1058
 Gloag (1929) p.475. 
1059
 McBryde (2007) para 14-11; this is also the view of Thomson ((1990) para 703). 
1060
 Gloag (1929) p.476.  Even less does innocent misrepresentation amount to fraud (p.471). 
1061
 McBryde (2007) para 14-14. 
1062
 Ibid. paras 14-14 – 14-15; Broatch v Jenkins (1866) 4 M 1030. 
1063





 His insistence on deceit confines the definition once more to 
restrictive territory. This is again similar to Gloag’s explanation that fraud can 
consist “in taking an unfair advantage in circumstances where the word 




There appear to me to be two justifications for treating misrepresentation as error 
rather than fraud: 
a) in order to find a location for innocent misrepresentation, as discussed at 
length above; and 
b) in order to preserve a structure for fraud that necessarily involves deceit, 
but which does not lead to error. To illustrate fraud which does not involve 
error McBryde’s recurrent example is the white bonnet at auction (he might 
these days give the example of shill bidding on eBay
1066
), whereby the seller 
or someone acting for the seller bids to increase the price.
1067
 Arguably, these 
are unusual instances of “unfair activities” which do involve deceit in 
comparison with the myriad of cases involving misrepresentation or 
concealment. It appears that the exceptional case has, unhelpfully in my view, 
dictated the structure.  
 
As McBryde’s writing on this topic spans four decades, it is particularly interesting 
to note the development in his thinking. His overall structure has remained broadly 
consistent, but there are some differences of emphasis and one significant substantive 
change. In his thesis McBryde strongly disagreed with Gloag’s view that “[t]he 
principles laid down in Derry v Peek, though inconsistent with certain dicta, are in 
                                                 
1064
 McBryde (2007) para 14-19. This example survives from his thesis (McBryde (1976) pp.83 ff.) 
through all editions of The Law of Contract in Scotland. A “white bonnet” is a term used to describe a 
sham bidder who has no intention of buying but who is planted by the seller to bid in order to inflate 
the auction price of the property. 
1065
 Gloag (1929) p.475. 
1066
 This is the modern equivalent of the white bonnet. A seller, for instance on eBay, may ask the 
“shill” or plant, often friends or family, to bid on their item in order to create a bidding war and drive 
up the auction price.  
1067
 McBryde (2007) para 14-19.  Other examples are also cited, which he suggests may be examples 
of devices contrary to public policy, for instance plans to defeat creditors, or obtaining credit on the 
basis of assets which are immediately disposed of after the credit is advanced. 
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entire accordance with the general trend of modern decisions in Scotland”.
1068
 In his 
thesis, perhaps with the boldness of youth, he criticised this view,
1069
 and in the first 
edition of the Law of Contract in Scotland (1987) he went further, saying that to 
regard Derry v Peek as the extent of the Scots law of fraud “would be a holocaust of 
centuries of case law”.
1070
 However, there is a significant change in his thinking by 
the time of the third edition (2007), which demonstrates the complex way in which 
commentators influence one another. He now explicitly refutes his own previous 
views on Derry, and accepts that Lord Herschell’s definition does represent Scots 
law in relation to misstatements. McBryde was clearly influenced initially by the 
views expressed in TB Smith’s Short Commentary
1071
 but he later confessed, “[i]t is 
now thought that this approach was misguided”.
1072
 By 2007 he had accepted that 
Derry v Peek was the law of Scotland, with the caveat that the context was 
misrepresentation, and not other (deceitful) activities which might constitute fraud. 
 
Perhaps the most significant development in McBryde’s thinking is the introduction 
of a section on “Good Faith” in the second edition of The Law of Contract
1073
 which 
is significantly expanded in the third.
1074
 It is under this heading that he recognises 
that there is “a mass of authority” on the effect of bad faith in Scottish sources, in the 
sense of knowledge or underhand behaviour
1075
 and acknowledges that “[s]ome of 
the cases viewed the issue as one of fraud (fraud having a wide meaning in the early 
law)”.
1076
 This sense of fraud has recently been used by the courts to create a general 
contractual principle of good faith
1077
 and in an important passage, McBryde 




                                                 
1068
 Gloag (1929) p.478. 
1069
 McBryde (1976) p.76. 
1070
 McBryde (1987) para 10-10. 
1071
 Specifically referring to p.828 ff. 
1072
 McBryde (2007) para 14-12 n.42. 
1073
 McBryde (2001) para 17-25 ff. 
1074
 McBryde (2007) paras 17-23 – 17-34. 
1075




 Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC (HL) 111 at 121 per Lord Clyde.  This development is 
discussed in greater detail in ch. 7. 
1078
 McBryde (2007) paras 17-30 – 17-31. 
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This illustrates what may be a neglected feature of the early law. Underhand 
dealing was treated in Scots law as an aspect of fraud, which had a wide 
definition. Scots law had a concept of bad faith.... A general doctrine of fraud 
gave birth to other examples of actions in bad faith, such as facility and 
circumvention and fraudulent preferences in bankruptcy.... The cases on 
underhand dealing could have been used to formulate a broad principle. 
 
He goes on to suggest that cases involving underhand dealing or private knowledge 
(of which he gives many examples), all treated as fraud historically, could have been 
used to formulate a general principle of good faith but concludes that there is no such 
general principle, leaving open the possibility of future developments.
1079
 What is 
most interesting is that having closed down the meaning of fraud to intentional 
deceit, McBryde finds it necessary to create another category to do the job that fraud 
once did. I would agree with his assessment, with the significant caveat that within 
the law of fraud Scots law did have a general principle of penalising bad faith, but 
modern Scots law neither knows how to find it nor how to explain it. 
 
But there is no doubt that contractual primary fraud in the work of both McBryde and 
Gloag is limited to deceitful behaviour, albeit the ways in which deceit might be 
practised are broad and open-ended.  It is in this sense that McBryde can assert that 





The Scottish Law Commission 
It is worth commenting briefly on the view of fraud taken by the Scottish Law 
Commission in its 1978 Memorandum on Defective Consent and Consequential 
Matters.
1081
 The Memorandum relies heavily on McBryde’s, at that time, recent PhD 
thesis
1082
 and a similar view might be expected. However, it must be borne in mind 
                                                 
1079
 Ibid. paras 17-32 and 17-34. 
1080
 Ibid. para 14-03. 
1081
 Scottish Law Commission (1978). 
1082
 The Memorandum quotes extensively from McBryde’s PhD thesis on fraud, see e.g. Scottish Law 
Commission (1978) pp.98-99, pp.101-104, on facility and circumvention and on undue influence.  
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that TB Smith was a Commissioner at the time,
1083
 with a powerful countervailing 
influence. As a working definition Erskine’s formulation is accepted “as probably the 
most serviceable which could be devised”.
1084
 It is emphatically stated that the 
Commission does not accept that Derry v Peek represents Scots law on the subject of 
fraud,
1085
 quoting McBryde’s assertion that such an acceptance would be a 
“remarkable result”.
1086
 The Commission accepts McBryde’s conclusion (which 
accorded with TB Smith’s own views) that misrepresentation “was treated merely as 
one of the means by which essential error could be brought about. It was not a 
separate ground of vitiation of consent and was relevant in a contractual context only 
as being one of the ways (but by no means the only one) whereby essential error 
might be caused.”
1087
 The Scottish Law Commission’s considered view in 1978 was 
that fraud should cease to exist as a separate category and should be incorporated 




It appears that the Commission understood McBryde to be expressing a wide view of 
the definition of fraud, and certainly he did (and does) not conceive it to be restricted 
to misrepresentation or concealment (as exemplified by the white bonnet example). 
However, the quotations used, for instance, that “fraud was given a wide meaning” 
or that “[t]he categories of fraud should never be closed” must be read in the context 
that it was essential to the definition of fraud for McBryde in 1976, as it still is in 
2007, that deceit be present. This is clearly at odds with TB Smith’s much broader 
view of culpa, as discussed above. It is difficult to understand why TB Smith would 
put forward a broader (and strongly held) view of the definition of fraud in the Short 
Commentary and yet affirm a much more restrictive concept in the Commission’s 
Memorandum. This can be explained either by speculating that the Commission 
misconceived what McBryde was saying in his thesis; or alternatively, that TB 
Smith’s own views had altered over time.  
                                                 
1083
 MacQueen (2005) pp.139, and pp.162-163; TB Smith was nearing retirement when it was 
published in 1978, so it may be surmised that his views on fraud had changed. 
1084
 Scottish Law Commission (1978) p.95. 
1085
 Ibid. p.94. 
1086
 Ibid. p.99. 
1087
 Ibid.  
1088





(e) Professor Thomson 
Professor Thomson’s title on “Fraud” in the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia analyses 
its effect both in voluntary
1089
 and in involuntary obligations.
1090
 In a delictual 
context Thomson uses the concept of mens rea to reinforce the idea that fraud 
requires intention, and identifies the nineteenth century as the point when “delictual 
liability for fraud came to be restricted to a narrow range of circumstances dependent 
on the mens rea of the defender”,
1091
 namely intentional deceit.  
 
His treatment of contractual fraud, on the other hand, is almost entirely discussed in 
relation to error. In general, Thomson’s definition of fraud is restrictive, and yet in 
some respects his treatment of the effects of fraud is surprisingly broad. He begins by 
accepting that fraud can prevent consensus, i.e. in effect it leads to a void rather than 
a voidable contract, where it has induced an “essential” error, as in the case of 
Morrisson v Robertson,
1092
 although he concedes this will be rare because of the 
difficulties of proof and the application of objective criteria to the question of 
consent.
1093
 The question of the effect of an induced error on third parties is an 
ongoing debate among academic commentators
1094
 and it is unsurprising to find it 
raised as an issue. What is much more surprising is that Thomson takes the view that 
where fraud prevents consensus in idem the behaviour in question does not need to 
amount to “fraud stricto sensu: absence of good faith can suffice”,
1095
 i.e. simply 
taking advantage of the other contracting party’s error, as opposed to inducing it, is 
enough to prevent consensus. This is a surprising proposition from a commentator 
whose views on uninduced unilateral error and the (non) effects of good faith have 
                                                 
1089
 Thomson (1990) paras 703ff. 
1090
 Ibid. paras 719 ff. He also considers fraud in a number of other areas such as property law, 
succession, trusts and insolvency which are not relevant to the question of definition.  
1091
 Ibid. para 719. 
1092
 1908 SC 332, and see earlier discussion of this case in ch. 1. 
1093
 Thomson (1990) paras 705-706. 
1094
 See for instance McBryde (2007) paras 15-79 – 15-85. 
1095
 Thomson (1990) para 706. 
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been unequivocally expressed elsewhere.
1096
  It may have been an early view that 
was later superseded. 
 
Thomson acknowledges that the definition of fraud is wider in the context of 
voluntary obligations than in involuntary, but in terms of definition, like McBryde, 
he adopts Erskine’s formulation requiring deceit. Therefore “a false statement of fact 
or law made in good faith does not constitute fraud unless ‘it is destitute of all 
reasonable grounds, or which the least inquiry would immediately correct.’”
1097
 His 
discussion of contractual fraud is almost entirely framed as an aspect of the law of 
error,
1098
 and the thrust of his treatment is similar to McBryde’s, except for the 
omission of a category of unfair activities carried out deceitfully. He argues that 
fraud no longer has the wide meaning it had in early Scots law, and he adopts a 
restrictive semantic approach outlining the “new” manifestations of fraud
1099
 which 
have superseded the old rules. However, he is of the view that both facility and 
circumvention and undue influence are, in substance, derivations from the older 
meaning of fraud,
1100




Thomson concedes that historically fraud had a broader meaning which included 
activities “which were fraudulent only in the sense of being considered unfair”.
1102
  
He also asserts that “until the mid-nineteenth century it was a principle of Scots law 
that parties when negotiating contractual obligations should act in good faith”, 
evidenced by the liability of a seller for concealment of latent defects in goods sold, a 
species of fraud which did not necessarily involve intentional deceit.
1103
 Thomson’s 
historical timeline is that there was a change in the second half of the nineteenth 
century because of “commercial interests” when Scots law “became influenced by 
the principle of caveat emptor and the significance of acting in good faith was 
                                                 
1096
 Thomson (1999). 
1097
 Quoting from Western Bank v Addie (1867) 5 M (HL) 80 at 87, per Lord Chelmsford. 
1098
 Thomson (1990) paras 708-712. 
1099
 in a contractual context, facility and circumvention or undue influence, ibid. paras 733ff. and 
738ff. 
1100
 Ibid. paras 733 and 738. 
1101
 Ibid. para 738. 
1102
 Ibid. para 702. 
1103





 He cites judicial authority for the narrowing of the 
definition of fraud to the effect that “a certain degree of cunning, craft, and even 




Doctrinal analysis inevitably involves selection of authority to affirm the views being 
expressed, but it could be argued that Thomson is being particularly selective in his 
use of case law to make this argument. There is ample authority throughout the 
nineteenth century to suggest that some on the Scottish bench were willing to impose 
higher ethical standards and were active in doing so. Moreover, it is not 
incontrovertible that Scots law has ever fully accepted the caveat emptor principle, 
nor does it appear to be as quintessentially an English doctrine as is often asserted in 
Scotland.
1106
   
 
Thomson does allow a narrow field of operation for the operation of good faith (or 
more accurately penalising bad faith) in certain situations where greater disclosure is 
demanded. Like McBryde’s analysis, this includes fiduciary relationships and others 
of a confidential nature,
1107
 as well as the scenario where one of the contracting 
parties knows that the other party is in error;
1108
 but Thomson finds the latter at odds 
with the caveat emptor principle and prefers to classify Steuart’s Trs v Hart  as a 




In a later historical analysis, Thomson does touch on presumptive fraud, and 
acknowledges that there were cases based on inequality in which the pursuer argued 
he had suffered lesion and “in so gross inequality ex re praesumitur dolus”.
1110
 He 
examines the historical sources and concludes that inequality of price was never 




                                                 
1104
 Ibid. para 708. 
1105
 Ibid. para 708, quoting from Gillespie v Russel (1856) 18 D 677 at 686 per Lord Curriehill. 
1106
 See Lobban (2012) pp.116-123. 
1107
 Ibid. para 712. 
1108




 Thomson (2000) p.166. 
1111
 Ibid. pp.168-9. 
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It is submitted that, in the light of the case law, by the end of the eighteenth 
century the substantive fairness of the contract was not in itself sufficient to 
have it modified or set aside. Nor would it appear that there was any 
presumption of fraud and deceit to be drawn from an unfair bargain unless in 
very exceptional circumstances where the contract ex facie demonstrated 
oppression. Such cases would be rare, indeed.  
 
His analysis accords with the one presented in chapter 2, where it is clear that 
inequality on its own, unless it was gross inequality – usually evidenced by the 
presence of an aggravating factor – was not enough. However, he does not examine 
the circumstances where those aggravating factors were present. Most of the 
examples he cites relate to price between trading parties. It is clear that price was 
never a ground of inequality, and most of the presumptive fraud cases concern 
inequality between the parties on other grounds, including relationship, means of 




The casual observer of modern Scots law could be forgiven for thinking that there 
are in fact many frauds, with different definitions and different effects. Or that the 
way in which fraud operates in contract law is different from, say, fraud as a delict, 
or fraud in an enrichment or a property context, or the fraudulent behaviour of 
fiduciaries, agents or trustees. This is most evident in the work of Thomson, whose 
aim is to look at “the effect of fraud in relation to juristic acts”
1112
 and who 
specifically wants to illustrate “how the conception of fraud varies according to the 
particular legal context in which it arises”.
1113
 Smith appears to support this view, for 
he repeatedly distinguishes between “the broad contractual (as opposed to delictual) 
sense” of fraud.
1114
 However, it should be borne in mind that Smith’s purpose was to 
limit the effect of Derry v Peek
1115
 and by putting clear blue water between delictual 
                                                 
1112




 Smith (1962) p.286. 
1115
 Derry v Peek (1889) LR 14 App Cas 337. 
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fraud where intentional deceit was required, he was able to preserve a broader 
meaning for contractual fraud.
1116
 McBryde, on the other hand, strongly rejects the 
notion of different frauds and cites extensive authority, both Institutional and 





Fraud as a delict and fraud as a factor vitiating consent in a contract are not, of 
course, mutually exclusive concepts although they lead to different consequences. 
One way of resolving the “many frauds” issue would be to consider whether fraud 
and other factors which are deemed to vitiate consent could be subsumed under one 
single principle of “improper obtaining of consensus” as a delictual category.
1118
 
There is a certain logic to this. Just as inducing a breach of contract is a recognised 
delict, why should improper inducement to enter into an obligation not also be a 
delictual wrong? It does, of course, beg the question: what is “improper”? The 
suggestion from South African academics who have explored the idea is that “the 
consent will have been improperly obtained if the conduct by means of which it was 
obtained was wrongful in the delictual sense of the term”.
1119
 There is perhaps some 
circularity in this argument and, in addition, unlike South Africa where wrongfulness 
is considered to be a “well-defined existing concept”,
1120
 it is not in Scots law,
1121
 as 
the attitude of the courts to fraud in the nineteenth century surely demonstrates. The 
Scottish courts are a long way from considering this option, preferring to adopt an 
approach which favours individual civil wrongs with their own individual rules. 
However, it may be a helpful insight that a more general theory of pre-contractual 
liability and a clearer view of the role of fault would be helpful in rationalising the 
function of fraud.  
 
                                                 
1116
 “In modern practice, however, as a result of a bywind from the English case of Derry v Peek, there 
has been a tendency to restrict the term “fraud” to imply such conduct as would found an action in 
delict. It may be stressed, nevertheless, that as Scottish institutional writers clearly discerned, the 
contractual and delictual effects of fraud are distinct” (Smith (1962) p.286). See also ibid. pp.833-835. 
1117
 McBryde (2007) para 14-04 and authorities cited therein. 
1118
 The suggestion is borrowed from Van der Merwe et al (2007) paras 4.1.2 and 4.5. 
1119
 Ibid. para 4.5.2. 
1120
 Ibid. p.133. 
1121
 For exploration of the topic see Blackie (1992) and Blackie (1997). 
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One final observation is that although fraud has a narrow definition in modern 
literature, some commentators allow for one significant exception. McBryde states a 
general rule that “error induced by the fraud of a third party does not constitute a 
ground for avoiding a contract”.
1122
 However, he then notes three significant 
exceptions to that rule: when the transaction is gratuitous; where the third party is an 
agent; and where the third party has participated in a fraudulent scheme.
1123
 He also 
links this to the “no benefit from fraud” rule.
1124
 These exceptions are part of the 
concept of secondary fraud, discussed in chapter 7, which is clearly acknowledged 
still to be an accepted part of Scots law and part of the law of fraud. 
                                                 
1122










Chapter 7: Secondary Fraud – the remnants of inequality 
 
 
In the preceding chapters I have examined the definition of fraud in a criminal and a 
civil law context in the light of historical sources. All of that discussion concerns 
situations where one party has been deceived or taken advantage of by another in a 
way that the law designates as fraudulent. The behaviour in question may be a 
criminal or a civil wrong, often both, and it is sufficient to warrant a legal remedy. 
That remedy may consist of criminal sanctions, reparation or damages in delict, 
restitution following unjustified enrichment, or reduction of a contract or a property 
transaction. This is the territory of primary fraud.  
 
At various stages along the way I have made reference to secondary fraud. In 
previous chapters it has been suggested that secondary fraud may have real effect, 
the equivalent of a vitium reale;
1125
 that the principle of inequality evident in 
presumptive fraud is even more relevant to secondary fraud, particularly where there 
is an imbalance of knowledge between the parties or a gratuitous transaction;
1126
 and 
that the fraud principle relied on in Mair v Rio Grande Rubber Estates Ltd
1127
 was an 
aspect of secondary fraud.
1128
 This begs the question: what is secondary fraud? This 
chapter will attempt to answer that question. 
 
One of the aims of this thesis is to create a more comprehensive taxonomy of fraud: 
one which goes beyond the modern law’s limitation of fraud to intentional deceit to a 
recognition that fraud was and is a broader concept of substantive justice rooted in an 
                                                 
1125
 See ch.1 pp.20-26. 
1126
 See ch.2 pp.68-90. 
1127
 1913 SC (HL) 74. 
1128
 See pp.193-4. 
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underlying concept of inequality. Hence, there are situations where intention is 
irrelevant and where fraud is inferred from certain fact scenarios which are deemed 
to constitute inequality. In older Scots law, this was the territory of presumptive 
fraud, but even in the modern law there are occasions when the courts refer to 
“fraud” in a sense which seems out of step with the account given of fraud by most 
legal commentators and which does not amount to a “machination to deceive”. An 
adequate taxonomy must take account of this wider sense of fraud, not only in 
historical perspective, but where it appears in the modern law. This chapter argues 
that presumptive fraud as a manifestation of inequality is alive and well in the 




1. What is secondary fraud? 
The question under consideration is this: to what extent are third parties protected 
where a transaction is tainted with fraud and in what circumstances can property or 
money be recovered from them?  It is in this area that fraud appears to operate in 
inconsistent ways, often perceived to be an exception to general rules within 
particular areas of the law. In this context fraud appears to operate like theft, like a 
vitium reale, enabling the property to be recovered from the third party. For instance, 
in property law the so-called “offside goals rule” would suggest that if there has been 
a double grant of property, even after the property has been transferred the prior 
grantee is capable of reducing that transfer if the second transferee is “fraudulent”, in 
a sense which clearly encompasses more than outright deceit and which is an 




Likewise in enrichment law, where assets have been acquired by a third party 
(usually money, for Scotland has no developed law of tracing and property law, 
therefore, provides no solution), in some circumstances the law is able to reach 
beyond the immediate fraudster to recover the assets as a major exception to the 
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 Reid (1996) para 695, see discussion in ch.1 pp.26-27. 
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general rule limiting recovery to the immediate recipient of the enrichment.
1130
 In a 
contractual context, cautionary obligations provide yet another example of a three 
party transaction where fraud as bad faith is capable of bringing about reduction or 
restitution.
1131
 An agent acting without authority constitutes a fourth scenario,
1132
 and 
perhaps the most disconcerting “exception” of all, is the rule that fraud passes against 
creditors
1133
 despite the general protection that Scots law has given creditors from as 
long ago as the bankruptcy legislation of 1621. While these can be regarded as 
isolated and unusual examples within their discrete subject areas, the consistency of 
the exception would suggest that where there is a combination of fraud and three-
party situations, there is a unified phenomenon at work: this type of fraud has real 
effect. In his analysis of the unsecured creditors rule, Reid does at least pose a wider 





Reviewing the Scottish academic literature dealing with fraud, it appears that there 
has been little attempt to cross-reference the workings of fraud across disciplinary 
boundaries. For instance, McBryde and Whitty in their respective treatments of fraud 
in a contractual and in an enrichment context identify,
1135
 albeit somewhat 




There are exceptional cases of indirect enrichment where recovery has been 
allowed, notably where a principal is gratuitously benefited by the 
unauthorised act of his agent or where a third party is gratuitously benefited 
                                                 
1130
 Whitty (1994) pp.251-269. Whitty also finds the “creditors rule” anomalous (pp.267-269). 
1131
 See Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC (HL) 111, at 120I – 121C where Lord Clyde specifically 
makes an analogy with two “offside goals” cases in order to equate the doctrine of notice with a 
Scottish requirement of “good faith” on the part of a third party; also at 117B-D where he refers to the 
“fraud” principle. 
1132
 McBryde (2007) paras 14-44 and 14-48; Whitty (1994) pp.251-252. 
1133
 Reid (1996) para 694; Mansfield v Walker’s Trs (1835) 1 Sh & Macl 203; AW Gamage Ltd v 
Charlesworth’s Trustee 1910 SC 257. 
1134
 Reid (1996) para 294, referencing, among others, the enrichment case Clydesdale Bank v Paul 
(1877) 4 R 626 and Lord Shand’s rule that no-one should profit from the fraud of another (at 629). 
1135
 McBryde (2007) paras 14-44, 14-45 and 14-48; Whitty (1994) pp.251-269. 
1136
 Whitty (1994) p.207. 
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by the fraudulent or other wrongful act of another, though here the law is 
uncertain. 
 
It is highly significant that both identify the same rules: the third party must either be 
in bad faith or have been a gratuitous recipient or, alternatively, a recipient from an 
agent acting without authority.
1137
 Reid, in a property context, identifies the first two 
rules, but not the third.
1138
 However, although the phenomenon has been identified, it 
has received very little analysis, and certainly no attempt has been made to situate it 
within the general law of fraud.  
 
 
(a) Suggested criteria for the operation of secondary fraud 
In essence, secondary fraud, in modern terminology often referred to as bad faith,
1139
  
involves three party transactions in which the third party is deemed to have 
participated in the primary fraud of one of the other parties (particeps fraudis). In 
other words it is a form of accessory liability. It is also a manifestation of 
presumptive fraud in that there is no question of intention or motive; rather a 
presumption of fraud arises from the circumstances. The criteria for the operation of 
secondary fraud are suggested below, but it should be noted that in this attempt to 
outline a concept of secondary fraud there are more questions than answers and this 
analysis should be regarded as a preliminary step: 
 
(i) One party has committed an act of fraud against another (an act of primary 
fraud) whereby property or money has been acquired. This in turn raises 
questions of definition: for instance does it apply only to intentional acts of 
deceit? The preceding discussion of the broad historical definition of fraud 
                                                 
1137
 Whitty does not explicitly link the rules relating to agency with those relating to the bona fide 
purchaser, but the principles outlined are nevertheless the same. 
1138
 Reid (1996) para 695, although in his earlier treatment of fraud as a vice of consent, leading to a 
voidable title, he does suggest that agency could be relevant, with reference to Morrisson v Robertson 
1908 SC 332. 
1139
 In the context of property transfers, where formerly “fraud” was used to describe the behaviour of 
a second purchaser acting in knowledge of a first purchaser’s prior right, it has been suggested that 
“[m]odern statements of the principle ask whether a second purchaser was in good or bad faith”, 
McBryde (2007) para 17-24. 
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should be borne in mind. For instance, would modern manifestations of 
presumptive fraud, such as undue influence or facility and circumvention, 
bring the principle into operation? Would lack of independent legal advice be 
relevant? 
 
(ii) The fraudulently acquired assets have been transferred on to a third party 
recipient. 
 
(iii) The third party has “participated” in the fraud in one of two ways: he has 
either acquired the assets gratuitously; or he is in bad faith.
1140
 In this context 
bad faith amounts to knowledge or constructive knowledge, i.e. it can be 
either subjective or objective, and it is sometimes framed as knowledge of the 
other’s wrongdoing or, more usually in a property context, knowledge of the 
prior right of another party which has been interfered with. 
 
 
(b) The particeps fraudis 
There are numerous instances in reported cases , ancient and modern, where a third 
party is deemed to be acting “fraudulently” if he benefits from or has knowledge of 
another’s wrongdoing. The most consistent framing of the issue is the idea of 
participation: the third party is deemed to have “participated” in the fraud and, as 
previously referred to in chapter 1, the idea of the particeps fraudis is not new to 
Scots law. From as far back as the seventeenth century it has been a relevant ground 
for reduction, restitution or recompense.
1141
 For instance, in Wemyss v Lord 
Torphichen
1142
 the defender was considered to be a particeps fraudis on grounds of 
knowledge and lack of an “onerous cause” and had to repay money “in quantum est 
                                                 
1140
 These general rules also apply in an agency context, and many of the cases considered below are 
agency cases. The specialities of agency, such as undisclosed principal or unauthorised agent, are not 
examined in detail but would merit further research. 
1141
 For instance in Cassie v Fleming (1632) Mor 10279; Wemyss v Lord Torphichen (1661) Mor 
1693; Auchinleck v Williamson (1667) Mor 10282; Scot v Cheisly (1670) Mor 4867; Crichton v 
Crichton (1671) Mor 4886; Duff v Fowler (1672) Mor 10282; Street v Mason (1672) Mor 491; Prince 
v Pallat (1680) Mor 4932; Anderson v Dempster (1702) Mor 10213; Irvine v Osterbye (1755) Mor 
1715; Bouack v Croll (1748) Mor 1695; Dougall v Marshall (1833) 11 S 1028; Wemyss v Lord 
Torphichen (1661) Mor 1693. 
1142
 (1661) Mor 1693. 
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lucratus alterius dispendio”. The same two criteria – whether or not the defender had 
knowledge and whether or not the cause was onerous or “lucrative”
1143
 – are 
consistently applied to determine liability.
1144
 An example in a property law context 
can be found in Anderson v Lows,
1145
 where an owner sold one storey of a tenement 
building to a purchaser and later disponed the whole tenement gratuitously to his 
wife. Lord Curriehill believed that the double alienation of the property was probably 
an error rather than involving some “dishonest purpose,”
1146
 but despite the lack of 
intentional deceit the court applied the well-established rule of civil law expressed in 
the Latin maxim dolus auctoris non nocet successori nisi in causa lucrativa
1147
 




The rule that the fraud of an author is not pleadable against a successor does 
not operate, if that successor either be in mala fide, or be not an onerous 
successor. 
 
In property law the rule is usually expressed as having private knowledge of a prior 
right, rather than knowledge of a fraudulent act. However, it amounts to the same 
thing, the important aspect being that a wrong has been committed, or a right 
infringed, whether intentionally, negligently or innocently. Secondary fraud, inferred 
fraud, will provide a remedy even if primary fraud no longer does and the debates 
about whether the fraud of the particeps has a broad or narrow definition are not 
relevant (although it is highly relevant to the initial act of fraud being participated 
in). 
 
                                                 
1143
 This is the terminology most frequently used in older case law, see cases in Morison’s Dictionary 
under the title “Personal and Real”. 
1144
 Bouack v Croll (1748) Mor 1695; Dougall v Marshall (1833) 11 S 1028. 
1145
 (1863) 2 M 100. 
1146
 Ibid. at 103 
1147
 I am grateful to Prof. Niall Whitty for the insight that this maxim, the “author’s fraud” rule 
derives from the Praetor’s edit, see Tennent v City of Glasgow Bank (1879) 6 R 554 at 558 per Lord 
President Inglis. 
1148
 (1863) 2 M 100 at 104 
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Stair employed the “partaker” metaphor
1149
 and there is the suggestion, as there is in 
case law, that fraud may have real effect: 
 
yet the parity of reason in fraud or force, should secure the innocent 
purchaser, who neither was accessory to the force, nor knew of it when he 
purchased, which requires a statute; for force, as well as fraud, are labes 




This passage is sometimes regarded simply as an inconsistency in the Institutions as 
Stair clearly does not regard fraud as a vitium reale or labes realis in his other 
discussions.
1151
 It may be that he is still thinking of the accessory, the purchaser in 
bad faith, for in those circumstances there is no protection and secondary fraud has 
real effect. The semantic structure used by the courts is almost always framed in the 
negative, i.e., there is no vitium reale “unless” or “nisi” the third party is a particeps 
fraudis.
1152
 In Crichton v Crichton
1153
 it was argued that fraud was a vitium reale 
reaching to a third party, but the court held that “the reason of reduction could have 





Stair certainly attributed liability to anyone “partaking” in fraud by being in mala 
fide about the right of another. And, as in modern law, mala fides can be actual 





The common ground in which all agree, is that the possessor’s credulity and 
                                                 
1149
 Stair mentions the partaker in almost every discussion of fraud and there are numerous examples, 
for instance I.9.9-10; I.9.15; IV.35.19-20; IV.40.20-21. 
1150
 Stair IV.35.20. 
1151
 “Fraud is no vitium reale affecting the subject, but only the committer of the fraud and these who 
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partakers of the fraud” (I.9.15). 
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 Duff v Fowler (1672) Mor 10282; Anderson v Dempster (1702) Mor 10213; Andersons v Lows 
(1863) 2 M 100. 
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 Stair II.12.6.  
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belief of his own and his author’s right makes bona fidem, and his knowledge 
of the right of another, malam, which seemeth to infer, that he who doubteth, 
must be in mala fide because he believeth not his author to have had right, 
doubt and belief being contraries. 
 
The fact that secondary fraud is able to reach third parties if either of the criteria is 
met seems anomalous. It flies in the face of caveat emptor and appears to have been 
untouched by the debates which raged about the definition of fraud in its primary 
context. For secondary fraud to take effect no intention to deceive is required, nor 
negligence, nor any requirement for error, nor any honest belief. This raises a bigger 
question: why should there be liability when the third party has not committed any 
wrong (in a delictual sense) and should the law penalise private knowledge or 
unequal transactions in this way? Perhaps more importantly where does this rule 
come from?  
 
 
2. Aquinas, Stair and Third Party Liability 
It has previously been shown in chapter 3 that there are a number of important 
parallels between Aquinas’ doctrine of restitution and Stair’s account of restitution 
and recompense. In summary, Aquinas translated the Aristotelian principle of 
equality into a legal framework of debt and owing and the function of justice (via the 
doctrine of restitution) was to restore equality. Where property was involved, 
restitution (in a narrow sense) was required; where the imbalance amounted to harm 
or loss that could not be restored, the broader category of recompense performed the 
same rebalancing function. Stair parallels this scheme in that restitution is an 
obligation arising from property;
1156
 whereas recompense is about actions rather than 
things, whereby deeds are done “not animo donandi, but of purpose to oblige the 
receiver of the benefit to recompense”. Recompense is conceptually related to the 




                                                 
1156
 Ibid. I.7.9; I.7.11. 
1157




However, there is another function within the Thomist account of recompense, only 




A fundamental distinction in Aquinas’ analytical division of restitution and 
recompense concerns the source of the obligation to restore property. Restitution can 
arise on account of the thing itself, i.e. from the very fact of possession where no 
culpa is involved, which he refers to as restitution ratione rei (on account of the 
thing).
1159
 Simply holding the property of another creates an obligation to restore but 
that obligation ceases along with possession. However, the obligation of restitution 
can also arise from wrongful receipt of property and this is his fault-based category, 
restitution ratione acceptionis.
1160
 The way in which possession was acquired must 
be examined and, in contrast to ratione rei, if it involved fault restitution is required 




Then a man is bound to restitution, not only because of the thing he takes, but 
also because of his injurious action, even though it is no longer in his 
possession. 
 
The obligation subsists even after possession has been lost, at which point 
recompense is the appropriate remedy.
1162
 However, Thomas also takes account of 
the ultimate destination of the property and the question of third parties acquiring 




                                                 
1158
 This scheme is dealt with in more detail my article, Reid (2008) pp.209-213 (reprinted at 
Appendix 2 below). 
1159
 Or ipsa res accepta (Summa, II-II q.62.6). See Hallebeek (1995) pp.48-49; Gordley (2006) p.424; 
Gordley (2002) p.228; Dolezalek (2002) p.112, for discussion of the treatment of Thomas’ 
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 Ibid. ad.1. 
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So then even though he who took something from another no longer has it, 
for it has passed to someone else, nevertheless, since the other is deprived of 
what is his, both the taker and the holder alike are bound to restitution, the 
former on account of his injurious action, and the latter on account of the 
thing itself. 
 
The intermediary is liable on account of the wrongful taking and the third party 
simply by possessing (ratione rei), by analogy with two party transactions. However, 
if the third party has been “a cause of the unjust taking”,
1164
 he is liable on both 
counts. All who have been either a direct cause (by commanding, giving advice or 
express consent) or an indirect one (by not preventing or by covering up after the 
event) form part of the chain of liability ranking in the order specified.
1165
 The range 
of participatory liability is wide, and, consistent with the voluntariness of virtue and 
vice, the unifying factor is that they all require the third party’s knowledge of the 
injustice. Aquinas does not dwell on the detail of third party liability, but here 
perhaps are the foundations for the liability of the particeps. 
 
Stair’s translation of the Thomist account of restitution into Scots law is complex and 
largely implicit but the combination of loss of possession and fault certainly imports 
a different kind of liability. Throughout title I.7 Stair is addressing possessors who 
are in bona fide, a requirement which he insists on in almost every section. The 
consequences of loss of possession for a possessor in bona fides correspond to 




In all these, the obligation of restitution is formally founded upon the having 
of things of others in our power, and therefore, that ceasing, the obligation 
also ceaseth. 
 
                                                 
1164
 Ibid. q.62.7. 
1165
 Ibid. Aquinas is more tentative about indirect liability and suggests that advice, flattery and 
keeping silent will not always import liability, only where they were a cause of the action. 
1166
 Stair I.7.11. 
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Aquinas’ second category of restitution has not entirely disappeared from Stair’s 
obediential obligations, but it is dealt with in his title on reparation because this is the 
territory of delict. If property has been wrongfully taken (by theft or fraud), 
restitution is required and, like ratione acceptionis, the wrongdoer is liable for the 




Reparation is either by restitution of the same thing, in the same case, that it 
would have been in if it had remained with the owner, and this is most exact; 
or where that cannot be, by giving the like value, or that which is nearest to 




Delict is, therefore, the second source of restitution for Stair if possession has been 
wrongfully acquired (or indeed wrongfully disposed of),
1168
 sometimes called its 
“binary” nature in modern Scots law.
1169
 Reparation is Stair’s “fault” category, the 
paradigm example of which is fraud.
1170
 However, it could be argued that restitution 
is not binary in nature; rather there is a third source of obligation, which also 
corresponds to Thomas’ category of ratione acceptionis and which is, at best, only 
implicit in Stair’s account. Coming back to Stair’s insistence on the bona fides of the 
possessor, it is apparent from a careful reading of title I.7 that many of the situations 
he describes involve three party transactions. For instance, if the bona fide possessor 
is liable to restore property recovered from thieves or pirates, there must be a 
wrongful intermediary in the shape of a thief or pirate! Similarly, when he suggests 
that even a bona fide purchaser for value must restore property,
1171
 recognising that, 
on policy grounds, “positive law secures the buyer, and leaves the owner to seek the 
seller”, there is implicitly an intermediary seller who has done wrong. Consistent 
with restitution ratione rei, it is the bona fides of the third party which will protect 
him from any liability once possession has been lost. 
 
                                                 
1167
 Ibid. I.9.4. 
1168
 Ibid. I.7.2 where “fraudful” disposal of property is also clearly a “delinquence”. 
1169
 Carey Miller (2005a) p.238 and generally ch. 10.  
1170
 Stair I.7.2. 
1171
 Ibid. I.7.4 and I.7.11. 
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But what of the mala fide possessor? For the answer, we have to look outwith Stair’s 
obediential obligations to his treatment of possession in Book II of the Institutions, 
where he defines bona fide possessors as those “who do truly think that which they 
possess to be their own, and know not the right of any other”.
1172
 If the third party 
has private knowledge of another’s right (or, presumably, of the intermediary’s 
wrong) he is also deemed to be a “partaker in the fraud”
1173
 which raises the 
obligation to restore and removes any protection for the third party.  
 
As noted previously, Whitty identifies the effects of fraud in “indirect” or three party 
enrichment cases as a major exception to a general rule against recovery.
1174
 For if 
the third party is either in bad faith or the transaction is gratuitous a “restitutionary 
obligation”
1175
 is created, usually recompense. In addition, unlike the strict liability 
nature generally asserted for claims in unjustified enrichment, “liability is fault-
based”.
1176
 The principal elements of Aquinas’ ratione acceptionis lie within this 
rule. However, the principle is not confined to enrichment law, rather it has 
explanatory effect for the broad sweep of secondary fraud. Aquinas’ exposition of 
fault-based liability is illuminating for the modern law and it is suggested that the 
concept of a participant (particeps) has scholastic roots and scholastic consequences 
in that it creates inequality and requires the intervention of the law. It is also clear 
that there are strong moral overtones, perhaps unsurprising given these were rules 
developed by moral theologians. For both Stair and Aquinas moral and religious 
duties were as important as legal ones: to return goods to others which are rightfully 
theirs; to recompense them for profits made at their expense; to maintain equality in 




                                                 
1172
 Ibid. II.1.24, see also II.1.24 for the further explanation that even a “colourable” title will be 
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1173
 Ibid. IV.40.21-22; also see II.1.42. 
1174
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3. Accessory Liability and the “No Profit from Fraud” Rule 
Accessory liability, or liability for participation in fraud, was, therefore, a familiar 
concept in Scots law from at least the seventeenth century, and it had two criteria: 
either the third party had to be in bad faith or have acquired the property gratuitously. 
The requirements of bad faith and onerosity operate independently of each other, 
either being sufficient to amount to participation in fraud.  
 
There is another well-established rule in which these criteria are combined, namely 
the “good faith purchaser for value”, equity’s darling in English law, which most 
commonly operates in contract and in property law. In Scots law it was traditionally 
framed in the negative as the rule penalising private knowledge of a prior right, 
commonly now known as the offside goals rule in property law or the doctrine of 
notice. It has been described as a “doctrinal anomaly” and its classification as a type 
of fraud as “merely a fiction to provide it with theoretical support”.
1177
 However, 
viewing it in the light of accessory liability and as part of a doctrine of secondary 
fraud may provide the doctrinal support necessary for its survival as a useful part of 
Scots law where it is regarded as an “exception”
1178
 to the usual principles inherent 
in the transfer of ownership. 
 
The classic case is a double grant of property, and the rule operates to ensure that the 
second purchaser will have good title only if he is in good faith and has given value. 
Much has been written about the rule against offside goals,
1179
 and there is extensive 
case law exploring its meaning and effect.
1180
 It is not, therefore, intended to explore 
the doctrine in detail, other than to note that in a number of these cases bad faith is 
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However, in Wardlaw v Mackenzie
1183
 the court made a significant connection 
between those two criteria and another legal maxim, namely quod nemo debet 
locupletari aliena jactura, a form of the Pomponius maxim
1184
 which is usually 
associated with the law of unjustified enrichment. 
 
Wardlaw concerned a three party family cautionary transaction in which the sister 
(the cautioner) alleged misrepresentation about the nature and extent of her 
obligation. The plea was not successful in the Outer House, because despite the fact 
that it was held to be fraud (it had all the marks of presumptive fraud), the third party 
had not participated in or had knowledge of it. On appeal the Lord Justice-Clerk 
(Inglis) stated the general rule that fraud does not affect innocent third parties, 
contrasting it with force and fear, which renders a contract null.
1185
 However, he 




The chief fallacy which pervades the defenders’ argument arises from their 
assuming it to be an universal rule of equity, that fraud is not a relevant 
ground for reducing an obligation in a question with an innocent third party, 
and from forgetting another rule of equity equally important, and quite as 
extensively applicable as the former, quod nemo debet locupletari aliena 
jactura. 
 
                                                 
1181
 For instance, Morrison v Sommerville (1860) 22 D 1082; it has been noted that “[m]odern 
statements of the principle ask whether a second purchaser was in good or bad faith” (McBryde 
(2007) para 17-24) but I would argue that, nevertheless, it is conceptually part of the law of fraud. 
1182
 There is sometimes thought to be one additional rule for its operation, namely that the prior right 
should be capable of being made real (Wallace v Simmers 1960 SC 255 at 260 per Lord President 
Clyde). However, this has been doubted, thus potentially giving the rule broader scope, see Gibson v 
Royal Bank of Scotland 2009 SLT 444; Reid (1996) para 695; Webster (2009). 
1183
 (1859) 21 D 940. 
1184
 neminem cum alterius detrimento et iniuria fieri locupletiorem, D 50.17.206. 
1185









There is one circumstance that, without much connection, real or personal, 
extends to many cases the maxim, quod nemo, &c., and that is fraud, deceit, 
or any sort of wrong.  If by means of a third person’s fraud one gains, and 
another loses, a Court of equity will interpose, to make up the loss out of the 
gain.  And this resolves into a general rule, that no man, however innocent, 
ought to take advantage of a tortuous act by which another is hurt. 
 
He then cited numerous English cases where the rule had been applied, and added a 




In all these authorities [English authorities], it is of course assumed that the 
innocent third party has given no consideration for that which has been 
obtained by the fraud, but is seeking gratuitous advantage. 
 
Lord Benholme makes a further connection with the “well-recognised maxim, that a 
gratuitous assignee is liable to be affected by the fraud of his cedent”
1189
 or nemo 
debet locupletari damno alterius. 
 
In effect, the court in Wardlaw made a connection between the criteria traditionally 
required for accessory liability, bad faith or a gratuitous transaction, and the 
enrichment principle. That connection was to mutate into the rule that “no-one 
should profit from the fraud of another”, which I refer to as the “fraud principle”,
1190
 
and which has received relatively little academic analysis although it appears in case 




                                                 
1187
 Ibid., quoting from Kames, Principles of Equity ((1767) p.107). 
1188
 Ibid. at 948. 
1189
 Ibid. at 955. 
1190
 I am grateful to Prof. Niall Whitty for the suggestion that the “author’s fraud” rule may be another 
manifestation of the fraud principle, mainly used in the context of property rather than money. 
1191
 An honourable exception is Whitty (1994) pp.252-267; Whitty acknowledges that he is not 
concerned with the question of the definition of fraud or bad faith (p.253), which this thesis addresses. 
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More recently in Smith v Bank of Scotland
1192
 Lord Clyde referred to both 
principles
1193
 as representing exceptions to the rule that fraud (including 
misrepresentation and undue influence)
1194
 committed by a third party was not 
relevant to reduce a transaction (in this case a contract of caution). And although he 
famously based his decision to reduce the contract “upon the broad principle in the 
field of contract law of fair dealing in good faith”
1195
 he used both principles to get to 
that point. It could be said that they represent the mirror image of good faith, namely 
penalising bad faith, a more familiar formulation in Scots law.  
 
 
(a) The enrichment principle 
The most striking aspect of the fraud principle is its similarity to the enrichment 
principle, that no-one should profit from the loss to another. The original formulation 
from Pomponius is neminem cum alterius detrimento et iniuria fieri 
locupletiorem
1196
 but the received version in Scots law has many variations. Stair 
adapted it so that no-one should profit from the “damnum” of another rather than the 
original detrimento or iniuria,
1197
 and referred to the Ciceronian version prohibiting  
profit from “another’s damage” or “the spoil of others”.
1198
 Bankton used the familiar 
enrichment formula of profit from the loss of another (jactura);
1199
 Erskine 
transliterated the maxim as being “a gainer to his neighbour’s cost”;
1200
 and Bell 
focused only on the gain side of the equation without reference to any corresponding 
loss or harm.
1201
 Kames also used the enrichment formula, but envisaged a wider 
principle which could reach to any kind of wrongdoing:
1202
 
                                                 
1192
 1997 SC (HL) 111. 
1193
 He refers to the fraud principle at 117; and the rule against offside goals at 121. 
1194
 Ibid. at 117. 
1195
 Ibid. at 118. 
1196
 Listed as one of the regulae iuris in D 50.17.206. 
1197
 Stair I.6.33 (in the context of obligations between minors and curators), again in I.8.2 (ex damno 
alterius). Damnum is later defined by Stair as “diminish[ing] or tak[ing] away something from 
another, which of right he had” (I.9.3). 
1198
 Stair I.8.6. 
1199
 Bankton, Institute, I, 9. 
1200
 Erskine, Institute, III,1,10. 
1201
 Bell, Principles § 538. 
1202




There is one circumstance, that, without much connection real or personal, 
extends to many cases the maxim, nemo debet locupletari aliena jactura; and 
that is fraud, deceit or any sort of wrong. 
 
It appears that the Scottish Institutional writers were prepared to adapt the original 
Pomponius maxim to their own purposes, depending on the degree of loss, harm or 
damage required.
1203
 We can also see a progression (or regression) in the way harm 
was conceptualised, with a gradual decrease in the standard of severity moving from 
Stair in the seventeenth century to Bell in the nineteenth. Stair’s use of damnum 
linked enrichment to the delictual standard used in his title on Reparation; Erskine 
and Kames more explicitly envisaged the harm to be financial or patrimonial (cost or 
loss); and by the time Bell was writing it was the enrichment which mattered with no 
mention of an equivalent loss.
1204
 The Institutional writers, therefore, formulated the 
maxim broadly and flexibly, but they did not use it in relation to fraud or dolus: this 
was a later judicial development.   
 
 
(b)  The fraud principle and the Scottish courts 
The fraud principle often arises in what would generally be considered cases 
involving principles of unjustified enrichment, but it is applied by the courts more 
generally in cases of fraud.
1205
 Gloag suggested it was a “liability closely resembling 
                                                 
1203
 Trayner cites the maxim as “No one should be enriched out of the loss or damage sustained by 
another”, describing it as “a maxim of the Roman law, founded upon equity, the principle of which 
has been adopted by the Scotch law”, the example given being negotiorum gestio (Trayner’s Latin 
Maxims (1993, 4
th
 edn.) p.377). 
1204
 Although the courts have not accepted Bell’s omission of loss, see Edinburgh and District 
Tramways Co Ltd v Courtenay 1909 SC 99 at 105-106 per Lord President Dunedin. 
1205
 Cases include Wardlaw v Mackenzie (1859) 21 D 940; Taylor v Tweedie (1865) 3 M 928; Gibbs 
v British Linen Bank (1875) 4 R 630; Clydesdale Bank v Paul (1877) 4 R 626; Houldsworth v City of 
Glasgow Bank (1879) 6 R 1164, aff (1880) 7 R (HL) 5; Thomson and Others v Clydesdale Bank Ltd 
(1893) 20 R (HL) 59; Mair v Rio Grande Rubber Est. Ltd 1913 SC (HL) 74; Price & Pierce Ltd v 
Bank of Scotland 1910 SC 1095; New Mining & Exploring Syndicate Ltd v Chalmers & Hunter 1912 
SC 126; GM Scott (Willowbank Cooperage) Ltd v York Trailer Co Ltd 1969 SLT 87; Royal Bank of 
Scotland plc v Watt 1991 SLT 138; M & I Investment Engineers Ltd v Varsada 1991 SLT 106 (OH); 
Universal Import Export GmbH v Bank of Scotland 1995 SLT 1318; Bank of Scotland v MacLeod 
Paxton Woolard & Co 1998 SLT 258 (OH); Subsea Offshore Ltd v Broom 2003 SCLR 309. 
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that resulting from the principle of recompense”,
1206
 and Lord Coulsfield more 
recently referred to it as “a principle analogous to recompense, namely that no one 
can profit from another person's fraud or breach of trust.”
1207
 However, there is a 
subtle difference in the mutation: no profit from another’s loss implies a two party 
situation; no profit from another’s fraud implies three parties – as well as the victim 
of the fraud, there is a third party who has gained from the actions of a fraudulent 
intermediary. 
 
Decisions on third parties and fraud in early Scots law were dealt with by the 
particeps concept, and that principle is clearly settled, as are the criteria for its 
operation. Indeed, in 1998 Lord Coulsfield affirmed, “It is a well settled principle 
that no one is entitled to profit gratuitously or knowingly as a result of a fraud.”
1208
 
However, the marriage between the particeps fraudis and the enrichment principle 
and its appearance in the form of the fraud principle date from the nineteenth 
century. The first statement of the fraud principle in its current form appears to have 
come in Wardlaw v Mackenzie,
1209
 discussed above. Some years later, it was 
formulated into a general principle by Lord Shand in two significant decisions 
shortly after he came to the bench. The most definitive statement, on which most 




a person cannot avail himself of what has been obtained by the fraud of 
another, unless he is not only innocent of the fraud but has given some 
valuable consideration. 
 
Lord Shand, like Lord Inglis in Wardlaw, was in fact quoting from an English 
judgment but this has subsequently become the standard formula, relied on 
                                                 
1206
 Gloag (1929) p.332. 
1207
 Bank of Scotland v MacLeod, Paxton, Woolard & Co 1998 SLT 258 at 272. 
1208
 Ibid. at 277. 
1209
 (1859) 21 D 940. 
1210




repeatedly in enrichment cases where there is an element of fraud.
1211
 Unlike the 
somewhat vague outline in Wardlaw, in Clydesdale Bank Lord Shand restated the 
specific criteria for the operation of the principle, namely to be innocent of the fraud 
and to have given value. The familiar criteria of bad faith and a gratuitous 
transaction, deriving from the particeps fraudis, have therefore been translated into 
modern legal concepts, most commonly the rule against offside goals and the fraud 
principle. 
 
Lord Shand also made clear that the principle goes beyond the law of principal and 
agent, or employer and employee; rather it is of general application.
1212
 Later 
qualifications of the rule suggest that it is not a delictual rule and therefore not 
competent to found a remedy in damages,
1213
 but that it is competent for actions of 
reduction or recompense. 
 
 
4. The Bad Faith Criterion 
The rule against “offside goals” or the doctrine of notice is a controversial, and 
somewhat anomalous, doctrine within property law and the legal underpinning of 
this type of accessory liability is little understood.
1214
 However, there is extensive 
evidence in case law that the third party is deemed to have behaved “fraudulently” if 
he has acquired a benefit either gratuitously or with knowledge of another party’s 
prior right or knowledge of another party’s wrongdoing.  
 
There has certainly been a resurgence of interest in bona fides in Scotland after Lord 
Clyde’s restatement of a good faith principle in contract law,
1215
 as well as academic 
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 Gibbs v British Linen Bank (1875) 4 R 630 at 634; M & I Investments v Varsada 1991 SLT 106 
at 108 per Lord Milligan; Bank of Scotland v MacLeod, Paxton, Woolard & Co 1998 SLT 258 at 272 
per Lord Coulsfield; Subsea Offshore Ltd v Broom 2003 SCLR 309 at 316. 
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 Clydesdale Bank v Paul (1893) 4 R 626 at 629. 
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 Houldsworth v City of Glasgow Bank (1879) 6 R 1164, aff (1880) 7 R (HL) 5. The Inner House 
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 However, prior to and post-Smith there has been considerable judicial 
reluctance to embark on any widespread adoption of the concept. Bad faith, on the 
other hand, is more comfortable territory. The general concept of bad faith was 
considered in chapter 2,
1217
 where it was shown that it usually amounts to private 
knowledge, or constructive knowledge where the third party ought to have been put 
on enquiry. The disputed territory is how far beyond actual (subjective) knowledge 
the principle extends. 
 
 
(a) What amounts to knowledge? 
In the context of the rule against offside goals it is clear that bad faith extends to 
constructive knowledge. In Rodger (Builders) Ltd v Fawdry,
1218
 the leading modern 




But fraud in the sense of moral delinquency does not enter into the matter.  It 
is sufficient if the intending purchaser fails to make inquiry which he is 
bound to do.  If he fails he is no longer in bona fide but in mala fide. 
 
Bad faith, therefore, does not require actual knowledge but can be inferred from the 
circumstances when it amounts to a failure to inquire or shutting one’s eyes to the 
truth.
1220
 This is a consistent principle in the property cases. 
 
 
(b) A due diligence approach 
It may be that the test of bad faith reaches even further than that as a logical 
extension of constructive knowledge towards what could be called a “due diligence 
                                                 
1216
 see, for example, the various contributions in Good Faith in Contract and Property Law (1999). 
1217
 See ch.2 pp.43-48. 
1218
 1950 SC 483. 
1219
 Ibid. at 499; the principle was established in Marshall v Hynd (1828) 6 S 384; Petrie v Forsyth 
(1874) 2 R 214; Stodart v Dalzell (1876) 4 R 236. 
1220
 Marshall v Hynd (1828) 6 S 384; Petrie v Forsyth (1874) 2 R 214; Stodart v Dalzell (1876) 4 R 
236; Rodger (Builders) Ltd v Fawdry 1950 SC 483; Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC (HL) 111, 
where wilful ignorance or putting one’s head in the sand is deemed to be “equivalent to knowledge” 
(at 113 per Lord Jauncey). 
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approach”. In Faulds v Townsend
1221
 neither restitution nor vindication of the 
property was competent because the horse was already dead, so the court examined 
the liability of the third party. Townsend had acted in bona fide without knowledge 
that the horse had been stolen. However, the very nature of the business was said to 
represent such a temptation for thieves that particular care and caution was 
necessary. The lack of such care in the purchase of the pursuer’s property was, 
therefore, wrongful, characterised simply as “fault” or “culpa quae equiparatur 
dolo”.
1222
 The court held: “Here there has not been reset of theft or mala fides, or 
actual dole, but there has been want of care and caution”.
1223
 That lack of care in the 
purchase and disposal of the horse was equivalent to culpa on grounds of public 
policy; therefore the defender was liable for the full value of the horse.  
 
The basis of the decision in Faulds has been characterised variously as a type of 
reparation
1224
 or as “sui generis”.
1225
 Whatever its correct classification, its rationale 
arguably stems from what has been suggested to be Stair’s third source of 
recompense,
1226
 which does not derive from property ownership or from delict but 
sits in a somewhat undefined area involving enrichment, third parties and “fault” 
which falls short of a delictual standard.
1227
 It may also be regarded as an aspect of 
secondary fraud since its function is to extend liability beyond the thief or the rogue 
to third parties who are “partakers” in the culpa.  
 
The cases discussed below rely on the concept of culpa lata,
1228
 as a general 
expression of fault by omission
1229
 and in this context it is equated to bad faith. The 
liability of the third party (in all of the cases discussed below the third party is a 
                                                 
1221
 (1861) 23 D 437. For the facts of the case see ch.1 p.56. 
1222
 Ibid. 439. 
1223
 Ibid. “Reset” in Scottish criminal law is broadly equivalent to handling stolen goods, see Criminal 
Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, s.51.  
1224
 Carey Miller (2005a) para 10.08, on the basis that bad faith equates to Stair’s notion of fraud. 
1225
 Evans-Jones (2003) para 9.33. 
1226
 See ch.3 pp.122-126. 
1227
 It may be closer to negligence, but again only implicitly. 
1228
 See earlier discussion in ch.2 pp.48-65. 
1229
 This weaker sense of culpa as fault appears to have been the meaning ascribed to it historically, 
rather than the “gross recklessness” which would be the modern translation. 
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business) is assessed on policy grounds in terms of whether or not they acted with 
reasonable care and caution. 
 
In Brown v Marr, Barclay & Others
1230
 the court had some doubts about the 
behaviour of a third party pawnbroker because Marr had pawned a substantial 
quantity of jewellery in a short period of time. According to Lord Moncreiff “[the] 
question arises whether the defenders exercised such reasonable care and caution as 
to give them a right to be considered as bona fide or innocent parties in this 
question”
1231
 or whether they acted so rashly as to deprive them of being in bona 
fide.
1232
 Good faith is not only a question of examining the third party’s state of 
knowledge, but it also involves scrutiny of behaviour according to an objective 
standard of “reasonable care and caution”. The pawnbrokers were considered not 
entirely free of blame because of the lack of enquiry into Marr’s title, but the court 




Similar reasoning can be seen in Jarvis v Manson,
1234
 in which an employee stole 
jewellery from her employer’s house, sold it to a retail jeweller and was subsequently 
convicted of theft. Meanwhile the jeweller renovated the jewellery and sold some of 
it in cash sales to unknown customers before being notified that the articles had been 
stolen. The owner was able to recover the property remaining in the hands of the 
jeweller because it was tainted with a vitium reale and, in relation to the property 
which had been sold, they argued they were entitled to the value of that jewellery 
because the jeweller was in bad faith. In fact, the court held there was no evidence 
that the defender was in bad faith or aware the articles had been stolen, a decision 
reached after careful examination of the circumstances in which the jewellery had 
been acquired. Hence, it was relevant that it was bought by two different partners, 
neither of whom was aware the other had bought from the same seller;
1235
 in 
addition, although the jewellery was bought for a price below market value, this 
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 (1890) 7 R 427. 
1231
 Ibid. at 437 per Lord Moncreiff. 
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 1953 SLT (Sh Ct) 93. 
1235
 Ibid. at 94. 
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alone would not be enough to put them in bad faith (the implication being that a low 
price combined with other factors might be); and finally, the jewellery was disposed 
of by cash sale where it was not usual practice to take the names and addresses of 
cash customers. Hence the jewellers’ lack of bad faith meant they were only liable in 
quantum lucratus for the profit they had made.  
 
This could be considered as an aspect of secondary fraud whereby the “participation” 
of the third party does not amount to private knowledge, but is a failure to take 
sufficient care in acquiring property which has been wrongfully taken from its 
owner. It is a more objective standard than private (subjective) knowledge and comes 
closer to the idea of constructive knowledge in that it imposes a duty, not merely of 




(c) The narrowing of bad faith 
However, things are less clear in relation to the fraud principle. In the same way that 
primary fraud underwent a process whereby the definition of fraud narrowed, so it 
appears that a similar pattern is perceptible in relation to secondary fraud.  In 
Thomson v Clydesdale Bank Ltd
1236
 a stockbroker absconded with funds belonging to 
investors which he had paid into his own account. The question was whether or not 
the third party (the bank) was liable to repay the funds. In a number of cases 
involving the fraud principle the difficulty lies in attributing knowledge to artificial 
legal persons, the mantra being that fraud is personal. And the court was conscious of 
commercial realities, for if banks had a duty to inquire about the source of all money 





[i]t is not enough for them to prove that the respondents acted negligently; in 
order to succeed, they must establish that the respondents knew, not only that 
                                                 
1236
 (1893) 20 R (HL) 59. 
1237
 Ibid. at 61. 
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the money represented by the cheque did not belong to the broker, but that he 
had no authority from the true owner to pay it into his bank account.  
 
Lord Shand, now in the House of Lords, held that a third party would be liable “only 
where it can be shewn directly, or as the reasonable inference from facts proved, that 
these parties were cognizant that the money was being wrongfully used, in violation 
of the agent's duty and obligation.”
 1238
 This is certainly a narrower test of bad faith, 
but it should also be noted that Thomson concerned the law of agency, as do many of 
the cases invoking the fraud principle, and more work needs to be done to establish 
the way in which breach of a fiduciary duty relates to a more general remedy for 
fraud. Admittedly, Lord Shand had earlier made the point that the fraud principle was 
one of general application,
1239
 but in later decisions he does not seem quite so 
convinced. 
 
The definition of bad faith is still very much an issue for the modern judiciary. At the 
very least there appears to be some disagreement. In Advice Centre for Mortgages v 
McNicoll
1240
 Lord Drummond-Young adopted the traditional test, affirming that 




Fraud in the sense of moral delinquency does not enter into the matter.  It is 
sufficient if the intending purchaser fails to make the inquiry which he is 
bound to do. If he fails he is no longer in bona fide but in mala fide…Thus 
implied or constructive knowledge, just as much as actual knowledge, will 
bring the principle into operation and render the second purchaser in mala 
fide. 
 
However, in another recent Outer House decision, Bank of Scotland v MacLeod, 
Paxton, Woolard & Co,
1242
 Lord Coulsfield took a considerably more restrictive 
                                                 
1238
 Ibid. at 62. 
1239
 Clydesdale Bank v Paul (1893) 4 R 626 at 629. 
1240
 2006 SLT 591. 
1241
 Ibid. at para 45. 
1242
 1998 SLT 258. 
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view. He had to consider the definition of bad faith in considerable detail in a 
complex fraud case where the pursuers were trying to recover funds paid out by a 
bank. The case before him turned on the knowledge of the bank and he asked “what 
the pursuers have to prove in order to show that the bank were not in bona fide”, 
claiming that existing Scottish authorities were of no help.
1243
 After reviewing 
Thomson in some detail, as well as English authorities including the “Baden 






It seems to me, therefore, that it must now be taken to be clear that dishonesty 
is an essential element in the establishing of liability against a third party in 
cases such as this. 
 
He does leave open the possibility of taking into account “evidence of acts or 
omissions which might be described as showing wilful blindness, wilful or reckless 
failure to ask questions, commercially unacceptable conduct or any other form of 
doubtful behaviour”
 1246
 to draw an inference of dishonesty, but nevertheless is 
insistent that “dishonesty or improbity”
1247
 are required.  
 
It appears that the spectre of Derry v Peek raises its head and threatens to emasculate 
secondary fraud as it did over a century ago for primary fraud. With respect, Lord 
Coulsfield only had to look across the disciplinary border to property law, or 
investigate the older sources, in order to give substance to the meaning of bad faith. 
He might even have thought to look to Stair’s Institutions. It is respectfully suggested 
that his pronouncements on bad faith are wrong. 
 
It may be that since the rule against offside goals is a much more established 
category of bad faith, with a good deal of consistency in the decisions of the courts, 
                                                 
1243
 Ibid. at 274. He is referring to New Mining & Exploring Syndicate Ltd v Chalmers & Hunter 
1912 SC 126; M & I Investment Engineers Ltd v Varsada 1991 SLT 106; Universal Import Export 
GmbH v Bank of Scotland 1995 SLT 1318; and Style Financial Services Ltd v B of S 1996 SLT 421. 
1244
 Baden v SG Developpement du Commerce SA [1992] 4 All ER 161. 
1245
 Ibid. 1998 SLT 258 at 275. 
1246
 Ibid. at 276. 
1247
 Ibid. at 276. 
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constructive knowledge is accepted in that context, but contested in the context of the 
fraud principle or in cases which appear to raise issues of unjustified enrichment. 
Since the fraud principle has become associated with enrichment, and since there is 
no settled view of how wrongful behaviour interacts with enrichment principles, that 
is perhaps unsurprising. The interface between the two remains a matter for the 
future as does the relationship between the fraud principle and cases involving 
indirect enrichment. However, again it would seem sensible to look at the matter in 
the round, to recognise that similar principles are at work, and to create a scheme 
which has consistency across the borders of private law.  
 
 
5. The Gratuitous Criterion 
Finally, although Stair does not couple together participation in wrongdoing with the 
requirement that the transaction be onerous,
1248
 the courts consider a lack of 
onerosity almost an aspect of participation in fraud. Transactions can be undone in 
relation to third parties who have acquired gratuitously even although there has been 




Reduction upon the head of fraud is good against gratuitous acquirers, tho’ 
not partakers of the fraud. 
 
From earliest times gratuitous transactions have been regarded with suspicion in 
Scots law. By contrast, Scotland is almost unique in recognising a gratuitous 
unilateral promise as a binding legal obligation, often thought to be the result of the 
strength of Scotland’s religious and moral heritage and the influence of canon 
law.
1250
 However, this is not a recognition that comes without safeguards and it is 
balanced against the “presumption against donation” with which it co-exists.
1251
 The 
effect of the presumption is to scrutinise gratuitous transactions and in some cases to 
                                                 
1248
 Stair does require onerosity, but it is discussed separately and is conceptually different from fraud 
in that it does not involve wrongdoing but the operation of a presumption in law against donation.  
1249
 Auchinleck v Williamson (1667) Mor 10282, also reported at Mor 6033 (Husband and Wife). 
1250
 Sellar (2000) p.262-266. 
1251
 For a recent treatment of donation see MacQueen & Hogg (2012). 
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reduce them if the circumstances suggest they have been entered into “fraudulently”, 
in the sense of taking advantage of a situation of inequality. As examined previously, 
this was a significant aggravating factor in the context of presumptive fraud, but it is 
also the second criterion for reduction of a transaction against a third party in the 
context of secondary fraud.  
 
There is extensive case law on gratuitous transactions,
1252
 particularly in relation to 
property titles. For instance, the courts looked for a “cause onerous and equivalent” 
to determine whether or not a passive title should be reduced.
1253
 In Boswell v 
Boswell
1254
 the question was whether “there was a considerable want of the 
equivalence of the price” in order to decide if the title was lucrative
1255
 or onerous, 
which looks remarkably like an evaluation of whether or not there was adequate 
consideration.  Some older cases also make an explicit link with presumptive fraud in 
these circumstances.
1256
 In Street v Mason
1257
 there was a competition between a son 
who was a gratuitous recipient and a creditor where it was argued that the father had 
known of his impending insolvency before granting the property to his son. The 
disposition was reduced on grounds of fraud. Another synonym which had the same 
effect was where a transaction was done sine causa,
1258
 consistent with the need for it 
to have an onerous cause. 
 
In terms of legal doctrine, the suspicion of gratuitous transactions and the 
presumption against donation are clearly close bedfellows of recompense. Stair’s 
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the obligations of recompense of what we are profited by the damage of 
others without their purpose to gift, or as the law expresseth it in quantum 
locupletiores facti sumus ex damno alterius …. It is a rule in law, donatio non 
praesumitur; and therefore, whatsoever is done, if it can receive any other 
construction than donation it is constructed accordingly….  Yea, trust is 
presumed rather than donation. 
 
In fact the whole idea of recompense is built on this principle (with exceptions for 
certain categories of “conjunct persons”). And it is in the very nature of the doctrine 
that it arises out of inequality – for Stair this is because a benefit has been received 
gratuitously, and in Scots law reciprocal performance is the norm rather than 
donation. Recompense, therefore concerns profit or gratuitous benefit and not 
property (or only indirectly insofar as profit is derived from it). It is also important to 
note that, by definition, receipt of such a benefit only arises from the unilateral 
actions of another: the defender is merely the passive recipient. Therefore, the 
onerosity of transactions becomes one of the tests by which their validity is assessed.   
 
Hence, enrichment scholars accept that the requirement of onerosity is part of the 
enrichment obligation, but are far less happy the accept the other secondary fraud 
criterion of bad faith.
1260
 Whitty identifies that the requirement for onerosity is part 
of enrichment law, but says that the bad faith element is “fault-based”
1261
 and indeed 
he questions whether Clydesdale Bank v Paul is a case of enrichment.
1262
 There is an 
alternative approach to the question, which is to say that both elements derive from 
secondary fraud, and in the cases in question the doctrine of fraud is being applied in 
an enrichment context. The criteria are the same wherever secondary fraud is found, 
be it in contract, property, enrichment or agency. Of course, the details are yet to be 
worked out, but it would be a logical solution to a systemic difficulty.  
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It is in relation to the gratuitous criterion that the fraud principle intersects most with 
indirect, or three party, enrichment cases, and many of those cases turn on the 
meaning of “gratuitous”.
1263
 It is a feature of this group of cases that there is no 
consistent meaning, and the definition appears to be decided on a case by case basis. 
So in New Mining & Exploring Syndicate Ltd v Chalmers & Hunter
1264
 the Inner 
House had to decide whether it was a gratuitous benefit when a partner in a law firm 
fraudulently obtained clients’ funds and temporarily credited them to the partnership 
bank account. Despite the fact that the credits had reduced the firm’s overdraft, the 
court held that “[t]he fact that the money has been deposited in the safe does not per 
se benefit the firm”.
1265
 It appeared to be a question of timing, in that the fraudulent 
partner had subsequently withdrawn the funds, indeed he withdrew more than had 
been deposited. In contrast to this fairly restrictive definition, in M & I Investment 
Engineers Ltd v Varsada
1266
 Varsada, who was subsequently convicted, applied 
fraudulently acquired funds to purchase a house in his wife’s name. When the 
transaction was challenged on the basis of the fraud principle the court held that he 
had donated the money to her, and the transaction was gratuitous,
1267
 despite the fact 
that she arguably obtained the benefit of a house purchased in her name.  
 
If the fraud principle is to be a helpful rule, more thought must be given to questions 
of definition, both in relation to bad faith and what constitutes a gratuitous 
transaction. These should not be arbitrary or discretionary definitions and there is 
adequate authority to give form and substance to the criteria for liability. Once again, 
the modern judiciary can be criticised for a lack of joined up thinking. In the recent 
case Advice Centre for Mortgages v McNicoll,
1268
 which was chiefly concerned with 
the two criteria in the context of the rule against offside goals, Lord Drummond-
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Young who was earlier quoted as having understood the scope of bad faith,
1269
 had 
more difficulty with the gratuitous element of the equation. He held that knowledge 





It seems that the consequences of the breach can also be visited on a person 
who acquires property gratuitously, or for a manifestly inadequate 
consideration, although so far as I can discover this situation has not been the 
subject of any decided cases outside the field of trusts. 
 
This is clearly not an accurate statement either of the law or of the cases coming 
before the courts. But since it is the bad faith requirement which is most contested in 
the rule against offside goals, and the gratuitous requirement most often in the “no 
profit from fraud” rule, unless there is a coherent approach across the spectrum of 
private law statements like this will be the consequence. 
 
 
6. A Brief Note on Secondary Fraud and Cautionary Obligations – from Smith 
to Smith 
Another important example of third party fraud can be found in the recent 
controversial “cautionary wives” decisions where the requirement that the creditor in 
a cautionary obligation act in good faith is, I will argue, an application of secondary 
fraud.
1271
 To illustrate the point, which again deserves consideration in much greater 
detail than space will allow, two decisions which are almost two centuries apart and 
both named Smith v Bank of Scotland, are briefly considered. 
 
In the first Smith
1272
 the House of Lords allowed reduction of a cautionary obligation 
on the grounds that the bank concealed the financial position of the debtor, i.e. a 
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species of secondary fraud. If it could be shown that the bank knew about his 
financial state and had not disclosed it, that would be enough to show mala fides;
1273
 
even having doubts about his circumstances and concealing those doubts would be 
sufficient.
1274
 Bad faith could also be constituted by taking advantage of private 
knowledge to someone else’s detriment. The equitable principle applied was that “it 
was agreeable to the doctrines of equity, at least in England, that no one should be 




More than a hundred and fifty years later, the same issues came before the court in 
the second Smith.
1276
 Once more a cautionary obligation was involved, and the key 
question was the extent to which the bank was in bad faith about the husband’s 
misconduct. Lord Clyde specifically made reference to authorities on the fraud 
principle,
1277
 and the idea of being a participant in wrongdoing,
1278
 which involved 
either bad faith or a gratuitous transaction. And in the context of caution, if the 
creditor suspected the transaction of being “tainted” in those circumstances he would 
be in bad faith if he did not make enquiry. Lord Clyde framed the principle in 
positive terms as an example of good faith, which places a positive obligation on the 
creditor “to take steps in the interest of the cautioner”.
1279
 It is interesting to note that 
he also alluded to other possible aggravating factors, all familiar from presumptive 
fraud or the modern law of undue influence, namely that “in relation to contracts 
between close relations the necessity for fairness and avoidance of undue pressure 
has already been recognised”,
1280
 and although in Scotland, unlike England, there is 
no presumption of undue influence in certain categories of relationship, in Scotland 
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Lord Clyde went on to recognise an active principle of good faith, which has since 
been controversial. However, the criteria he used and the authorities he relied on are 
part of the doctrine fraud in its secondary context, and Smith may have had a better 
structural fit within Scots law had he used bad faith instead of good faith. One other 
consequence of the change from the negative to the positive frame is that it was 
unfamiliar. Had Lord Clyde relied either on the rule against offside goals or the fraud 
principle, both of which were part of his construction of the good faith principle, it 
would have been more familiar territory for future decisions. As it is, the 
development of similar cases in the Scottish courts has been a steady process of 
erosion of the principle of good faith.
1282
 Almost all of the relevant criteria have 
subsequently been narrowed: the behaviour of the debtor;
1283
 what is required to 
show bad faith in the creditor; whether there is, therefore, a positive duty on the 
creditor;
1284





In all of these areas, the Scottish courts have narrowed the meaning and scope of the 
decision in Smith until it has become only a shadow of what it might have heralded. 
Lord Justice-Clerk Gill has even questioned whether it was correctly decided
1286
 and 
even academic commentators interpret the no profit from fraud rule as referring 
principally to fraudulent misrepresentation, which is to ignore large parts of the 
historical law of fraud.
1287
 If the essence of secondary fraud is participation, its scope 
can only be determined by understanding what has been participated in. Is it only 
fraudulent (in a secondary sense) to have knowledge of intentional deceit? Or would 
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participation in other unfair (in the older sense of “fraudulent”) dealings be equally 
sanctionable. It is clear that a better understanding of the scope and definition of 
fraud, even if it is regarded as a historical relic, would be helpful for a modern 
understanding of the fraud principle. And the sad tale of the cautionary wives does 
highlight the need for greater clarity of definition when we talk about fraud in either 









This thesis has challenged the current knowledge we have about fraud in Scots law. 
The existing narrative acknowledges that historically fraud had a much broader 
meaning than it has today, including the possibility that it could be inferred; that 
Derry v Peek had a significant impact by narrowing the definition of fraud to 
intentional deceit; that the law of error developed significantly in the second half of 
the nineteenth century; and that fraud operates in an anomalous way where three 
party transactions are involved. 
 
On the face of it, this thesis tells a similar story. It has demonstrated that, despite the 
ubiquitous mantra that fraud must be proved, up to the mid-nineteenth century there 
was an extensive concept of presumptive fraud and detailed analysis has been given 
of the categories where it was operative. The underlying conceptual basis of 
presumptive fraud, inequality, has been examined in a wider historical context to 
show the impact of scholastic thinking on Stair’s foundational account of Scots law, 
particularly on his treatment of the law of obligations. It has previously been pointed 
out that Stair was more concerned with obligations than with the assertion of rights; 
more concerned with the behaviour of the defender than the infringed rights of the 
pursuer.
1288
 This was, of course, entirely in keeping with post-Reformation Scotland, 
permeated with the moral imperatives of Calvinism. Stair’s religious convictions 
may, therefore, have made him more receptive to structural and substantive 
borrowings from Aquinas and scholastic moral theologians who were equally 
concerned with the internal forum and with questions of motive. 
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The important role that Derry v Peek played in relation to the Scots law of fraud is 
acknowledged in this thesis, but only as part of the story. It has been shown that even 
before Derry v Peek, the Scottish courts were beginning to lose confidence in fraud 
and were looking for alternative solutions, with the result that some of its functions 
were transferred to the law of error. The mischief being addressed was how the law 
should treat unintentional misrepresentation. Crucially this thesis presents the 
argument, in contrast to the views of most commentators, that unintentional 
misrepresentation was historically part of the law of fraud and not the law of error, 
and that fraud remains conceptually and structurally a more appropriate solution. It is 
not entirely clear why this development took place, and difficult over a century later 
to speculate with any degree of certainty. However, it is at least plausible to suggest 
that economic and social forces outside the law were partly responsible. The mid-
nineteenth century was an important period of change in Scotland and the combined 
impact of the Scottish Enlightenment and the industrial revolution was transforming 
the law, as well as wider society. The courts, often consciously, became part of the 
machinery for facilitating growth and commerce, and for rewarding entrepreneurs 
and company directors who took risks and who represented the agents of economic 
growth. Lenman points out that the message that growth was good, “rang from the 
pulpits”, and the paternalism of Kirk and state was giving way to the idea that 





It is perhaps no coincidence that the transformation of fraud went hand in hand with 
a period of trauma for the Scottish economy. Many of the cases considered in this 
thesis were actions by shareholders who were affected by the collapse of banks or 




By the end of 1845 there were 17 note-issuing Scottish banks and between 
1850 and 1878 the number fell to ten as a result of four amalgamations, one 
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carefully managed collapse disguised as an amalgamation, and two 
sensational crashes.  
 
The Western Bank collapsed in 1857 and the City of Glasgow Bank followed in 
1878. Both were “run on aggressive lines”,
1291
 and had over-extended their lending 
by offering higher interest rates than their more conservative Edinburgh 
counterparts.
1292
 The losers were ordinary shareholders and, in the case of the City of 
Glasgow Bank, there was the added complication of fraudulent behaviour by the 
directors of the bank, who had attempted to conceal problems by falsifying the 
balance sheets.
1293
 History repeats itself, they say, but in the nineteenth century there 
was no question of the government stepping in to bail out failing banks. Instead the 
courts were left to formulate policy and to attribute liability using the existing legal 
rules. Most of the actions raised by shareholders alleged fraud and misrepresentation 
and this is the context in which the mutation from fraud to error took place. One of 
the difficulties may have been a semantic one, because fraud sounds like (and is) a 
criminal offence
1294
 and many company directors were professional people, 
including judges and lawyers. It may have been a step too far for their 
contemporaries in the courts to label them fraudsters simply for an inaccuracy in the 
share prospectus or in the accounts.  
 
The final part of this thesis has attempted to create a new taxonomy of fraud and has 
argued that the “exception” which fraud represents in three party situations, such as 
the “offside goals” rule or the fraud principle, is a unified doctrine in itself. The dual 
criteria of bad faith and a gratuitous transaction – both categories within presumptive 
fraud – are remnants of the principle of inequality and it is only by appreciating the 
origins of these rules that they can be developed consistently with the rest of Scots 
law. 
 




 Campbell (1985) pp.112-114. 
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One phenomenon that is noticeable from an extensive study of the cases relating to 
fraud and misrepresentation is the gradual narrowing of the scope not only of fraud 
but of almost all the criteria associated with it, so much so that the Court of Session 
found its decisions regularly being reversed by London on grounds of equity. Scots 
law was losing the broad concept of fraud which had been used for centuries to deal 
with unwarrantable behaviour and in the process was losing the ability to call on its 
equitable jurisdiction to deal with substantive unfairness. Fraud was narrowed to 
intentional deceit; the culpa lata principle became “gross negligence” rather than a 
lack of reasonable care and caution; it was disputed whether a misrepresentor needed 
to have reasonable grounds for an honest belief in the truth of his misstatement or 
whether it could simply be asserted; and even bad faith is currently on the way to 
requiring dishonesty in the way fraud did over a century earlier. 
 
In his masterly account of the doctrine of notice in South Africa, Gerhard Lubbe 
makes a much wider comment on the need for theoretical work in private law:
1295
 
   
The temptation ... to address the problem of substance by developing a 
dogmatic instrumentalism which assigns particular problem areas to the one 
or other area of private law with reference to the supposed socio-economic 
functions of the various divisions of private law, does not, it is submitted, 
provide a satisfactory solution in all respects. 
 




The challenge, therefore, for any proponent of a productive doctrine, is the 
development of a methodology to ensure that any theoretical treatment of the 
law takes place in a manner responsive to the needs of society, the parties 
involved and the demands of justice.  
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It is submitted that this is no less true for Scots law except that there is precious little 
reference by our courts to the socio-economic functions of law other than the 
demands of commerce and the corresponding need for certainty (substitute rigidity). 
But the “dogmatic instrumentalism” of assigning cases to formalistic categories (as 
happened with the law of fraud) can be identified in other areas: the erosion of Lord 
Clyde’s “good faith” principle in a cautionary context and the requirement for 
dishonesty in the definition of bad faith are only two examples. It is possible to view 
developments in the law of fraud over the course of the nineteenth century as a 
dearth of legal science and an inability, or a refusal, to take an overarching view of 
how to achieve substantive fairness. However, and on the assumption that it is not 
controversial to suggest that part of the law’s function is to deliver fairness, balanced 
with certainty, legal scientists have to develop the rules, and the exceptions to those 
rules, in a way that is rational and historically consistent so that the law can develop 
in a coherent way (as well as the need to provide a reasoned explanation for the next 
generation of lawyers). The narrowing of fraud and the expansion of error was done 
in an irrational and historically inconsistent way: the end result is confusion that has 
lasted for a century. 
 
My final suggestion is that fraud needs a new name. It may be desirable to reclaim 
some of the territory that the historical doctrine of fraud encompassed, but it would 
not be realistic to think it could still be called fraud. The definitions are too well 
established and the connotations too negative. However resistant Scots law may be to 
an overarching principle of good faith, it is very familiar with bad faith, and that may 
be a good place to start. 
 
As this account of the law of fraud has demonstrated, from the time of Stair it was 
the delivery mechanism for substantive justice in Scots law. It acted almost as a 
moral arbiter of what was acceptable according to the mores of civil society as much 
as the application of legal rules. It could be argued that fraud in this wide historical 
sense was as close to a general fault principle as Scots law ever came. Fraud was 
Scottish equity at work. And all law needs equity, including Scots law, in order to 
269 
 
preserve the connection between law and justice, and to avoid the accusation that law 
is simply a body of complicated rules for the benefit of the legal industry.  
 




As the natural law is in aequo, so the positive law is in bono or utili: and 
upon these two legs doth justice move, in giving every man his right. 
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Appendix 1: The 1691 Glasgow University Library 
Catalogue 
 
This appendix provides a more detailed analysis of Glasgow University library 
holdings according to the 1691 catalogue, the earliest systematic catalogue still 
extant. The 1691 library catalogue was an attempt to consolidate the holdings at that 
time.
1298
 It is therefore likely to include the main collections of donations received up 
to that date. Dr. Stephen Rawles
1299
 is currently engaged in transcribing the entries of 
the 1691 catalogue and has created a searchable database of records. He was kind 
enough to provide a subset of this database, restricted to 1645, which allows a more 
accurate assessment of the library’s stock in the early 1640s. The 1645 subset 
contains all works from the 1691 catalogue which were published up to 1645. It is 
not possible to ascertain accurate dates of acquisition, so it remains possible that 
works published prior to 1645 may have been acquired after that date but before 
1691. However, we do know that there was an “extraordinary pronounced peak”
1300
 
in the number of works dating from the first three decades of the seventeenth 
century, suggesting a higher level of acquisitions at that time.    
 
Dr. Rawles’ work confirms the religious character of the library’s stock which 
“corresponds to the strong orientation of the University towards Divinity”.
1301
 A 
summary of the classification sequence gives a flavour: 
 
The first alphabetical sequence deals with the Bible, followed by what we 
would now call Biblical criticism.  The Greek and Latin Fathers follow, and 
then the Councils of the Church, then back to more patristics and ritual. The 
catalogue goes on to classify scholastics, then Reformed, followed by 
Catholic biblical commentary; "didactic" theology, perhaps equivalent to 
practical theology then lots of ‘polemic’ of various hues follows, and finally 
Church History. Non theological subjects commence the second sequence, 
with sizeable chunks of non-Church history and Philosophy. A 
"Miscellaneous" section follows, then the works donated by John Snell 
                                                 
1298
 Although only a book by book comparison with the lists of bequests in the Munimenta alme 
universitatis Glasguensis (Vol. 3, C. Innes, ed., Glasgow, 1854, 403-64), could rule out the possibility 
that some were omitted. Full details of the Concilia et Decreta classification of the 1691 catalogue are 
printed in Robertson (1981) pp.124-127. 
1299
 My thanks to Dr. Rawles for making this material available to me. A short summary of Dr. 
Rawles’ work is available on Glasgow University Library (GUL) Special Collections website as an 
illustrated exhibition, see http://special.lib.gla.ac.uk/exhibns/1691Catalogue/Introduction.html. 







(1629-1679), founder of the Snell exhibitions at Balliol College Oxford, and 




In the 1691 catalogue 191 pages are devoted to Theology and Divinity alone, and 
only 156 pages to all other subject classifications, for instance law, medicine, maths 
or philosophy.
1303
 Some basic statistical work on the number of books
1304
 within each 
classification makes this emphasis even more pronounced, since many of the 
“theological” pages are crammed full of entries, to the point where the writer has had 
to insert entries in margins and around the sides of the pages. This is particularly true 
in the sections on “Polemici” and Protestant biblical commentaries. The best stocked 
subjects in the 1691 catalogue are Polemici with 564 works, followed by Philosophy 
(353), Civil History (281) and Protestant Biblical commentary with 219 works. The 
section on Scholastici contains 173 works, still a sizeable collection. In contrast, 
Juridici has only 82 titles, Geography 95 titles and Medicine 100.   
 
Examination of the 1645 subset of the catalogue presents a similar picture for the 
period in which Stair may have made use of the library’s resources.
1305
 The subject 
classification with the largest holdings in 1645 was again Polemici (393 titles), which 









 It also included doctrinal treatises,
1310
 debates 
between Protestant theologians or works written to counter doctrinal heresy, both 
Roman Catholic
1311
 and Protestant sectarian debates.
1312
 The conflict which we know 
                                                 
1302
 http://special.lib.gla.ac.uk/exhibns/1691Catalogue/Classification.html. The full classification list 




 The term “books” is used in the loosest sense, since one catalogue entry may include up to 20 
pamphlets bound together, see http://special.lib.gla.ac.uk/exhibns/1691Catalogue/Stock.html. 
1305
 Any conclusions reached from this subset of the catalogue are tentative in that not all the works 
published prior to 1645 may have been acquired prior to 1645. But we can be certain that nothing 
published later than that date was acquired prior to it. Titles of books are given as they are listed in the 
catalogue. 
1306
 “Martini Lutheri Opera polemica in fol: Edit: Wittebergae 1546” (GUL Sp Coll Bi7-e.4); or 
“Martinus Lutherus de servo Arbitrio in 8vo Edit: Wittebergae 1535” (GUL Sp Coll Bk4-l.10). 
1307
 “Jo: Calvini Tractatus Theolog: in fol: Edit: Genevae 1576” (GUL Sp Coll Bm10-c.7). 
1308
 “Martini Buceri Defensio Christianae Reformationis in 4to Edit: Genevae 1613” (GUL Sp Coll 
Bn4-h.10); “Martin Buceri opera in fol: Edit: Basil: 1577” (GUL Sp Coll Bn4-b.1). 
1309
 “Jo: Knox concerning praedestination in 8vo Edit: 1560” (GUL Sp Coll Bi7-k.23). 
1310
 For instance “A Scholasticall discourse against the Idolatrie of the crosse in fol: Edit: 1607” (GUL 
Sp Coll Bm5-e.10); or “Mr Baxter upon Infants Baptisme in 4to Edit: Lond: 1635” (GUL Sp Coll 
Bk6-g.15). 
1311
 For instance “Tho: Beards Retractive from the Romish Religion in 4to Edit: Lond: 1616” (GUL 
Sp Coll Bl4-i.13); or “Christophorus contra Jesuitarum dogmata in 4to Edit: Francofurti 1608” (GUL 
Sp Coll Bh9-g.8) or “Cameron's treatise against the papists Gall: in 8vo Edit: Rochell 1617” (GUL Sp 
Coll Bi4-i.6). 
1312
 See “De Incarnatione Pedo-baptismo et Disciplina Eccl: contra Anabaptistos per Sam: 
Ampsingium in 8vo Edit: Lugd: Bat: 1619” (GUL Sp Coll Bi7-k.16); or “William Fulks Defence of 




raged within Scotland at this time, particularly the battle between Episcopalians and 




Next in terms of the size of the holdings up to 1645 is Philosophy (209), followed by 
Protestant Biblical commentary (181); Civil History (173) and Scholastici (110), 
similar in proportion to the holdings in 1691. Both the Philosophy and Scholastic 
sections would have been of particular relevance to the arts curriculum which Stair 
taught. 
 
The legal holdings up to 1645 run to 66 works and it appears that for the library 
classifiers juridici meant the civil law of Rome or canon law, plus a few Scottish 
works and a smattering of materials relating to foreign jurisdictions.
1314
 Most of the 
titles relate to Roman law, including Justinian’s Institutes,
1315
 the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis,
1316
 and other general treatments of canon and civil law
1317
 with commentaries 







 There is also a legal work by the scholastic jurist Luis de Molina, De 
Justitia et Jure.
1321
     
 
Scottish legal resources are limited to three titles, tw0 of which are collections of 
statutory materials,
1322
 the third a copy of Regiam Majestatem.
1323
 There is only 
marginally more English material - five titles, two of which are statutes of the 
                                                 
1313
 For instance “The Dew Right of Presbytrie by Mr Rutherfoord in 4to Edit: Lond: 1644” (GUL  Sp 
Coll Bi8-i.7); or “A defence of the Presbyterian church Goverment by Jo: Pagit: in 4to Edit: Lond: 
1641” (GUL Sp Coll Bk9-i.6). 
1314
 For instance, “The statutes of Ireland the first vol: in fol: Edit: Dublin 1621” (GUL Sp Coll q556, 
modern classification uncertain); or “Juris Civilis in Hispaniae Regis Constitutiones Tom: Primus in 
Fol: Edit: Duaci 1612” (GUL  Sp Coll Bm2-c.8); or “Stile and Practise of France Gall: in 12mo Edit: 
Paris:1552” (GUL Sp Coll Bh8-l.28). 
1315
 “Justiniani Institutionum Lib: Quatuor a Joa: Crespino in 12mo Edit: 1597” (GUL Sp Coll Bh6-
l.2); also see “Imperatoris Justiniani Vol: Continens Librum Authenticorum in novem Collationes 
Distinctum in Fol: Edit: Paris: 1529” (GUL Sp Coll Bi6-c.14). 
1316
 “Corpus Juris Civilis Justiniani cum Comment: Accursii Tom: Primus Continens Digestum Vetus 
in Fol: Edit: Genevae 1625” (GUL Sp Coll Bm4-a.6-10/BR.1.11, modern classification uncertain); 
“Codicis Sacratissimi Imperatoris Justiniani Libri duodecim cum Comment: Accursii et aliorum in 
fol: Edit: Genevae 1625” (GUL Sp Coll Bm4-a.6-10/BR.1.11, modern classification uncertain). 
1317
 For instance, “Lexicon juris Civilis et Cannoni in Fol: Lugd: 1574” (GUL Sp Coll Bn3-c.12); or 
“M. Antonii Cucchi Institutionis juris canonici libri quatuor Coloniae 1564” (GUL Sp Coll Bi2-l.28). 
1318
 by whom there are 5 works, including “Volumen Legum Parvum cum Comment: Accursi et 
aliorum in Fol: Edit: Genevae 1625 It: Ejusdem de Consuetudine feudorum” (GUL Sp Coll Bm4-a.6-
10/BR.1.11, modern classification uncertain). 
1319
 by whom there are 5 works, including “Bartholi Operum, Commentaria in primam et 2dam digesti 
noti Vol: 1. in fol: Edit: Lugd: 1552” (GUL Sp Coll Bl6-a.1). 
1320
 by whom there are 3 works, including “Baldi Comment: in Primam Digesti veteris partem in fol: 
Edit: Veneti: 1616” (GUL Sp Coll Bi3-a.8-10). 
1321
 “Molinaeus De Justitia et jure Tom: Primus et 2dus in fol: Edit: Colon: Agrip:1613” (GUL Sp 
Coll Bm6-c.8). 
1322
 “The acts of Parliament of the Kings and Queen Mary in fol: Edit: Edinburg: 1568” (GUL Sp Coll 
Bn6-d.8); and “The Acts of Some Parliaments of Scotland in King James the sexth his tyme in Fol: 
Edit: Edinburgh 1611” (GUL Sp Coll f418, modern classification uncertain). 
1323





 Only 16 more titles were acquired (or published) between 
1645 and the complete catalogue in 1691 for the Juridici section and only three of 
those were Scottish works: a later collection of Scottish statutory material
1325
 and 
two works by George McKenzie.
1326
 The latter represents the first doctrinal legal 
material on Scots law held by the library, and it was certainly acquired after Stair’s 





 as well as Puffendorf’s Elementa Jurisprudentia.
1329
   
 
The works of Aristotle dominate the philosophy classification including the 
Nicomachean Ethics.
1330
 The library held all of the major works of Aquinas,
1331
 
including the Summa Theologiae, together with numerous commentaries on Aquinas. 
Among these were familiar scholastic names, now associated with legal writing as 
well as theology and philosophy and somewhat inconsistently classified in the library 
catalogue. For example, Lessius’ De Justitia et Jure and de Soto’s De Iustitia de Iure 
are both classified with the scholastics,
1332
 while Molina’s work of the same title is 
with the Juridici.
1333
 Suarez’ complete works in fifteen volumes were available
1334
 
and he is represented both in philosophy and with the scholastics. 
 
                                                 
1324
 “The second part of the paralel or conference of the civill law Cannon law & comon law of 
England by William Fulbeck in 4to Edit: Lond” (GUL Sp Coll Bl6-i.23);  “Statuta Selecta 
Universitatis Oxon: in 4to Edit: Oxoniae 1638” (GUL Sp Coll Bi6-l.10); “Eirenarcha or the office of 
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Appendix 2: Thomas Aquinas and Viscount Stair: the influence of 
scholastic moral theology on Stair’s account of restitution and 
recompense 
 
The following article was published in the Journal of Legal History in 2008. It is 
reprinted with permission of the publishers. 
 
Reid, D.  Thomas Aquinas and Viscount Stair: the influence of scholastic moral 
theology on Stair's account of restitution and recompense. (2008) 29 Journal of 
Legal History, pp. 189-214. ISSN 0144-0365 (doi:10.1080/01440360802196661) 
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